The promotion of democracy is today a familiar feature of foreign policy, and an accepted part of the activities of international organizations. Should international law join in this move to promote democratic political arrangements? If so, on what basis, and with which of the many competingconceptions of democracy? Drawing on an eclectic range of source material, the author examines current debates about the emergence of an international legal 'norm of democratic governance', and considers how proposals for such a norm might be rearticulated to meet some of the concerns to which theygive rise. She also uses these debates to illustrate some more general points about approaches to the study of international law. In doing so, she seeks to defend an approach to international legal scholarship that takes its cue from the tradition of ideology critique.

The book examines current debates about the emergence of an international legal norm of democratic governance and also considers some of the wider theoretical issues to which those debates give rise. It asks should international law seek to promote democratic political arrangements? If so, on what basis, and using which of the many competing conceptions of democracy?

The period from the fifteenth century to the late eighteenth century was one of critical importance to British constitutionalism. Although the seeds were sown in earlier eras, it was at this point that the constitution was transformed to a system of representative parliamentary government. Changes at the practical level of the constitution were accompanied by a wealth of ideas on constitutions written from different - and often competing - perspectives. Hobbes and Locke, Harrington, Hume, and Bentham, Coke, the Levellers, and Blackstone were all engaged in the constitutional affairs of the day, and their writings influenced the direction and outcome of constitutional thought and development. They treated themes of a universal and timeless character and as such have established themselves of lasting interest and importance in the history of constitutional thought. Examining their works we can follow the shaping of contemporary ideas of constitutions, and the design of constitutional texts. At the same time major constitutional change and upheaval were taking place in America and France. This was an era of intense discussion, examination, and constitution-making. The new nation of the United States looked to authors such as Locke, Hume, Harrington, and Sydney for guidance in their search for a new republicanism, adding to the development of constitutional thought and practice. This collection includes chapters examining the influences of Madison, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Adams. In France the influence of Rousseau was apparent in the revolutionary constitution, and Sieyes was an active participant in its discussion and design. Montesquieu and de Maistre reflected on the nature of constitutions and constitutional government, and these French writers drew on, engaged with, and challenged the British and American writers. The essays in this volume reveal a previously unexplored dynamic relationship between the authors of the three nations, explaining the intimate connection between ruler and ruled.

This book fills a major gap in the ever-increasing secondary literature on Hannah Arendt's political thought by providing a dedicated and coherent treatment of the many, various and interesting things which Arendt had to say about law. Often obscured by more pressing or more controversial aspects of her work, Arendt nonetheless had interesting insights into Greek and Roman concepts of law, human rights, constitutional design, legislation, sovereignty, international tribunals, judicial review and much more. This book retrieves these aspects of her legal philosophy for the attention of both Arendt scholars and lawyers alike. The book brings together lawyers as well as Arendt scholars drawn from a range of disciplines (philosophy, political science, international relations), who have engaged in an internal debate the dynamism of which is captured in print. Following the editors' introduction, the book is split into four Parts: Part I explores the concept of law in Arendt's thought; Part II explores legal aspects of Arendt's constitutional thought: first locating Arendt in the wider tradition of republican constitutionalism, before turning attention to the role of courts and the role of parliament in her constitutional design. In Part III Arendt's thought on international law is explored from a variety of perspectives, covering international institutions and international criminal law, as well as the theoretical foundations of international law. Part IV debates the foundations, content and meaning of Arendt's famous and influential claim that the 'right to have rights' is the one true human right.

In 2010, Martin Loughlin, Professor of Public Law at the LSE, published Foundations of Public Law, 'an account of the foundation of the discipline of public law with a view to identifying its essential character'. The book has become a landmark in the field, and it has been said, notably by one of its major critics, that it now provides the 'starting point' for any deeper inquiry into the subject. The purpose of this volume is to engage critically with Foundations – conceptually, comparatively and historically – from the viewpoints of public law, private law, political, social and legal theory, as well as jurisdictional perspectives including the UK, US, India, and Continental Europe. Scholars also consider the legacy and continuing relevance of Foundations in the light of developments in transnational law, global law and regional integration in the European Union.

The promotion of democracy is familiar in foreign policy and the activities of international organizations. The author considers whether international law should join this move to promote democratic political arrangements.

This book analyses the right to religious freedom in international law, drawing on an array of national and international cases. Taking a rigorous approach to the right to religious freedom, Anat Scolnicov argues that the interpretation and application of religious freedom must be understood as a conflict between individual and group claims of rights, and that although some states, based on their respective histories, religions, and cultures, protect the group over the individual, only an individualistic approach of international law is a coherent way of protecting religious freedom. Analysing legal structures in a variety of both Western and Non-Western jurisdictions, the book sets out a topography of different constitutional structures of religions within states and evaluates their compliance with international human rights law. The book also considers the position of women's religious freedom vis-à-vis community claims of religious freedom, of children’s right to religious freedom and of the rights of dissenters within religious groups.