This article conducts a plant-level study of the factors affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow to a large opening economy endowed with specific factor advantages. We conclude that the distribution of FDI in Russian regions depends on market access and can be most notably described by the knowledge-capital framework. Factor endowments built by natural resources are more successful in explaining the location decisions of export-platform affiliates. The impact of natural resources depends on how the availability of these resources is measured. The results reject the crowding out effects of resource FDI and prove co-location mode, when service investments are attracted to resource-rich regions. Labour cost advantages better explain the preferences of non-trading service affiliates.

Not only does Russia have a poor record of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) since the advent of reform in the early 1990s, but well over half of the investment it does attract goes to four regions in the western part of the country. Overcoming this skewed distribution of FDI - undoubtedly a factor in the country's uneven regional economic development - is essential for furthering Russia's growth and transition to a market economy. Factors associated with market size, infrastructure development, and the policy environment seem to explain much of the observed variation in FDI flows to regions in Russia. Since its transition to a market economy began, Russia has not attracted much foreign direct investment (FDI). Inflows of FDI into Russia are much lower than those into other transition countries in the region, adjusted for population size and similar measures. Clearly, if Russia is to grow it must increase the level of FDI inflows, which is why a good deal of policy attention has focused on the problem. Equally important for achieving sustainable growth in such a large, heterogeneous economy is learning how to make the spatial distribution of FDI within Russia more even. Inflows are strikingly skewed. Close to 60 percent of FDI goes to four regions in the western part of the country - Moscow City, Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg, and Leningrad oblast - which account for only 22 percent of Russia's gross national product and only 13 percent of Russia's population. Only two of the other 85 regions account for more than 2.5 percent of the country's FDI and most account for much less. Surprisingly, neither policymakers nor observers and analysts have paid much attention to diagnosing the reason for this imbalance in FDI's distribution. Broadman and Recanatini try to empirically unbundle the determinants of FDI's regional distribution within Russia. They find that factors associated with market size, infrastructure development, and the policy environment seem to explain much of the observed variation in FDI flows to regions in Russia. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model that best explains cross-regional variation in FDI flows from 1995 to 1998 changes significantly after the 1998 default and ruble devaluation - suggesting the possibility of a "structural change" in the determinants of FDI after the 1998 crisis. This paper - a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to study structural reforms in the Russian Federation.

Since its transition to a market economy began, Russia has not attracted much foreign direct investment (FDI). Inflows of FDI into Russia are much lower than those into other transition countries in the region, adjusted for population size and similar measures. Clearly, if Russia is to grow it must increase the level of FDI inflows, which is why a good deal of policy attention has focused on the problem. Equally important for achieving sustainable growth in such a large, heterogeneous economy is learning how to make the spatial distribution of FDI within Russia more even. Inflows are strikingly skewed. Close to 60 percent of FDI goes to four regions in te western part of the country--Moscow City, Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg, and Leningrad oblast--which account for only 22 percent of Russia's gross national product and only 13 percent of Russia's population. Only two of the other 85 regions account for more than 2.5 percent of the country's FDI and most account for much less. Surprisingly, neither policymakers nor observers and analysts have paid much attention to diagnosing the reason for this imbalance in FDI's distribution. The authors try to empirically unbundle the determinants of FDI's regional distribution within Russia. They find that faactors associated with market size, infrastructure development, and the policy environment seem to explain much of the observed variation in FDI flows to regions in Russia. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model that best explains cross-regional variation in FDI flows from 1995 to 1998 changes significantly after the 1998 default and ruble devaluation--suggesting the possibility of a "structural change" in the determination of FDI after the 1998 crisis.

Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Economics - Case Scenarios, grade: A-, , language: English, abstract: Foreign direct investment constitutes a highly important part of contemporary world economy. Globalization of international economic relations have led to the situation in which many countries face the necessity to compete with each other and, thus, to enhance their competitiveness through attraction of foreign capital. FDI in this respect appears to be the most desirable option for many economies, as they are more stable than other forms of investment. This papers answers the question of why Russia attracted such a small amount of FDI since the beginning of the transition process. This analysis takes into consideration major determinants of FDI inflow to the country as well as factors of their spatial and sectoral distribution within the state.

This paper conducts an empirical study of the factors that affect the spatial distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) across regions in Russia; in particular, this paper is concerned with those regions that are endowed with natural resources and market-related benefits. Our analysis employs data on Russian firms with a foreign investor during the 2000-2009 period and linked regional statistics in the conditional logit model. The main findings are threefold. First, we conclude that one theory alone is not able to explain the geographical pattern of foreign investments in Russia. A combination of determinants is at work; market-related factors and the availability of natural resources are important factors in attracting FDI. The relative importance of natural resources seems to grow over time, despite shocks associated with events such as the Yukos trial. Second, existing agglomeration economies encourage foreign investors by means of forces generated simultaneously by sector-specific and inter-sectoral externalities. Third, the findings imply that service-oriented FDI co-locates with extraction industries in resource-endowed regions. The results are robust when Moscow is excluded and for subsamples including only Greenfield investments or both Greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions (M&A).

After becoming the 5th largest FDI recipient worldwide in 2008, foreign direct investments in Russia have largely been impacted by the big crisis. To put these changes in context, this paper starts with an overview of foreign investments in Russia from the beginning. Analyzing the source countries, we argue that round-tripping and trans-shipped FDI significantly mask the real sources. In terms of the regional distribution, high concentration is stressed. Reviewing the industrial breakdown of FDI in Russia, we point out that the fuel industry, mainly the oil production, except for 1999, has had a prominent or a leadership role only since 2003. Despite the Russian natural resource base, foreign investors are now motivated mostly by market-related factors. Before the crisis Russian macroeconomic, fiscal and debt policies improved the investment climate, while the growing state control has had a negative effect. Red tape, poor infrastructure, corruption and complex tax system remained major obstacles. Until the early 2000s, government made few steps to encourage foreign investment. Amid and after the crisis it was explicitly acknowledged at the highest level that resource based Russia needs the West, the foreign investments and knowledge for its modernization. The paper finally turns to investments from Hungary. Despite the low share of Russia in outward FDI from Hungary, there are a few significant investments of Hungarian-based investors, worth to be surveyed.