The liberal world order, a euphemism for American global hegemony, is crumbling at an accelerating pace. While its collapse is tangible, the outcome of such a collapse remains a matter of speculation and public debate. The US is desperately seeking to preserve the status quo, which rests primarily upon recognition of its military supremacy. For millennia, warfare has been a driving force behind changes in the geopolitical status of power configurations (whether of peoples, states or empires), and it remains so, today. Accordingly, short of actual warfare, the assessment (modeling) of relative military power plays an inordinate role in the determination of national status. Models of emerging changes in military capability range from relatively simple to extremely complex ones. Viewing the evolution of the current system of international relations outside the framework of actual, rather than propaganda-driven, military capabilities is not only useless, it is dangerous since states’ mistaken assessment of their own and other states’ military power can lead to misadventures and catastrophic mistakes. The United States’ efforts to preserve not just its dominance but the perception of its dominance are bound to fail for many important reasons, none more important than what is often misidentified in past American military-theoretical hypotheses about the future of warfare, known generically as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This book explains why those hypotheses are failing and will continue to fail, and addresses the real RMA. In the end, technological development in weaponry as a response to tactical, operational and strategic requirements defines not only a nation’s geopolitical status but determines the global order. Assessments of military capacity, if reality-based, serve as good predictors of the level of volatility in international relations and the level of violence globally. This book gives an insight into the evolution of weapons and the way they influenced international relations in the 20th and 21st centuries. It also defines Revolution in Military Affairs as manifested via policy, politics, and technology. It reviews some models which are useful in assessing the current geopolitical situation. This book also tries to give a forecast of the future development of warfare and the ways in which it is going to change the whole system of the international relations, hopefully towards a new geopolitical equilibrium.

This book studies the changes that have marked war in the Western World since the thirteenth century.

The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs updates two central debates in military history--the one surrounding the concept of military revolution, and the one on military affairs--whilst advancing original research in both fields. Only a handful of publications consider the military revolution and the RMA in tandem. This book breaks new ground conceptually and appeals to an exceptionally large and diverse readership. Comparative revisionist studies of the military revolution and RMA better enable us to comprehend the historical continuum and reveal the new RMA for what it is. And for what it is shortly to become. This book presents original contributions within the "epicentre" of the military revolution debate, the 1500s, with an emphasis on gunpowder revolution (offensively and defensively). The connections with the Revolution in Military Affairs are then made explicit by scholars, a practitioner, and an analyst, with an emphasis on airborne lethal autonomous weapons systems. This is a chronologically broad and unique methodological approach to a historical debate that begs for clarification as we enter an era where killer robots will almost certainly take from humans their monopoly on violence.

The contributors to this volume seek to explore the multi-dimensional (institutional, cultural, technological, and political) environments of several Asian states to determine the amenability of those host environments for the adoption/adaptation of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMS).

"This is an exploration, a speculation if you will, on the nature of war in the future. It explores in particular the symptoms of what appears to be a transition, in thought and practice, from a way of warfare that is centered on the notion of destruction to one that has paralysis as its "center of Gravity." At this stage of research, the idea that future war will be "paralysis-based" provides a framework for discerning, interpreting, and organizing a collection of seemingly disconnected phenomena. It is not an argument for a "kinder and gentler" way of war per se ..."--Introduction

In April 1994, the Army War College and the Strategic Studies Institute hosted the Fifth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme of this year's conference was "The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Jeffrey R. Cooper presented the following paper as part of an opening panel which sought to define the RMA. He urges defense planners to determine what strategic--as opposed to operational-- benefits might be derived from the RMA. He contends that making the internal reforms that will be required will be as challenging as coming to terms with the operational and strategic implications of the new technologies. The first requirement is to understand the parameters and dynamics of this particular revolution in military affairs. Mr. Cooper puts the RMA in historical perspective by discussing the relationships among technology, socioeconomic, and political change, and their implications for warfare during the Napoleonic era, the mid-19th century, and World Wars I and II. He argues that, in the past, dramatic technological change affected warfare in different ways. Mr. Cooper warns that by using the RMA to define a "technical legacy" we make three errors. First, such an approach could lead to a fruitless search for a "silver bullet" technology on which to build the RMA. Second, the focus on technology could shift attention away from the critical issues of purpose, strategy, doctrine, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation. Finally, committing the first two errors will compound the problem by wasting very scarce defense resources on new programs and projects which may have little or nothing to do with the strategic situation. Military professionals and defense planners alike need to remind themselves that while technology can provide new capabilities, the strategic equation is not necessarily driven by technological innovation.

Information dominance may be defined as superiority in the generation, manipulation, and use of information sufficient to afford its possessors military dominance. It has three sources: Command and control that permits everyone to know where they (and their cohorts) are in the battlespace, and enables them to execute operations when and as quickly as necessary; Intelligence that ranges from knowing the enemy's dispositions to knowing the location of enemy assets in real-time with sufficient precision for a one-shot kill; information warfare that confounds enemy information systems at various points (sensors, communications, processing, and command), while protecting one's own. Technical means, nevertheless, are no substitute for information dominance at the strategic level: knowing oneself and one's enemy; and, at best, inducing them to see things as one does.