"In February 2016, while testifying in a House Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch, a Barack Obama appointee, promised that her department would act with independence in investigating Hillary Clinton's usage of a personal email server during her tenure as Secretary of State. During that hearing, Congressman John Carter (R-TX) asked Lynch: If the FBI makes the case that Hillary Clinton mishandled classified information and put America's security at risk, will you prosecute the case? . . .[P]lease look the American people in the eye and tell us what your position is as you are the chief prosecutor of the United States. In response to this questioning, Lynch asserted that: [The matter] is being handled by . . . independent attorneys in the Department of Justice. They follow the evidence, they look at the law and they'll make a recommendation to me when the time is appropriate. . .This will be conducted as every other case. We will review all the facts and all the evidence and come to an independent conclusion as how to best handle it. And I am also aware of no efforts to undermine our review or investigation into this matter at all (Goldman 2016). Despite strong claims of prosecutorial independence, many Republicans complained that a Department of Justice run by Obama appointees could not impartially pass legal judgment on the Hillary Clintonemails matter. A June 27, 2016 meeting between Lynch and former U.S. President Bill Clinton would not help matters. The two privately talked for approximately 20 minutes on a plane sitting on the Phoenix Sky Harbor airport tarmac in a meeting described as unplanned and "primarily social." Despite the meeting's claimed innocuous content, it "caused a cascading political storm" for Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign and "provided fodder for Republicans who have accused the Justice Department of bias in its inquiry into Secretary Clinton's use of a private email server at the State Department" (Chozick 2016). Even Democrats expressed concerns about the meeting Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) remarked that "I do think that this meeting sends the wrong signal . . . I think she should have steered clear, even of a brief, casual social meeting with the former president"--

Federal prosecutors have immense power and discretion to decide when to bring criminal charges, what plea bargains to offer, and how to implement the federal government's legal priorities in their districts. While U.S. Attorneys take pains to emphasize their independence, we know relatively little about the extent to which politics colors federal prosecutorial staffing and decision making. The Politics of Federal Prosecution draws upon a wealth of data from 1990s to the present to examine the interplay of political factors and federal prosecution. First, the authors find that congressional and presidential politics affect who becomes federal prosecutors and how long those individuals serve. Second, the book demonstrates that signals of presidential and congressional preferences, along with local priorities, affect key prosecutorial decisions: whether to bring prosecutions, how to approach plea bargaining negotiations, and when to utilize criminal asset forfeiture to cripple criminal activities. In short, the book demonstrates that politics affects the behavior of U.S. Attorneys at nearly every stage of their service.

"Project of the American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Standards Committee, Criminal Justice Section"--T.p. verso.

The convergence of tough-on-crime politics, stiffer sentencing laws, and jurisdictional expansion in the 1970s and 1980s increased the powers of federal prosecutors in unprecedented ways. In Hard Bargains, social psychologist Mona Lynch investigates the increased power of these prosecutors in our age of mass incarceration. Lynch documents how prosecutors use punitive federal drug laws to coerce guilty pleas and obtain long prison sentences for defendants—particularly those who are African American— and exposes deep injustices in the federal courts. As a result of the War on Drugs, the number of drug cases prosecuted each year in federal courts has increased fivefold since 1980. Lynch goes behind the scenes in three federal court districts and finds that federal prosecutors have considerable discretion in adjudicating these cases. Federal drug laws are wielded differently in each district, but with such force to overwhelm defendants’ ability to assert their rights. For drug defendants with prior convictions, the stakes are even higher since prosecutors can file charges that incur lengthy prison sentences—including life in prison without parole. Through extensive field research, Lynch finds that prosecutors frequently use the threat of extremely severe sentences to compel defendants to plead guilty rather than go to trial and risk much harsher punishment. Lynch also shows that the highly discretionary ways in which federal prosecutors work with law enforcement have led to significant racial disparities in federal courts. For instance, most federal charges for crack cocaine offenses are brought against African Americans even though whites are more likely to use crack. In addition, Latinos are increasingly entering the federal system as a result of aggressive immigration crackdowns that also target illicit drugs. Hard Bargains provides an incisive and revealing look at how legal reforms over the last five decades have shifted excessive authority to federal prosecutors, resulting in the erosion of defendants’ rights and extreme sentences for those convicted. Lynch proposes a broad overhaul of the federal criminal justice system to restore the balance of power and retreat from the punitive indulgences of the War on Drugs.

Although administrative policy-making is overshadowed by the drama of judicial decision-making, it is a vital part of the judicial process. Peter Graham Fish examines the structure and legislative history of the various institutions of the federal judicial administration, their development, and their operation. He focuses on the lower courts to show that, although it is delimited by a network of formal institutions, the federal judicial administration is characterized by informality and voluntarism and depends, as he emphasizes, on the roles played by individual judges. As administrators, judges become deeply involved in politics, and Peter Graham Fish concentrates on the politics of the national judicial administration. Within this framework he raises enduring issues: Shall local federal judges be wholly independent or must they conform to uniform standards of law and administration? Shall administration be separate and diffused or united and centralized? Shall politics be superior or subordinate to so-called standards of "'efficiency"? Shall the interests of trial judges prevail over or be subordinate to the regional and national interests of appellate judges? How shall money, manpower, jurisdictional, and structural changes be distributed among the courts? To what extent, if any, should judges modify their behavior or institutions to meet external criticism? Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.