Combines military operational insight with rigorous analysis

How the United States pivoted from containment to regime change in Iraq between the Gulf War and September 11, 2001.

In the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a fair number of Americans thought the idea was crazy. Now everyone, except a few die-hards, thinks it was. So what was going through the minds of the talented and experienced men and women who planned and initiated the war? What were their assumptions? Overreach aims to recover those presuppositions. Michael MacDonald examines the standard hypotheses for the decision to attack, showing them to be either wrong or of secondary importance: the personality of President George W. Bush, including his relationship with his father; Republican electoral considerations; the oil lobby; the Israeli lobby. He also undermines the argument that the war failed because of the Bush administration’s incompetence. The more fundamental reasons for the Iraq War and its failure, MacDonald argues, are located in basic axioms of American foreign policy, which equate America’s ideals with its interests (distorting both in the process) and project those ideals as universally applicable. Believing that democratic principles would bring order to Iraq naturally and spontaneously, regardless of the region’s history and culture or what Iraqis themselves wanted, neoconservative thinkers, with support from many on the left, advocated breaking the back of state power under Saddam Hussein. They maintained that by bringing about radical regime change, the United States was promoting liberalism, capitalism, and democracy in Iraq. But what it did instead was unleash chaos.

While some scholars would argue that there was no “Iraq” before King Faysal’s coronation in 1921, Iraqi history spans fourteen centuries of tribal communities that endured continual occupation in their historic homeland, including Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century and subsequent Ottoman and British invasions. An Iraqi identity was established long before the League of Nations defined the nation-state of Iraq in 1932. Drawing on neglected primary sources and other crucial accounts, including memoirs and correspondence, Reclaiming Iraq puts the 1920 revolt against British occupation in a new light—one that emphasizes the role of rural fighters between June and November of that year. While most accounts of the revolution have been shaped by the British administration and successive Iraqi governments, Abbas Kadhim sets out to explore the reality that the intelligentsia of Baghdad and other cities in the region played an ideological role but did not join in the fighting. His history depicts a situation we see even today in conflicts in the Middle East, where most military engagement is undertaken by rural tribes that have no central base of power. In the study of the modern Iraqi state, Kadhim argues, Faysal’s coronation has detracted from the more significant, earlier achievements of local attempts at self-rule. With clarity and insight, this work offers an alternative perspective on the dawn of modern Iraq.

Much has been written about the events surrounding the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, especially about the intentions, principles, plans and course of action of US policy, but much less attention has been given to the consequences of US policy on Iraqi political and social development. This book provides an in-depth analysis of the impact of US policy on the social and political development of Iraq in the twenty-first century. It shows how not just the institutions of the state were destroyed in 2003, leaving the way open for sectarianism, but also the country’s cultural integrity, political coherence, and national-oriented economy. It outlines how Iraq has been economically impoverished, assessing the appalling situation which ordinary people, including women and children, have endured, not just as a result of the 2003 war, but also as a consequence of the 1991 war and the sanctions imposed in the following years. The book argues that the social, political, and cultural ruin that accompanied the Iraq war was an absolute catastrophe; that the policies which had such adverse effects were the foreseeable consequences of deliberate policy choices; and that those responsible continue to evade being made accountable.