Over the last decade, a new phenomenon has emerged within the international community: the Global Remittances Trend (GRT). Thereby, government institutions, international (financial) organisations, NGOs and private sector actors have become interested in migration and remittances and their potential for poverty reduction and development, and have started to devise institutions and policies to harness this potential. This book employs a gender-sensitive governmentality analysis to trace the emergence of the GRT, to map its conceptual and institutional elements, and to examine its broader implications. Through an analysis of the GRT at the international level, combined with an in-depth case study on Mexico, this book demonstrates that the GRT is instrumental in spreading and deepening specific forms of gendered neoliberal governmentality. This innovative book will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, international relations, sociology, development studies, economics, gender studies and Latin American studies.

Manuel Orozco moves beyond the numbers to provide a uniquely comprehensive, historically informed overview and analysis of the complex role of migrant remittances in the global economy. How do patterns of migration and remittances differ across regions? What kinds of regulatory and institutional frameworks best support the contributions of remittances to local development? What has been the impact of remittances on migrants and their families? Drawing on empirical data from five continents and firmly grounded in theory, Orozco¿s work reflects the evolution of our understanding about the importance of migrant remittances and the policies that govern them.

This volume provides theoretical treatments of remittance on how its development potential is translated into reality. The authors meticulously delve into diverse mechanisms through which migrant communities remit, investigating how recipients engage in the development process in South Asia.

Why do international migrants send money home? What are the implications of these monetary flows for developing countries? Long debated by economists and sociologists, these questions have received very little attention in the political science literature. This dissertation argues, however, that remittances--money sent home or "remitted" by international migrants--have significant implications for the study of politics. My main contention is that international migrants assume a more significant welfare burden when their home government's commitment to social insurance provision is in decline. Remittances, in other words, flow to compensate non-emigrating citizens for state retrenchment and the absence of a robust welfare state. I argue that this "transnational safety net" makes remittance recipients (RRs) less vulnerable to economic instability than neighbors who do not receive this money. All else equal, RRs should be more contented with their economic circumstances and have fewer economic grievances with which to politicize. The income-stabilizing and insurance effect of remittances, then, should reduce public pressure on the state, leaving RRs less motivated to mobilize against and punish incumbents for a poor economy when public safety nets are weak. Evidence comes from an original survey of 768 Mexican households, field interviews, and time-series data published by the Bank of Mexico. Statistical tests reveal that Mexicans abroad remit more to families that do not receive social benefits and send roughly $2.5 million more home for every $10 million reduction in spending on social programs by the Mexican government. Analyses furthermore reveal that despite being very poor on average, RRs tend to enjoy higher levels of income stability, are less likely to identify an economic matter as "the most important problem facing Mexico," and make more positive and optimistic assessments of the national economy and their own financial circumstances. In the 2006 Mexican presidential election, I find that RRs were up to 15 percent more likely to stay home on election day at the expense of the primary opposition party and significantly less likely to punish the incumbent party with a vote for either of the major opposition parties if they did vote.

This three-paper dissertation is about the relationship between remittances and political institutions in developing countries and how institutions shape emigration flows. I build on the political economy, democratization, and international migration literatures to theorize the political consequences from remittances. Drawing on underutilized surveys and extant cross-national databases, I show that remittance inflows alter citizen preferences on redistribution as well as government spending patterns on health and educational outcomes. In addition, I find that institutional quality in migrant-sending countries shapes emigration lows in times of economic crisis. My findings add to established theories of government redistribution, which are largely based on wealthier, industrialized countries, and the nascent field on the political economy of remittances. The first paper analyzes how remittance recipients view the role of the state and how citizen attitudes change due to fluctuations in remittance income. I use survey data from the most remittance-dependent countries in Latin America to see how preferences for redistribution changed during the course of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009. With the United States as the main source of remittances, the recession had ripple effects in Latin America. I find remittance receivers are more likely to favor redistribution policies following the economic crisis than before 2009. The second paper analyzes the political effects of remittances at the country level. I use country-level data to show that the relationship between remittances and government spending is conditional on regime type. Autocratic regimes show greater changes in spending on educational and public health from rising remittances. On the other hand, democracies show mild relationships between remittances and spending. I find that institutions will influence the ways government spending responds to rising remittances. The final paper argues that political institutions shape emigration flows conditional on economic performance. Using data from the American Community Surveys to measure Latin American migration into the United States, I find that countries with higher quality institutions will experience a brain drain when economic growth is low. I use the example of Venezuela in 2002-2003 when the country saw its intelligentsia emigrate. While economic performance is a strong factor explaining emigration flows, political institutions have the capacity to mitigate or exacerbate them. Together, these three essays show that remittances and migration flows have profound implications for domestic policy, state expenditures, and the consequences of institutional quality and economic crisis.

This volume provides theoretical treatments of remittance on how its development potential is translated into reality. The authors meticulously delve into diverse mechanisms through which migrant communities remit, investigating how recipients engage in the development process in South Asia.