Michael C. Webb explores a central question about postwar economic history: how has the growth of international markets affected the coordination of economic policy among nations? His analysis overturns the popular assumption that policy coordination has eroded as American hegemony has receded. Instead, he argues that the growing mobility of capital forced governments to abandon the strategies they had used in the 1950s and 60s to insulate monetary and fiscal policies from international influences, and to move toward more direct coordination of central economic strategies. Webb shows that since 1945 there has been a crucial shift in the pattern of international collaboration. He focuses on three types of adjustment policy: trade and capital controls, balance-of-payment lending and intervention in foreign-exchange markets, and monetary and fiscal policies. Noting that the first two types are no longer effective, he demonstrates that governments now rely more on monetary and fiscal policy coordination to regulate the global economy. As the expansion of international finance created greater turbulence in the global economy in the 1980s, the liberal system of international trade threatened to collapse. Webb examines in particular how the United States, Japan, and Germany took unprecedented steps to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, although domestic political obstacles—not any decline in U.S. power—limited the impact of this policy coordination. He concludes by assessing the effectiveness of these attempts to reconcile the goal of a stronger liberal system of economic exchange with the desire to maintain national autonomy.

The economic rationale for international monetary policy coordination is not strong. This is the conclusion, not only of the traditional Mundell-Fleming literature, but also the more recent New Open-Economy Macroeconomics literature on international monetary coordination. Yet a broader political economy approach illustrates that national currency policy can in fact impose non-pecuniary externalities on partner nations. This is especially the case with major policy-driven misalignments, which cannot easily be countered by other governments. For example, one country's substantially depreciated currency can provoke powerful protectionist pressures in its trading partners, so that exchange rate policy spills over into trade policy in potentially damaging ways. Inasmuch as one government's policies create these sorts of costs for other countries, and for the world economy as a whole, there is a case for global governance. This might include some institutionalized mechanism to monitor and publicize substantial currency misalignments.

The ideal introductory textbook to the politics of the policymaking process This textbook uses modern political economy to introduce students of political science, government, economics, and public policy to the politics of the policymaking process. The book's distinct political economy approach has two virtues. By developing general principles for thinking about policymaking, it can be applied across a range of issue areas. It also unifies the policy curriculum, offering coherence to standard methods for teaching economics and statistics, and drawing connections between fields. The book begins by exploring the normative foundations of policymaking—political theory, social choice theory, and the Paretian and utilitarian underpinnings of policy analysis. It then introduces game theoretic models of social dilemmas—externalities, coordination problems, and commitment problems—that create opportunities for policy to improve social welfare. Finally, it shows how the political process creates technological and incentive constraints on government that shape policy outcomes. Throughout, concepts and models are illustrated and reinforced with discussions of empirical evidence and case studies. This textbook is essential for all students of public policy and for anyone interested in the most current methods influencing policymaking today. Comprehensive approach to politics and policy suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduate students Models unify policy curriculum through methodological coherence Exercises at the end of every chapter Self-contained appendices cover necessary game theory Extensive discussion of cases and applications

When markets work, finding the right economic policy is easy. Government must merely ensure their smooth functioning. But, as Steven M. Sheffrin shows, trouble starts when markets fail to work. Economic failure is too often compounded by political failure in the guise of clumsy partisan regulations. Applying his analysis to seven critical problems - health care, Social Security and Medicare, the environment, the liability crisis, international trade, monetary and international financial policy, and the deficit - Sheffrin pinpoints the market failures at the root of these problems and the heavy-handed regulatory regimes that have exacerbated them, and shows how innovative solutions, sensitive to both market and political failures, can solve them.

What is the balance of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy more than half a century after its birth? Does it illustrate the virtues of the European model of coordinated capitalism, as opposed to US-style liberal capitalism? Or is it an incoherent set of instruments that exert diverse negative impacts and, like Frankenstein’s monster, seems to have escaped the control of its designers? The Political Economy of the Common Agricultural Policy does not criticize the CAP from the liberal standpoint that views most public interventions in the economy as bad for efficiency and welfare. The CAP has been costly to Europeans, both as consumers and as taxpayers, and has also generated a number of negative impacts upon third countries, but these costs and impacts have been more moderate than is suggested. This book proposes that the issue with the CAP is not a generic problem of coordinating capitalism but, instead, a more specific problem of low-quality coordination. The text argues that profound reform of the European Union’s institutions and policies is required to counter the rapid rise of a more Eurosceptical state of mind but – in the case of agricultural policy – history casts serious doubts on the capacity of the European network of agriculture-related politicians to lead such a reform. This key work is essential reading for researchers, graduate students, and master’s level docents of the Common Agricultural Policy and – more broadly – European Union policy and reform.