Throughout history, societies have had to decide whom to 'sacrifice' and whom to help in times of disaster. This volume examines how elite groups attempt to maintain power through the use of particular economic, political, and ideological instruments and how both ruling elites and common people endeavor to create meaningful traditions while enduring hardship.The Political Economy of Hazards and Disasters demonstrates how vulnerability is economically constructed, primary producers adapt their production regimes, how traders and merchants adapt their practices, and how political economic objectives play out in recovery efforts.

One of the primary responsibilities of governments is to shield citizens from life threatening events such as natural disasters. Previous work has demonstrated that voters electorally reward incumbents for the provision of disaster relief but not for investing in disaster prevention, leading incumbents to over-invest in relief spending even though investing in preparedness would yield large efficiency gains. This suggests that natural disasters offer governments a unique opportunity to improve their re-election prospects by providing generous disaster relief. Building on these findings, the present thesis first theorizes about and empirically explores which types of electorally motivated strategies guide the allocation of disaster relief. Using county-level data on natural disasters and relief payments in the context of U.S. presidential elections (1985-2008) the thesis shows that presidents channel relief aid to high-turnout counties in which they enjoy strong electoral support even when controlling for disaster damage. A subsequent analysis then investigates how citizens prefer policy benefits to be distributed among individuals experiencing natural disasters and to what extent presidents' distributive choices align with citizens' preferences. An exploration of data from a novel survey experiment with a representative sample of U.S. citizens suggests that citizens prefer allocations that reflect affectedness and need, but not electoral ties. Despite a notable degree of congruence between preferred and observed spending decisions, citizens' preferences do conflict with presidents' electoral considerations. Finally, the third part studies individual disaster policy preferences and investigates whether providing additional information about the effectiveness and efficiency of preventive measures affects support for preparedness spending. Two novel survey experiments with a representative sample of U.S. citizens indicate that i.

This book sets out to develop a new framework for the analysis and understanding of large natural disasters occurring in developing countries in the last three decades, and their effects on the economy and society. In doing so, it challenges many of the accepted wisdoms of disaster theory upon which policy prescriptions are built. A number of important issues are addressed and analysed within this framework. The reliability of current statistics about disasters is questioned, and the effects of disaster situations on the main economic aggregates are examined. The author also looks at the importance of indirect disaster effects, the motivations of disaster response, and the impact of both capital loss and disaster response on output. He assesses the minimum level of additional investment required to secure a balanced recovery, and the extent to which a society's structure and dynamics determine people's vulnerability to disasters. Finally, the overall effects of disaster situations on economy and society are considered. The author concludes that although disasters are primarily a problem of development, they are not necessarily a problem for development. What we should be looking at are the underlying social and economic processes within developing countries which structure the impact of natural disasters, rather than at disasters as unforeseen events requiring large scale intervention. An important feature of the book is the deconstruction of the notion of disaster. Disasters, the author points out, cannot be analysed in isolation from the particular social and political setting in which they occur.

This work combines research and empirical evidence on the economic costs of disasters with theoretical approaches. It provides new insights on how to assess and manage the costs and impacts of disaster prevention, mitigation, recovery and adaption, and much more.

Natural disasters occur in a political space. Although events beyond our control may trigger a disaster, the level of government preparedness and response greatly determines the extent of suffering incurred by the affected population. We use a political economy model of disaster prevention, supported by case studies and preliminary empirics to explain why some governments prepare well for disasters and others do not. We show how the presence of international aid distorts this choice and increases the chance that governments will under-invest. Policy suggestions that may alleviate this problem are discussed.