This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.International banking standards are intended for the regulation of large, complex, risk-taking international banks with trillions of dollars in assets and operations across the globe. Yet they are being implemented in countries with nascent financial markets and small banks that have yet to ventureinto international markets. Why is this? This book develops a new framework to explain regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and the periphery of the global financial system. Drawing on in-depth analysis of eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it shows howfinancial globalisation generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. It explains how specific cross-border relations between regulators, politicians, and banks within developing countries, and international actors includinginvestors, peer regulators, and international financial institutions, generate regulatory interdependence. It explains why some configurations of domestic politics and forms of integration into global finance generate convergence with international standards, while other configurations lead todivergence. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory decisions in the periphery, and the ways that governments and firms from peripheral developing countries manoeuvre within the constraints andopportunities created by financial globalisation.

Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.

Industrial policy has long been regarded as a strategy to encourage sector-, industry-, or economy-wide development by the state. It has been central to competitiveness, catching up, and structural change in both advanced and developing countries. It has also been one of the most contested perspectives, reflecting ideologically inflected debates and shifts in prevailing ideas. There has lately been a renewed interest in industrial policy in academic circles and international policy dialogues, prompted by the weak outcomes of policies pursued by many developing countries under the direction of the Washington Consensus (and its descendants), the slow economic recovery of many advanced economies after the 2008 global financial crisis, and mounting anxieties about the national consequences of globalization. The Oxford Handbook of Industrial Policy presents a comprehensive review of and a novel approach to the conceptual and theoretical foundations of industrial policy. The Handbook also presents analytical perspectives on how industrial policy connects to broader issues of development strategy, macro-economic policies, infrastructure development, human capital, and political economy. By combining historical and theoretical perspectives, and integrating conceptual issues with empirical evidence drawn from advanced, emerging, and developing countries, The Handbook offers valuable lessons and policy insights to policymakers, practitioners and researchers on developing productive transformation, technological capabilities, and international competitiveness. It addresses pressing issues including climate change, the gendered dimensions of industrial policy, global governance, and technical change. Written by leading international thinkers on the subject, the volume pulls together different perspectives and schools of thought from neo-classical to structuralist development economists to discuss and highlight the adaptation of industrial policy in an ever-changing socio-economic and political landscape.

Ten original essays examine the political and institutional factors that influence the initiation and efficiency of preferential credit policies in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil.

Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries. The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.

Examines the law and policy of financial regulation using a combination of conceptual analysis and strong empirical research.

There is little literature on the development of banking regulation in Nigeria, or the scope of powers of the Central Bank of Nigeria, which is its core banking sector regulator. The critical impetus of this book is to contribute to the literature of this area, with a detailed exploration of the Nigerian regulatory architecture. In addition, the book also engages in a comparative analysis with two emerging economies in Africa: South Africa and Kenya. It also considers the UK and the US as comparator jurisdictions in light of their regulatory responses to the global financial crisis of 2008. This book contributes to the ongoing discourse in this area by exploring, in detail, the theoretical underpinnings of regulation and supervision, to determine whether there is an understanding of what constitutes effective regulation in these jurisdictions. Given that Nigeria is the core jurisdictional focus, a historical account of banking exchanges from the pre-colonial era to more recent times is provided. Offering an understanding of how political, local and economic settings, in conjunction with the theories of regulation, have impacted and influenced regulatory development in Nigeria, the book engages in an examination of Nigeria’s historical experiences with bank failures, including the banking crisis it experienced in 2008. The newly enacted Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 2020 is also explored as part of this discourse. Through a critical analysis of the law, the book demonstrates that the Nigerian regulator has historically adopted a reactionary strategy, instead of a proactive and pragmatic approach, which is imperative for an effective regulatory regime. The outcome of this analysis is that there are lessons to be learned, and proposals are discussed in order to rethink the act of banking regulation.