This collection of specially written papers on F. H. Bradley's philosophy makes accessible the writings of one of England's greatest philosophers. The contributors, finding in Bradley's writings arguments that extend topics currently at the forefront of philosophical thought, aim to show the relevance of Bradley's work to contemporary issues in logic, metaphysics, and moral and political philosophy.

T. S. Elliot left Harvard during his third year of study in the department of philosophy and went to England. Forty-six years later he authorized the publication of his doctoral dissertation. Here we have a reprint of his sympathetic but not entirely uncritical study of the English idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley.

This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosopher F. H. Bradley, the most influential member of the nineteenth-century school of British Idealists. It offers a sustained interpretation of Bradley's Principles of Logic, explaining the problem of how it is possible for inferences to be both valid and yet have conclusions that contain new information. The author then describes how this solution provides a basis for Bradley's metaphysical view that reality is one interconnected experience and how this gives rise to a new problem of truth.

This book examines some of the central logical and epistemological doctrines of British idealist philosopher, F. H. Bradley. Through a detailed analysis of Bradley's doctrine of judgment and its relation to "feeling," Phillip Ferreira views as mistaken recent efforts to see Bradley as a writer in the tradition of anglo-empiricism. And, though the significance of Bradley's thought remains great, Ferreira contends that it stands at a considerable distance from mainstream philosophical analysis. Arguing against those who see Bradley as either a skeptic or a mystic, Bradley and the Structure of Knowledge places the thought of the nineteenth century Oxford philosopher where it was originally understood to belong—firmly in the tradition of rationalistic idealism.

In the early twentieth century, an apparently obscure philosophical debate took place between F.H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell. The outcome was momentous: the demise of British Idealism and the rise of analytic philosophy. Stewart Candlish examines afresh this formative period in twentieth-cenutry thought and comes to some surprising conclusions.