The Air Mobility Command (AMC) has faced a host of challenges in recent years that compromise its ability to cost-effectively fulfill the dual goals of meeting peacetime demand and maintaining wartime readiness. This report compares the peacetime tempo of air mobility operations during the Cold War with that of the post-Cold War period in efforts to pinpoint the challenges AMC faces as well as to suggest corrective measures that AMC should take to address these challenges.

Although the September 11 terrorist attacks and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have led the Department of Defense (DoD) leadership to change its terms of reference for sizing and planning its force, these events have not changed the dual objectives of U.S. peacetime air mobility operations: to meet peacetime demand and to maintain wartime readiness. This study compares the peacetime tempo of air mobility operations in the Cold War (the 1980s) with that of the post-Cold War period (the 1990s) and examines the factors and as sociated trends that can affect the Air Mobility Command's (AMC's) ability to meet these dual objectives in a cost-effective manner. Does AMC have the flexibility to generate enough flying hours for pilot training when flying demand is low? Can AMC man flying operations with the number of pilots Congress has authorized? How well does the actual ratio of copilots (CPs) to aircraft commanders (ACs) match what is authorized? Comparing peacetime operations in the 1980s with those of the 1990s, did pilots get less hands-on training during flights in the latter period? Was AMC less able to project airlift demand accurately in the latter than in the former period? Did AMC have to fly more missions with shorter advance notice? Has AMC been successful in using reimbursements from its customers to defray its operating expenses? We will first report our findings on these factors and trends and will then suggest measures to correct the problems we have identified.

The military leadership is concerned that the tempo of peacetime missions is interfering with training to support wartime readiness. The authors of this book developed a mission-day metric to measure the availability of crewmembers to fly peacetime missions after accounting for training.

Mobility forces dominate air operations in the post?Cold War era, at least statistically. Colonel Lenderman examines this trend and

Since airlift was first used as a tool of national security during the Berlin Airlift, it has grown to deliver passengers, cargo, and fuel to operations worldwide in support of national security. However, Air Mobility Command is the single organization that performs for air mobility for the United States. Cm%Currently, the Air Force has structured Air Mobility Command for war, yet this command performs operations during times when the US is at peace. Air Mobility Command performs missions to support US military operations in hostile environments as well as humanitarian operations in non-hostile environments. The number of operations requiring mobility air forces has been on the rise since the Cold War ended 10 years ago. These steady-state operations seem to over task mobility air forces. This study centers on the question: Can Air Mobility Command's force structure, organized for two major-theater wars, fulfill that requirement and perform the steady-state operations in today's strategic environment? This study finds that Air Mobility Command's force structure cannot meet its requirements for two major-theater wars and that the current force structure is inefficient in meeting the requirements for steady-state operations. First, this thesis presents a primer to acclimate the reader to the complex environment and multifaceted requirements of mobility air forces. Next, this thesis examines Air Mobility Command's current force structure as determined by Department of Defense requirements for war. Then this thesis also describes the various types of missions that Air Mobility Command performs on a steady-state basis and evaluates the importance of these operations in fulfilling US National Security Strategy. Finally, this thesis recommends action that the Air Force and the Department of Defense should investigate in order to improve their air mobility capabilities in.

This study applies lessons learned from air mobility’s pivotal role in Field Marshal Sir William Slim’s World War II Burma campaign to contemporary air mobility operations. The author begins by tracing the evolution of air mobility from its pre-World War I roots to the Second World War, noting how its development proceeded despite the lack of coherent, codified doctrine. Next the author assesses Slim’s Burma campaign and how the key elements of organization, training and leadership, apart from air mobility, proved critical to Allied victory. Building upon this, the discussion turns to air mobility’s contributions to Slim’s joint campaign. From this analysis, the author identifies the tenets of air superiority, organization and air mobility normalization as being critical and enduring airpower lessons from the Burma theater. The closing chapters offer a primer on contemporary mobility operations before arguing that modern air mobility practitioners must account for five key essentials: superiority across the air and space domains; proper organization that promotes relationship building at the operational level of war; normalization of the complete air mobility supply chain and its accompanying idea of “air mobility mindedness”; training focused on increased interoperability; and the vital role of leadership.

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, employing, and assessing air mobility operations across the range of military operations. Air mobility is a network of systems that combines airlift, airdrop, aeromedical evacuation (AE), air refueling (AR), and air mobility support assets, processes, and procedures into an integrated whole to support the transport of personnel and materiel. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directs the assignment of air mobility forces to the Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) and other combatant commanders (CCDRs). To deter threats against, or to assist in the defense or pursuit of United States (US) national interests, the Department of Defense maintains forces, organizations, and processes necessary to conduct air mobility operations. The National Air Mobility System (NAMS) is a broad and comprehensive system that provides the President, SecDef, and CCDRs with rapid global mobility. The mobility air forces (MAF) are those forces assigned to combatant commands that provide rapid global mobility and conduct air mobility operations. The MAF's four core functions are airlift, AR, air mobility support, and AE. NAMS consists of forces that perform intertheater, intratheater, and organic mobility operations. US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) possess air mobility assets that are capable of performing both intertheater and intratheater operations. A unique aspect of these operations is their reliance on Global Air Mobility Support System (GAMSS) and the worldwide command and control (C2) capabilities of the Air Mobility Command 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (618th TACC). The GAMSS is comprised of a limited number of permanent en route support locations plus mobile forces that deploy under the global reach laydown strategy. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.