In The Ontological Roots of Phenomenology: Rethinking the History of Phenomenology and Its Religious Turn, Anna Jani examines the common methodological background of phenomenology. Through attention to the phenomenon of being, the existential experience of religiosity can be phenomenologically described by the ontological difference between being and beings. Jani demonstrates that the methodological inquiries connect closely with the ontological source of phenomenology. First, she elaborates on the contributions of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Roman Ingarden, and Edith Stein from the point of view of Heidegger’s influence on the early phenomenologists from Husserl’s students. Second, she analyzes Heidegger’s reinterpretation of his own earlier thinking after the “turn,” which is formulated in the idea of the “new beginning of philosophical thinking” in the Contributions to Philosophy. In the context of clarifying the difference between being and beings, her third hypothesis about Ricœur’s critique of Heidegger reveals an ethical level. The primordiality of the ethical dimension of the action reveals the ontological foundation of the hermeneutical-phenomenological situation.

Phenomenology, together with Marxism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy, dominated philosophy in the twentieth century—and Edmund Husserl is usually thought to have been the first to develop the concept. His views influenced a variety of important later thinkers, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who eventually turned phenomenology away from questions of knowledge. But here Tom Rockmore argues for a return to phenomenology’s origins in epistemology, and he does so by locating its roots in the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant and Phenomenology traces the formulation of Kant’s phenomenological approach back to the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In response to various criticisms of the first edition, Kant more forcefully put forth a constructivist theory of knowledge. This shift in Kant’s thinking challenged the representational approach to epistemology, and it is this turn, Rockmore contends, that makes Kant the first great phenomenologist. He then follows this phenomenological line through the work of Kant’s idealist successors, Fichte and Hegel. Steeped in the sources and literature it examines, Kant and Phenomenology persuasively reshapes our conception of both of its main subjects.

Understanding the political and ecological implications of Heidegger’s work without ignoring his noxious public engagements The most controversial philosopher of the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger has influenced generations of intellectuals even as his involvement with Nazism and blatant anti-Semitism, made even clearer after the publication of his Black Notebooks, have recently prompted some to discard his contributions entirely. For Michael Marder, Heidegger’s thought remains critical for interpretations of contemporary politics and our relation to the natural environment. Bringing together and reframing more than a decade of Marder’s work on Heidegger, this volume questions the wholesale rejection of Heidegger, arguing that dismissive readings of his project overlook the fact that it is impossible to grasp without appreciating his lifelong commitment to phenomenology and that Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is an aberration in his still-relevant ecological and political thought, rather than a defining characteristic. Through close readings of Heidegger’s books and seminars, along with writings by other key phenomenologists and political philosophers, Marder contends that neither Heidegger’s politics nor his reflections on ecology should be considered in isolation from his phenomenology. By demonstrating the codetermination of his phenomenological, ecological, and political thinking, Marder accounts for Heidegger’s failures without either justifying them or suggesting that they invalidate his philosophical endeavor as a whole.

Von Hermann's Hermeneutics and Reflection, translated here from the original German, represents the most fundamental and critical reflection in any language of the concept of phenomenology as it was used by Heidegger and by Husserl.

Merleau-Ponty says in his Institution and Passivity lectures that he wants to "consider criticism itself as a symbolic form" instead of doing "a philosophy of symbolic form." This invites the possibility of an unconventional thought: If critical philosophy is a symbolic form, it cannot disclose its own limits and is, in fact, uncritical. Furthermore, the symbolic form can never itself be thought according to the terms of the criticism it produces but is always only constellated and matrixed within them—a symbolic form within both reflection and what it reflects on, within consciousness and the world. Thus, as Rajiv Kaushik argues, the symbolic form is another name for what Merleau-Ponty calls ontological divergence. Only now divergence introduces the question of a limit to both the subject and philosophy itself. This is nothing less than a psychoanalysis of philosophy. Kaushik's analyses of the matrices between space—imagination, light—dark, awake—asleep, and repression—expression reveal this symbolism in its form of divergence, its lack of origin and destination. Kaushik also argues that the phenomenology of symbolism must detour from the purely descriptive method. Drawing from Merleau-Ponty's recently published course materials, and attentive to his reliance on literature and literary language, Merleau-Ponty between Philosophy and Symbolism continues the living force of Merleau-Ponty's thought and develops his radical insight of the primacy of the symbolic form, even in an ontology that claims to be about the sensible and its elements.

It can be easily argued that the radical nature and challenge of Heidegger’s thinking is grounded in his early embrace of the phenomenological method as providing an access to concrete lived experience (or “factical life,” as he called it) beyond the imposition of theoretical constructs such as “subject” and “object,” “mind” and “body.” Yet shortly after the publication of his groundbreaking work Being and Time, Heidegger appeared to abandon phenomenology as the method of philosophy. Why? Heidegger was conspicuously quiet on this issue. Here, William McNeill examines the question of the fate of phenomenology in Heidegger’s thinking and its transformation into a “thinking of Being” that regards its task as that of “letting be.” The relation between phenomenology and “letting be,” McNeill argues, is by no means a straightforward one. It poses the question of whether, and to what extent, Heidegger’s thought of his middle and late periods still needs phenomenology in order to accomplish its task—and if so, what kind of phenomenology. What becomes of phenomenology in the course of Heidegger’s thinking?

Presenting the first step-by-step commentary on Husserl's Ideas I, Marcus Brainard's Belief and Its Neutralization provides an introduction not only to this central work, but also to the whole of transcendental phenomenology. Brainard offers a clear and lively account of each key element in Ideas I, along with a novel reading of Husserl, one which may well cause scholars to reconsider many long-standing views on his thought, especially on the role of belief, the effect and scope of the epoché, and the significance of the universal neutrality modification.