Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British Government’s strategy towards nuclear deterrent from 1945 to 1964. This volume, written with full access to the UK documentary record, examines the strategic nuclear policy of British governments after 1945 as they tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic capability, while also attempting to forge a close nuclear relationship with the United States. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations.

Volume II of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British Government’s strategy towards nuclear deterrent from 1964 to 1970. Written with full access to the UK documentary record, Volume II examines the nuclear policy of the Labour Government that took office in October 1964. Having decided to preserve the Polaris programme, ministers were nevertheless committed not to develop another generation of nuclear weapons beyond those in the pipeline, placing major questions over the long-term future of the nuclear programme and collaboration with the United States. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations.

Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."

"Cabinets and the Bomb publishes declassified Cabinet and Cabinet Committee papers that reveal the private debates between prime ministers, senior ministers, civil servants, scientists and intelligence analysts as they made decisions about Britain's nuclear weapons"--Back cover.

In this White Paper, the Government reaffirms its commitment to maintain Britain's independent nuclear capability by investing in a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines and extending the life of the Trident D5 missile. However, in order to ensure the deterrent system is the minimum necessary to provide effective deterrence, there will be a further 20 per cent reduction in operationally available warheads. The Government believes this decision balances the interests of national security against its undertaking to work towards multilateral disarmament and to counter nuclear proliferation, and it is fully compatible with Britain's international legal obligations. The White Paper discusses the policy context and sets out the reasons why decisions on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent system are needed now, as well as considering the various options and their costs, and the industrial aspects involved in building the new submarines in the UK.

Independence and Deterrence , commissioned by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, continues the story of Britain's atomic project begun in Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945 , and covers the years from 1945 to the first British bomb test at the end of 1952. Volume 1 studies policy making at the highest levels - the strategic, political and international considerations, the administrative and constitutional machinery. It shows how and why Britain decided to make atomic bombs and follows traumatic negotiations for Anglo-American atomic collaboration and their effect on Britain's relations with Europe and the Commonwealth. There is important material on Anglo-Canadian affairs. The book sheds new light on Britain's rights to consultation on any American use of atmoic bombs. Volume 2 studies the execution of the project. It analyses the cost of the project in money and manpower, the problems of health and safety, secrecy and security, the relationship between government and private industry. Above all it gives a 'nuts and bolts' description of the work of the scientists and engineers in carrying out - with great success - a complex technological project operating on the furthest frontiers of knowledge, which culminated in making and testing the Mark I weapon. There is an illuminating chapter on the origins of Britian's nuclear power programme and her choice of reactor. These chapters emphasise not only ecomomic, managerial and technological aspects, but also the great influence of personalities. This is the first peacetime official history to be authorised for publication. It has been written with free access to official documents and very little has been modified or omitted on public interest grounds. Most of the material is completely new. Ronald Clark wrote of Britain and Atomic Energy , '[Mrs Gowning] has been able to let cats out of bags by the litterful'. This is even more true of Independence and Deterrence.

En studie vedr. kernevåbens betydning og indflydelse på sikkerhedspolitik og magtbalance