This book presents a detailed analysis of the U.S. policy that was adopted toward Cuba by the Richard M. Nixon administration between January 20, 1969, and August 8, 1974. Based on governmental, as well as other, sources from both the U.S. and Cuba, this book examines the rupture where the policy of “passive containment” was complemented with a policy of “dirty war.” President Nixon attempted to reestablish a confrontational and violent path of action, and once again, Cuba was exposed to a “dirty war” consisting of different forms of aggressive terrorist activities. Since the conditions for this violent route had changed dramatically both in the U.S. and in Cuba, a policy characterized by a continuity of the economic and psychological warfare came to be the central one for the Nixon administration. This book is unique since it is written from a Cuban perspective, and it therefore complements and enriches the knowledge of the U.S.–Cuban relationship during the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, and the policy adopted by the Nixon administration. It is of relevance to everyone interested in the issue, and especially for students and researchers within the disciplines of history and political science.

This book presents a detailed analysis of the U.S. policy that was adopted toward Cuba by the Richard M. Nixon administration between January 20, 1969, and August 8, 1974. Based on governmental, as well as other, sources from both the U.S. and Cuba, this book examines the rupture where the policy of “passive containment” was complemented with a policy of “dirty war.” President Nixon attempted to reestablish a confrontational and violent path of action, and once again, Cuba was exposed to a “dirty war” consisting of different forms of aggressive terrorist activities. Since the conditions for this violent route had changed dramatically both in the U.S. and in Cuba, a policy characterized by a continuity of the economic and psychological warfare came to be the central one for the Nixon administration. This book is unique since it is written from a Cuban perspective, and it therefore complements and enriches the knowledge of the U.S.–Cuban relationship during the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, and the policy adopted by the Nixon administration. It is of relevance to everyone interested in the issue, and especially for students and researchers within the disciplines of history and political science.

A comprehensive study of the reasons for the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missile in the 1970s and the reasons why they agreed to eliminate it in the 1987 INF Treaty. In the process, Haslam examines the evolution of Soviet foreign and defence policy towards Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.

Fifty Years of Revolution features contributions from an international group of leading scholars. This unique volume adopts a nonpartisan attitude, a departure from this topic's generally divisive nature.

The first-ever full account of Nixon's extensive ties to the American Mafia, from a veteran White House reporter. Unbeknownst to most people even now, the election of 1968 placed the patron saint of the Mafia in the White House. In other words, Richard Nixon would go on to not only lead a criminal presidency; he would be totally indebted to our nation’s top mobsters. By 1969, thanks in large part to his long-time campaign manager and political advisor Murray Chotiner, a lawyer who specialized in representing mobsters, Nixon had participated in secret criminal dealings for more than 20 years with sketchy figures such as Mickey Cohen, Mob financial guru Meyer Lansky, Teamsters union chief Jimmy Hoffa, and New Orleans Mafia boss Carlos Marcello. And with Chotiner as one of his key behind-the-scenes advisors in the White House, Nixon's ties to the Mafia didn't end there. The Mafia’s President reveals a mind-blowing litany of favors Nixon exchanged with these sinister characters over decades, ranging from springing Jimmy Hoffa from prison to banning the federal government from using the terms “Mafia” and “La Cosa Nostra.” Drawing on newly released government tapes, documents, and other fresh information, The Mafia’s President by Don Fulsom offers a carefully reported, deeply researched account of Richard Nixon’s secret connections to America’s top crime lords.

Fidel Castro described Salvador Allende's democratic election as president of Chile in 1970 as the most important revolutionary triumph in Latin America after the Cuban revolution. Yet celebrations were short lived. In Washington, the Nixon administration vowed to destroy Allende's left-wing government while Chilean opposition forces mobilized against him. The result was a battle for Chile that ended in 1973 with a right-wing military coup and a brutal dictatorship lasting nearly twenty years. Tanya Harmer argues that this battle was part of a dynamic inter-American Cold War struggle to determine Latin America's future, shaped more by the contest between Cuba, Chile, the United States, and Brazil than by a conflict between Moscow and Washington. Drawing on firsthand interviews and recently declassified documents from archives in North America, Europe, and South America--including Chile's Foreign Ministry Archive--Harmer provides the most comprehensive account to date of Cuban involvement in Latin America in the early 1970s, Chilean foreign relations during Allende's presidency, Brazil's support for counterrevolution in the Southern Cone, and the Nixon administration's Latin American policies. The Cold War in the Americas, Harmer reveals, is best understood as a multidimensional struggle, involving peoples and ideas from across the hemisphere.

History is being made in U.S.-Cuban relations. Now in paperback and updated to tell the real story behind the stunning December 17, 2014, announcement by President Obama and President Castro of their move to restore full diplomatic relations, this powerful book is essential to understanding ongoing efforts toward normalization in a new era of engagement. Challenging the conventional wisdom of perpetual conflict and aggression between the United States and Cuba since 1959, Back Channel to Cuba chronicles a surprising, untold history of bilateral efforts toward rapprochement and reconciliation. William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh here present a remarkably new and relevant account, describing how, despite the intense political clamor surrounding efforts to improve relations with Havana, negotiations have been conducted by every presidential administration since Eisenhower's through secret, back-channel diplomacy. From John F. Kennedy's offering of an olive branch to Fidel Castro after the missile crisis, to Henry Kissinger's top secret quest for normalization, to Barack Obama's promise of a new approach, LeoGrande and Kornbluh uncovered hundreds of formerly secret U.S. documents and conducted interviews with dozens of negotiators, intermediaries, and policy makers, including Fidel Castro and Jimmy Carter. They reveal a fifty-year record of dialogue and negotiations, both open and furtive, that provides the historical foundation for the dramatic breakthrough in U.S.-Cuba ties.