This report examines the development of Army doctrine relevant to military operations short of war and noncombat operations and how doctrinal treatment of nonconventional operations affects the Army's capabilities in low intensity conflict (LIC) environments. The report concludes that progress toward a workable, integrated LIC doctrine has been slow, but is occurring. Doctrinal manuals currently in draft should be published without fundamental changes, enabling the Army to move toward a better doctrine for guiding its efforts in this area. It also concludes that the Army cannot continue to maintain its focus on conventional conflict as the primary ingredient of success to the exclusion of nonconventional capabilities. For the U.S. military to play a successful supporting role in peacetime or in conflict--whether through training of international military students, civil affairs, or various forms of civic action--U.S. troops themselves must be adequately versed in the precepts of internal defense and development, LIC and sensitive political environments, civil-military relations, and respect for human rights.

This report examines the Army's role in the Third World from a doctrinal perspective. Specifically, the report looks at the development of Army doctrine relevant to MOSW (military operations short of war) and NCO (non-combat operations) and how doctrinal treatment of nonconventional operations affects the Army's capabilities in low-intensity conflict (LIC) environments in developing countries. It considers the relative status of nonconventional operations to Army operations as a whole; the projected post-Cold War increase in Army combat and noncombat missions in nonconventional environments; and the broader issue of the Army's mission within the evolving post-Cold War peacetime strategy. The study also examines LIC doctrine and the overall utility of LIC as a concept, and compares the doctrine with new and renascent doctrinal concepts relevant to operations in LIC. The report concludes that progress toward a workable, integrated LIC doctrine has been slow, but it is occurring. Doctrinal manuals currently in draft should be published without fundamental changes, enabling the Army to move toward a better doctrine for guiding its efforts in this area. It also concludes that the Army cannot continue to maintain its focus on conventional conflict as the primary ingredient of success to the exclusion of nonconventional capabilities. For the U.S. military to play a successful supporting role in peacetime or in conflict, whether through training of international military students, civil affairs, or various forms of civic action, U.S. troops themselves must be adequately versed in the precepts of internal defense and development, LIC and sensitive political environments, civil-military relations, and respect for human rights. More attention must therefore be paid to the training and preparation of U.S. troops sent to LIC environments as advisors, instructors, or less probably, combatants. (1 table, 3 figures, 47 refs.).

This book argues that the US Army has made four significant shifts in the content of its capstone operations doctrine along a spectrum of war since the end of WWII: 1) in 1954 it made a shift from a doctrine focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare to a doctrine that added significant emphasis to high-intensity nuclear warfare; 2) in 1962 it made an even greater shift in the opposite direction toward low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine; 3) in 1976 it shifted back to an almost exclusive focus on mid-intensity conventional warfare content; 4) and this is where Army doctrine remained for 32 years until 2008, when it made a doctrinal shift back toward low-intensity unconventional warfare – five and seven years into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. Closely tracking each of these shifts, the author zooms in on specific domestic, international and bureaucratic politics that had a direct impact on these shifts.

From the American Revolution to the global war on terror, U.S. Army doctrine has evolved to regulate the chaos of armed conflict by providing an intellectual basis for organizing, training, equipping, and operating the military. Walter E. Kretchik analyzes the service's keystone doctrine over three centuries to reveal that the army's leadership is more forward thinking and adaptive than has been generally believed. The first comprehensive history of Army doctrine, Kretchik's book fully explores the principles that have shaped the Army's approach to warfare. From Regulations For the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States in 1779 to modern-day field manuals, it reflects the fashioning of doctrine to incorporate the lessons of past wars and minimize the uncertainty and dangers of battle. Kretchik traces Army doctrine through four distinct eras: 1779-1904, when guidelines were compiled by single authors or a board of officers in tactical drill manuals; 1905-1944, when the Root Reforms fixed doctrinal responsibility with the General Staff; 1944-1962, the era of multiservice doctrine; and, beginning in 1962, coalition warfare with its emphasis on interagency cooperation. He reveals that doctrine has played a significant role in the Army's performance throughout its history-although not always to its advantage, as it has often failed to anticipate accurately the nature of the "next war" and still continues to be locked in a debate between advocates of conventional warfare and those who emphasize counterinsurgency approaches. Each chapter presents individuals who helped define and articulate Army doctrine during each period of its history-including George Washington and Baron von Steuben in the eighteenth century, Emory Upton and Arthur Wagner in the nineteenth, and Elihu Root and William DePuy in the twentieth. Each identifies the "first principles" set down in manuals covering such topics as tactics, operations, and strategy; size, organization, and distribution of forces; and the promise and challenges of technological innovation. Each also presents specific cases that analyze how effectively the Army actually applied a particular era's doctrine. Doctrine remains the basis of instruction in the Army school system, ensuring that all officers and enlisted soldiers share a common intellectual framework. This book elucidates that framework for the first time.

Between 1991 and 1993, the Army formulated a fighting doctrine recast to fit the power demands of a new strategic world. This new power-order replaced the Army's earlier "AirLand Battle" doctrine, first issued in 1982. This monograph addresses several questions revolving around the rapid replacement, less than 2 years after its success in the desert war, of a recognized and successful fighting doctrine. Discusses the roots of U.S. Army doctrine and the antecedent developments leading to the Army's recasting of its key battle doctrine. Examines the mechanism of the process of change, the effects of the new doctrine and how it was implemented.