Toward a New Maritime Strategy examines the evolution of American naval thinking in the post-Cold War era. It recounts the development of the U.S. Navy’s key strategic documents from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the release in 2007 of the U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. This penetrating intellectual history critically analyzes the Navy’s ideas and recounts how they interacted with those that govern U.S. strategy to shape the course of U.S. naval strategy. The book explains how the Navy arrived at its current strategic outlook and why it took nearly two decades to develop a new maritime strategy. Haynes criticizes the Navy’s leaders for their narrow worldview and failure to understand the virtues and contributions of American sea power, particularly in an era of globalization. This provocative study tests institutional wisdom and will surely provoke debate in the Navy, the Pentagon, and U.S. and international naval and defense circles.

Mission Failure argues that, in the past 25 years, the U.S. military has turned to missions that are largely humanitarian and socio-political - and that this ideologically-driven foreign policy generally leads to failure.

Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.

“Engrossing and illuminating.” —Arthur Herman, Wall Street Journal When Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, the United States and NATO were losing the Cold War. The USSR had superiority in conventional weapons and manpower in Europe, and it had embarked on a massive program to gain naval preeminence. But Reagan already had a plan to end the Cold War without armed conflict. In this landmark narrative, former navy secretary John Lehman reveals the untold story of the naval operations that played a major role in winning the Cold War.

This book offers a detailed investigation of naval diplomacy, past and present, and challenges the widely accepted Anglo-American school of sea power thought. Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of the threat or use of force in the pursuit of policy since the dawn of strategic thought, the utility of seapower in operations other than war is poorly understood and articulated. Theorists have invariably viewed seapower in peacetime through the lens of hard power effects such as coercion and deterrence. Commentaries on engagement, interoperability and the forging of friendships are largely conspicuous by their absence. This book considers how all these strands of international politics can be better understood for use in the 21st century. The book explains and defines naval diplomacy, with existing theoretical frameworks being critically analysed. It reviews over 500 incidents from the post-Cold War era, drawing on this empirical evidence to determine that naval diplomacy remains a potent means of 21st century statecraft. It finds that existing understanding of naval diplomacy is insufficient and offers an alternative model, drawing on basic communication and stakeholder theories. The implications of the book relate directly to national security: naval deployments could be more effectively targeted; foreign activity at sea could be better understood and, if necessary, countered; finally, the ability of non-state actors to support national interests from the sea could, potentially, be better harnessed. This book will be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and International Relations.

As U.S. strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy's naval strategy system from the post-World War II era to 1994. Steven T. Wills draws some important conclusions that have relevance to the ongoing strategic debates of today. His analysis focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. Navy strategic thought was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high water mark in the form of the 1980s' maritime strategy and its attendant six hundred -ship navy force structure. He traces the collapse of this earlier system by identifying several contributing factors: the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, the aftermath of the First Gulf War of 1991, the early 1990s revolution in military affairs, and the changes to the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. All of these conditions served to undermine the existing naval strategy system. The Goldwater Nichols Act subordinated the Navy to joint control with disastrous effects on the long-serving cohort of uniformed naval strategists. The first Gulf War validated Army and Air Force warfare concepts developed in the Cold War but not those of the Navy's maritime strategy. The Navy executed its own revolution in military affairs during the Cold War through systems like AEGIS but did not get credit for those efforts. Finally, the changes in the Navy (OPNAV) staff in 1992 served to empower the budget arm of OPNAV at the expense of its strategists. These measures laid the groundwork for a thirty-year "strategy of means" where service budgets, a desire to preserve existing force structure, and lack of strategic vision hobbled not only the Navy, but also the Joint Force's ability to create meaningful strategy to counter a rising China and a revanchist Russian threat. Wills concludes his analysis with an assessment of the return of naval strategy documents in 2007 and 2015 and speculates on the potential for success of current Navy strategies including the latest tri-service maritime strategy. His research makes extensive use of primary sources, oral histories, and navy documents to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy created both successful strategies and how a dedicated group of naval officers were intimately involved in their creation. It also explains how the Navy's ability to create strategy, and even the process for training strategy writers, was seriously damaged in the post-Cold War era.

The Navy in the Post-Cold War World is the first book to invite the reader to think strategically&—that is, in means-ends terms&—about the navy in the new post-Soviet era. It provides a unique synthesis of strategic theory, defense analysis, and history. Colin Gray first explains how sea power &"works&"; explores the strategic relationship among sea, land, and air power, with particular attention to the course of a conflict viewed as a whole; and ventures boldly into the region of the meaning of space strategy for maritime power and the relevance of that power in the still emerging post-Cold War security environment. The Navy in the Post-Cold War World is unusual because it is written by an internationally recognized general strategic theorist and analyst rather than by a long-standing naval writer. Gray is thus better able to view naval issues in proper perspective. Gray delves deeply into the role of sea power as an enabling agent and team player in the overall enterprise of national and international security. He provides the most current assessment of what sea and space power mean for each other as well as envisioning the future of maritime-oriented defense.