The Mental Models Theory of Reasoning presents theoretical and empirical research on an area of growing interest, the status of mental models in deductive reasoning. As research in the framework of the mental models theory flourishes, this book answers a need to assess the contribution of the notion of training and content. It covers the central issues of propositional, relational, causal and probabilistic reasoning, and argumentation and development. In addition, this work presents data regarding strategies, argumentation, and the development of reasoning. Special features of this text include: *sharp theoretical analyses as well as important new empirical data offered by theorists who work in the framework of the mental models theory; *a critical and empirically driven account of content effects in conditional and linear reasoning; and *an original account on the influence of pragmatics on reasoning. The Mental Models Theory of Reasoning will be of interest to researchers and advanced students of cognitive psychology, and will be valuable to individuals working in Artificial Intelligence, as it highlights theoretical and empirical data on how humans use mental models when tackling deductive puzzles.

This book offers a unified theory of the major propertries of mind, including comprehension, inference, and consciousness. The author argues that we apprehend the world by building inner mental replicas of the relationships among objects and events that concern us. The mind is essentially a model-building device that can itself be modeled on a computer. The book provides a blueprint for building such a model and numberous important illustrations of how to do it.

Discover the essential thinking tools you’ve been missing with The Great Mental Models series by Shane Parrish, New York Times bestselling author and the mind behind the acclaimed Farnam Street blog and “The Knowledge Project” podcast. This first book in the series is your guide to learning the crucial thinking tools nobody ever taught you. Time and time again, great thinkers such as Charlie Munger and Warren Buffett have credited their success to mental models–representations of how something works that can scale onto other fields. Mastering a small number of mental models enables you to rapidly grasp new information, identify patterns others miss, and avoid the common mistakes that hold people back. The Great Mental Models: Volume 1, General Thinking Concepts shows you how making a few tiny changes in the way you think can deliver big results. Drawing on examples from history, business, art, and science, this book details nine of the most versatile, all-purpose mental models you can use right away to improve your decision making and productivity. This book will teach you how to: Avoid blind spots when looking at problems. Find non-obvious solutions. Anticipate and achieve desired outcomes. Play to your strengths, avoid your weaknesses, … and more. The Great Mental Models series demystifies once elusive concepts and illuminates rich knowledge that traditional education overlooks. This series is the most comprehensive and accessible guide on using mental models to better understand our world, solve problems, and gain an advantage.

This collection brings together a set of specially commissioned chapters from leading international researchers in the psychology of reasoning. Its purpose is to explore the historical, philosophical and theoretical implications of the development of this field. Taking the unusual approach of engaging not only with empirical data but also with the ideas and concepts underpinning the psychology of reasoning, this volume has important implications both for psychologists and other students of cognition, including philosophers. Sub-fields covered include mental logic, mental models, rational analysis, social judgement theory, game theory and evolutionary theory. There are also specific chapters dedicated to the history of syllogistic reasoning, the psychology of reasoning as it operates in scientific theory and practice, Brunswickian approaches to reasoning and task environments, and the implications of Popper's philosophy for models of behaviour testing. This cross-disciplinary dialogue and the range of material covered makes this an invaluable reference for students and researchers into the psychology and philosophy of reasoning.

Over the past decade, the question of whether there is a mental logic has become subject to considerable debate. There have been attacks by critics who believe that all reasoning uses mental models and return attacks on mental-models theory. This controversy has invaded various journals and has created issues between mental logic and the biases-and-heuristics approach to reasoning, and the content-dependent theorists. However, despite its pertinence to current issues in cognition, few cognitive scientists really know what the mental-logic theory is, and misapprehensions are prevalent. This volume is a comprehensive presentation of the theory of mental logic and its implications for cognition and development, including the acquisition of language. The theory offered here has three parts. Part I is the mental logic per se that contains a set of inference schemas. Part II is a reasoning program that applies the schemas in lines of reasoning, including a direct-reasoning routine and more sophisticated indirect-reasoning strategies. Part III of the theory is pragmatic, proposing that the basic meaning of each logic particle is in the inferences that are sanctioned by its inference schemas.

The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning brings together the contributions of many of the leading researchers in thinking and reasoning to create the most comprehensive overview of research on thinking and reasoning that has ever been available. Each chapter includes a bit of historical perspective on the topic, and concludes with some thoughts about where the field seems to be heading.

Global climate change policy has failed us all, but what is the reasoning that underlies this failure? Why are some people more disposed to reflect on confounding issues like climate change, recognise the danger, seek a solution, and act accordingly, more than others? This book is concerned with how we think and act in response to climate change. In particular, faced with deep uncertainty and the multifaceted complexities that characterise the climate change conundrum, how the various actors and institutions involved in the policymaking process make decisions that both aid and impede in the design and implementation of climate change policy. This book focuses on how these actors and institutions frame and use the knowledge available – under conditions of competing ideologies and interests – and synthesise it to form often-disparate mental models, or worldviews, that inspire them to become firm advocates of meaningful climate change action or indeed, sceptics that continue to downplay the threat, and hence the need for urgency. By exploring how we think about climate change and the disparate mental models we hold as a result, this book explores why humankind has thus far failed in its endeavours to solve the climate change problem. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of climate change, environmental policy and environmental psychology.