During the First World War, the British army's most consistent German opponent was Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. Commanding more than a million men as a General, and then Field Marshal, in the Imperial German Army, he held off the attacks of the British Expeditionary Force under Sir John French and then Sir Douglas Haig for four long years. But Rupprecht was to lose not only the war, but his son and his throne. In Haig's Enemy, Jonathan Boff explores the tragic tale of Rupprecht's war--the story of a man caught under the wheels of modern industrial warfare. Providing a fresh viewpoint on the history of the Western Front, Boff draws on extensive research in the German archives to offer a history of the First World War from the other side of the barbed wire. He revises conventional explanations of why the Germans lost with an in-depth analysis of the nature of command, and of the institutional development of the British, French, and German armies as modern warfare was born. Using Rupprecht's own diaries and letters, many of them never before published, Haig's Enemy views the Great War through the eyes of one of Germany's leading generals, shedding new light on many of the controversies of the Western Front. The picture which emerges is far removed from the sterile stalemate of myth. Instead, Boff re-draws the Western Front as a highly dynamic battlespace, both physical and intellectual, where three armies struggled not only to out-fight, but also to out-think, their enemy. The consequences of falling behind in the race to adapt would be more terrible than ever imagined.

Prince Bismarck's greatness as a statesman and his imperishable services to Prussia and Germany are historical facts of such tremendous significance that there is doubtless no man in existence, whatever his party affiliations, who would dare to place them in question. For this very reason alone it is stupid to accuse me of not having recognized the greatness of Prince Bismarck. The opposite is the truth. I revered and idolized him. Nor could it be otherwise. It should be borne in mind with what generation I grew up—the generation of the devotees of Bismarck. He was the creator of the German Empire, the paladin of my grandfather, and all of us considered him the greatest statesman of his day and were proud that he was a German. Bismarck was the idol in my temple, whom I worshiped. But monarchs also are human beings of flesh and blood, hence they, too, are exposed to the influences emanating from the conduct of others; therefore, looking at the matter from a human point of view, one will understand how Prince Bismarck, by his fight against me, himself destroyed, with heavy blows, the idol of which I have spoken. But my reverence for Bismarck, the great statesman, remained unaltered. While I was still Prince of Prussia I often thought to myself: "I hope that the great Chancellor will live for many years yet, since I should be safe if I could govern with him." But my reverence for the great statesman was not such as to make me take upon my own shoulders, when I became Emperor, political plans or actions of the Prince which I considered mistakes. Even the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was, to my way of thinking, a mistake, likewise the "Kulturkampf." Moreover, the constitution of the Empire was drawn up so as to fit in with Bismarck's extraordinary preponderance as a statesman; the big cuirassier boots did not fit every man. Then came the labor-protective legislation. I most deeply deplored the dispute which grew out of this, but, at that time, it was necessary for me to take the road to compromise, which has generally been my road both on domestic and foreign politics. For this reason I could not wage the open warfare against the Social Democrats which the Prince desired. Nevertheless, this quarrel about political measures cannot lessen my admiration for the greatness of Bismarck as a statesman; he remains the creator of the German Empire, and surely no one man need have done more for his country than that. Owing to the fact that the great matter of unifying the Empire was always before my eyes, I did not allow myself to be influenced by the agitations which were the commonplaces of those days. In like manner, the fact that Bismarck was called the majordomo of the Hohenzollerns could not shake my trust in the Prince, although he, perhaps, had thoughts of a political tradition for his family. As evidence of this, he felt unhappy, for instance, that his son Bill felt no interest in politics and wished to pass on his power to Herbert.

Because of his foppish and dandified appearance, emphasised by the cigarette holder he always used, the Crown Prince was regarded by the British during the Great War as a figure of ridicule, known to them as Little Willy . He was born in Potsdam on 6 May 1882, the eldest of Kaiser, and his memoirs begin with his childhood and early years and the development of his relations with his father, a somewhat remote figure though he notes that as time went on he often found himself being approached to use his position to make representations to the Kaiser. He was commissioned into the First Foot Guards and later was given command of a squadron of the Garde du Corps (the elite cavalry regiment) and then, to broaden his military experience, he took command of a battery of the 1st Regiment of Field Artillery and finally he was appointed commanding officer of the Life Guard Hussar Regiment - the Death s Head Hussars. When war came he was given command of the Fifth Army with General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf as his chief of staff, and it was his army that launched the Verdun offensive in February 1916 . As you read on the more it becomes clear trhat he was, in fact, far from his caricature. He was well aware of the enormous prestige attached to his person as son of the All-Highest and he did not hesitate to make use of it, in the political and military scene. He played no small part in the downfall of the Chancellor, von Bethman Hollweg, in 1917. In the aftermath of Ludendorff s resignation he urged the Kaiser not to appoint Groener in his place, a man he regarded as a defeatist whom he disliked and mistrusted. He also maintained that the German army was not defeated at the Marne; it was withdrawn by its leaders. The battle was lost because the High Command gave it up as lost. When Moltke s emissary, Lt Col von Hentsch, doing his rounds of the Army commanders ordering them to fall back, arrived at Fifth Army HQ, the Crown Prince refused point blank to comply without a written authority, which Hentsch did not have. And even when von Moltke himself turned up, struggling to repress his tears and demanded the instant withdrawal of Fifth Army, Wilhelm, after a lengthy argument still refused to go until he was ready. Moltke, apparently, left in tears. The imagination boggles at the thought of Haig tearfully imploring Rawlinson to obey orders, and the latter standing there, arms folded and saying: Shan t!

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