Pearl Harbor will long stand out in mens minds as an example of the results of basic unpreparedness of a peace loving nation, of highly efficient treacherous surprise attack and of the resulting unification of America into a single tidal wave of purpose to victory. Therefore, all will be interested in this unique narrative by Admiral Wallin. The Navy has long needed a succinct account of the salvage operations at Pearl Harbor that miraculously resurrected what appeared to be a forever shattered fleet. Admiral Wallin agreed to undertake the job. He was exactly the right man for it _ in talent, in perception, and in experience. He had served intimately with Admiral Nimitz and with Admiral Halsey in the South Pacific, has commanded three different Navy Yards, and was a highly successful Chief of the Bureau of Ships. On 7 December 1941 the then Captain Wallin was serving at Pearl Harbor. He witnessed the events of that shattering and unifying "Day of Infamy." His mind began to race at high speeds at once on the problems and means of getting the broken fleet back into service for its giant task. Unless the United States regained control of the sea, even greater disaster loomed. Without victory at sea, tyranny soon would surely rule all Asia and Europe. In a matter of time it would surely rule the Americas. Captain Wallin salvaged most of the broken Pearl Harbor fleet that went on to figure prominently in the United States Navys victory. So the account he masterfully tells covers what he masterfully accomplished. The United States owes him an unpayable debt for this high service among many others in his long career.

This is the story of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence (COMINT) effort between 1924 and 1941. It races the building of a program, under the Director of Naval Communications (OP-20), which extracted both radio and traffic intelligence from foreign military, commercial, and diplomatic communications. It shows the development of a small but remarkable organization (OP-20-G) which, by 1937, could clearly see the military, political, and even the international implications of effective cryptography and successful cryptanalysis at a time when radio communications were passing from infancy to childhood and Navy war planning was restricted to tactical situations. It also illustrates an organization plagues from its inception by shortages in money, manpower, and equipment, total absence of a secure, dedicated communications system, little real support or tasking from higher command authorities, and major imbalances between collection and processing capabilities. It explains how, in 1941, as a result of these problems, compounded by the stresses and exigencies of the time, the effort misplaced its focus from Japanese Navy traffic to Japanese diplomatic messages. Had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the Japanese naval messages rather than Japanese diplomatic traffic, the United States would have had a much clearer picture of the Japanese military buildup and, with the warning provided by these messages, might have avoided the disaster of Pearl Harbor.

'Magic' was the name given to the American decoding of the secret Japanese codes used in diplomatic communications before and during the Pacific War of 1941-45. This important new work, presenting a Japanese perspective, argues for the first time that in the final phase of the eight months of US-Japan talks leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor, serious mistranslations in Magic were a significant factor in the cumulative effect of mutual misunderstandings which grew between the two sides over a longer period. In spite of the number of historians who take the opposite point of view, the author argues that the efforts made by the participants on both sides to achieve a successful outcome and avert military conflict, or at least delay the outbreak of the war until the following March (1942), might have been much closer to achieving success than generally believed. The mistranslations of Magic which led to the crisis in 1941 were influenced by misunderstanding and misperception, and the persistence of stereotypes and 'images' among the parties involved. The study of these kinds of phenomena has been an important part of the growth of the discipline of international relations since the Second World War.