A full account of the Luzon campaign, from the planning stages to the surrender of the Japanese general Yamashita. The Luzon campaign of 1945 was the longest island campaign of the Pacific War, lasting from January 1945 to September 1945, and only ended with the surrender of Imperial Japan. It is often overlooked or mentioned in passing by most histories of that war, yet hundreds of thousands of Americans and Japanese fought in some of the worst conditions imaginable for eight months to clear Luzon of the invaders. This full account of the Luzon campaign stretches from planning stages to the end of the war and the surrender of over 50,000 Japanese troops under the noted Japanese general Yamashita. The landings at Lingayen Gulf, the Battle for Manila and the recapture of Corregidor are all included, as well as lesser-known battles for the summer capital of Baguio, the battle for Manila's water supply, constant jungle fighting, the raids to rescue Allied POWs, the recapture of Bataan, destruction of the only Japanese armored division to fight in the Pacific, American parachute drops on Corregidor and Aparri, and much more. Individual acts of heroism are highlighted as are the interactions among the senior commanders involved, including General MacArthur, General Krueger (6th Army) and General Eichelberger (8th Army). The book ends with the surrender of Imperial Japan and the end of the Luzon Campaign in September 1945.

The reconquest of the Philippine archipelago (exclusive of Leyte), with detailed accounts of Sixth Army and Eighth Army operations on Luzon, as well as of the Eighth Army's reoccupation of the southern Philippines.

On December 8, 1941, the day after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese invaded the Philippine Islands, catching American forces unprepared and forcing their eventual surrender. Among the American soldiers who managed to avoid capture was twenty-five-year-old Lieutenant Robert Lapham, who was to play a major role in the resistance to the brutal Japanese occupation. After emerging from the jungles of Bataan and in the face of daunting odds, Lapham built from scratch and commanded a devastating guerrilla force behind enemy lines. His Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces (LGAF) evolved into an army of thirteen thousand men that eventually controlled the entire northern half of Luzon's great Central Plain, an area of several thousand square miles. This personal account of the Luzon guerrilla operations is woven into the larger context of the war. Lapham and Norling shed light on the clandestine activities of the LGAF and other guerrilla operations, assess the damages of war to the Filipino people, and discuss the United States' postwar treatment of the newly independent Philippine nation. They also offer a fuller understanding of Japan's wartime failures in the Philippines, the Pacific, and elsewhere in Asia, and of America's postwar failure to fully realize opportunities there.

Highly detailed account of events in the Pacific during the winter of 1944 - 1945 After the Battle of Leyte Gulf, which crushed Japanese naval power in the Pacific even more effectively than American naval chiefs were aware at the time, the U.S. moved against Japan to liberate the Philippines. Here, the carrier actions supporting these operations are told in detail. Through Admiral Samuel Morison's eloquence, the half-forgotten, far-off names of these Philippine battles come to life again, as he tells of the preliminary bombardments, the assaults over the beaches, and the land fighting for the islands and Manila, as well as of the countermeasures taken against the fanatical air attacks of the Japanese. Here too is Admiral Halsey's famous raid of Task Force 38 in the South China Sea, ranging from Formosa to Indochina. Of particular interest to sailors and landsmen alike is the chapter on the frightful typhoon of 18 December, 1944, in which three U.S. ships went down and over eight hundred lives were lost. Additional chapters tell the story of the three amphibious assaults on Borneo by Australian troops covered by the U.S. Navy; of submarine operations in the southwest Pacific in 1945; and of Captain Milton Miles's amazing U.S. Naval Group, China, which carried out cloak-and-dagger operations on the mainland for years and fought the last naval battle of the war with sailing junks.

“Illuminating.… An eloquent testament to a doomed city and its people.” —The Wall Street Journal In early 1945, General Douglas MacArthur prepared to reclaim Manila, America’s Pearl of the Orient, which had been seized by the Japanese in 1942. Convinced the Japanese would abandon the city, he planned a victory parade down Dewey Boulevard—but the enemy had other plans. The Japanese were determined to fight to the death. The battle to liberate Manila resulted in the catastrophic destruction of the city and a rampage by Japanese forces that brutalized the civilian population, resulting in a massacre as horrific as the Rape of Nanking. Drawing from war-crimes testimony, after-action reports, and survivor interviews, Rampage recounts one of the most heartbreaking chapters of Pacific War history.

Two years before the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped bring a quick end to hostilities in the summer of 1945, U.S. planners began work on Operation Downfall, codename for the Allied invasions of Kyushu and Honshu, in the Japanese home islands. While other books have examined Operation Downfall, D. M. Giangreco offers the most complete and exhaustively researched consideration of the plans and their implications. He explores related issues of the first operational use of the atomic bomb and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, including the controversy surrounding estimates of potential U.S. casualties. Following years of intense research at numerous archives, Giangreco now paints a convincing and horrific picture of the veritable hell that awaited invader and defender. In the process, he demolishes the myths that Japan was trying to surrender during the summer of 1945 and that U.S. officials later wildly exaggerated casualty figures to justify using the atomic bombs to influence the Soviet Union. As Giangreco writes, “Both sides were rushing headlong toward a disastrous confrontation in the Home Islands in which poison gas and atomic weapons were to be employed as MacArthur’s intelligence chief, Charles Willoughby, succinctly put it, ‘a hard and bitter struggle with no quarter asked or given.’ Hell to Pay examines the invasion of Japan in light of the large body of Japanese and American operational and tactical planning documents the author unearthed in familiar and obscure archives. It includes postwar interrogations and reports that senior Japanese commanders and their staffs were ordered to produce for General MacArthur’s headquarters. This groundbreaking history counters the revisionist interpretations questioning the rationale for the use of the atomic bomb and shows that President Truman’s decision was based on real estimates of the enormous human cost of a conventional invasion. This revised edition of Hell to Pay expands on several areas covered in the previous book and deals with three new topics: U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the war against Imperial Japan; U.S., Soviet, and Japanese plans for the invasion and defense of the northernmost Home Island of Hokkaido; and Operation Blacklist, the three-phase insertion of American occupation forces into Japan. It also contains additional text, relevant archival material, supplemental photos, and new maps, making this the definitive edition of an important historical work.