This book delivers a thorough and essential analysis of current economic policy, transformation and legislative changes in Libya. The authors answer many questions about Libya’s distinctive society and economic system and explain the necessity for the major restructuring of the Libyan economy which is currently in process. The book makes extensive use of previously unavailable economic and social data and thus allows a unique insight into a fascinating country.

Although Libya and its current leader have been the subject of numerous accounts, few have considered how the country's tumultuous history, its institutional development, and its emergence as an oil economy combined to create a state whose rulers ignored the notion of modern statehood. International isolation and a legacy of internal turmoil have destroyed or left undocumented much of what researchers might seek to examine. Dirk Vandewalle supplies a detailed analysis of Libya's political and economic development since the country's independence in 1951, basing his account on fieldwork in Libya, archival research in Tripoli, and personal interviews with some of the country's top policymakers. Vandewalle argues that Libya represents an extreme example of what he calls a "distributive state," an oil-exporting country where an attempt at state-building coincided with large inflows of capital while political and economic institutions were in their infancy. Libya's rulers eventually pursued policies that were politically expedient but proved economically ruinous, and disenfranchised local citizens. Distributive states, according to Vandewalle, may appear capable of resisting economic and political challenges, but they are ill prepared to implement policies that make the state and its institutions relevant to their citizens. Similar developments can be expected whenever local rulers do not have to extract resources from their citizens to fund the building of a modern state.

Since the 2011 uprising that toppled the former regime, Libya has been mired in deep political strife. An economy in which agriculture once flourished was converted wholesale to an oil-based rentier state of the most extreme kind. Following the immediate post-revolution oil-consumption boom, in 2014 Libya's economy is in recession. Security is the greatest challenge to stability (World Bank 2014). Today, limited opportunities exist for reintegrating youth and ex-combatants into the labor market. This policy note provides an initial assessment of Libya's labor market and discusses policy options for promoting employability as part of a broader jobs strategy. It is intended as a contribution to evidence on Libya's labor market for the benefit of policy makers, civil society and the broader international community. The report finds that the overall unemployment rate in Libya increased from 13.5 percent in 2010 prior to the uprising to 19 percent as of 2012, having changed little since then. Youth unemployment stands at approximately 48 percent and female unemployment 25 percent. The vast majority (85 percent) of Libya's active labor force is employed in the public sector, a high rate even by regional standards. The rate for women is even higher (93 percent). Employment in industry (largely the oil sector) and agriculture accounts for only 10 percent of the labor force. While nearly all public sector workers are covered by some form of social insurance, only 46 percent of private sector workers are enrolled - a striking difference. The report further discusses the implications of Libyan jobseeker profiles. Thirty percent of firms have reported difficulty in recruiting qualified Libyan nationals. Only 15-30 percent of Libya’s labor force is relatively skilled and likely could be hired readily if given access to basic job training and job search assistance. For the remainder of the unemployed work force, targeted interventions would need to be designed for advanced skills development, vocational training, reconversion, and apprenticeship and entrepreneurship programs. The report discusses options for shifting Libya from a rentier state to a diversified, productive economy through economic and technical partnerships to help accelerate creating economic opportunities and jobs.

This edited volume provides the first fully comprehensive evaluation of Libya since the Qadhafi coup in 1969. Throughout the different chapters the authors explore the rise of the military in Libya, the impact of its self-styled revolution on Libyan society and economy.

This book represents a response to a relative lack of academic research into corporate governance and especially corporate governance disclosure in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Specifically, the author explores recent developments in corporate governance disclosure produced by Libyan commercial banks. Along with other corporate governance mechanisms, disclosure plays an essential role in discharging accountability to and protecting shareholders, enhancing corporate performance and reducing the risk of financial crises. In order to improve corporate governance disclosure, it is necessary to understand the context in which it takes place. The MENA countries have unique characteristics, and those involved in the Arab Spring have been affected in different ways. This book provides up to date research into corporate governance disclosure in the context of Libya following the Arab Spring. The banking sector plays a crucial role in the Libyan economy and has specific characteristics which make corporate governance more important than in other sectors, yet research in this sector is rare. Furthermore, the banking sector in Libya has seen significant corporate governance reforms in recent years. As one of the most significant oil producing countries, Libya’s political and business environments have been dramatically affected by the Arab Spring. The author discusses how banks have responded to these reforms and the ways in which their corporate governance disclosure has evolved.

In 2011, NATO and a number of Arab and other countries backed a rebel overthrow of longstanding Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi. When Qaddafi was killed in October, the intervening powers abruptly wrapped up military operations. A small United Nations mission was given responsibility for coordinating post-conflict stabilization support. The essential tasks of establishing security, building political and administrative institutions, and restarting the economy were left almost entirely up to Libya's new leaders. The results of this very limited international approach have been lackluster at best. Libya has fallen behind on a number of critical post-conflict fronts, jihadist groups have made inroads, and there is still a possibility that this newly freed nation could once again collapse into civil war. Although Libya's fate is ultimately in the hands of Libyans themselves, international actors could have done more to help and could still take steps to avert further deterioration of Libya itself as well as the broader region. This report is based on research and interviews with officials in Washington, London, Paris, Brussels, and Tripoli and draws on existing RAND work on post-conflict reconstruction. It explains the challenges that Libya faced after the war, assesses the steps taken to overcome them, draws implications for future post-conflict efforts, and sketches a way forward in Libya itself.