More than five years have passed since South Korea fell prey to the Asian financial crisis. Bringing together experts from Korea and a variety of other countries, this book aims to better understand the three stages of the Korean crisis: the onset, the policy reaction, and the economic response. Providing an integrated analysis of the event and its consequences, the chapters in the book consider the causes of the crisis, the response of the US government and International Monetary Fund, adjustments in the Korean monetary and fiscal policies, and the success of financial and corporate restructuring. The concluding chapters bring the story up-to-date, describing the aftermath of the crisis and assessing whether there has been sufficient reform to facilitate the country s recovery and growth. International and also Asian economists will find this a thoroughly accessible and illuminating book, as will specialists on Korea, political scientists and political economists.

After years of strong performance, Korea’s economy entered a crisis in 1997, owing largely to structural problems in its financial and corporate sectors. These problems emerged in the second half of that year, when the capital inflows that had helped finance Korea’s growth were reversed, as foreign investors—reeling from losses in other Southeast Asian economies—decided to reduce their exposure to Korea. This paper focuses on the sources of the crisis that originated in the financial sector, the measures taken to deal with it, and the evolution of key banking and financial variables in its aftermath.

Korea has played, and will increasingly play, an important role in the future development of the South East Asian region, including the expansion of regional economic cooperation and interregional trade. Indeed Korea has been a leading proponent of the idea of ASEAN+3. Clearer understanding of this economy, its major contemporary policy and reform issues and its future, are of particular interest from both regional and global perspectives.

Viewed from afar, North Korea may appear bizarre, or positively irrational. But as Nicholas Eberstadt demonstrates in this meticulously researched volume, there is a grim coherence to North Korea's political economy, and a ruthless logic undergirding it--one that unreservedly subordinates economic welfare to augmentation of political power. Thus, paradoxically, even as official policies and practices consign the DPRK economy to a perilous realm between crisis and catastrophe, the country's leadership maintains unchallenged domestic control and has actually managed to increase its international influence.Through painstaking collection of hard-to-uncover data and careful analysis, Eberstadt provides a quantitative tableau of North Korea's terrible failure in its economic race against South Korea; its stubborn adherence to policies all but guaranteed to stifle growth and undermine economic performance; and the longstanding official effort to ignore, or mitigate, pressures for economic reform.Eberstadt is skeptical of optimistic accounts from South Korea and elsewhere suggesting that the North Korean leadership is interested in resolving the current nuclear impasse, and getting on with the business of reform and development. So long as Pyongyang's rulers entertain the ambition of reunifying the Korean peninsula on its own terms, Eberstadt argues, economic reforms worthy of the name will be subversive of state authority--and vigilantly resisted by Pyongyang's rulers. This authoritative volume has received widespread attention from Asian specialists, well as those concerned with nuclear proliferation and world peace, and international relations professionals in general.