This book explores the interaction between competition law and corporate governance. It will appeal to an audience of lawyers and non-lawyer competition professionals in the US, UK, and EU, as well as other jurisdictions with competition law regimes.

"Regulatory competition within Europe and internationally, operates in several fields with different outcomes. This book offers a comparative legal and economic analysis of corporate, securities and competition law, exploring the reasons behind such differences. The books conceptual framework covers the most relevant drivers of competition, including legal actors incentives, channels of competition and governance design. It shows how the different drivers and institutional designs are shaping competitive interactions, drawing relevant conclusions for both general and field specific regulatory policy. Providing a comparative analysis of regulatory competition in three legal fields, this book will be a valuable resource for researchers and academics in law, economics and political science, as well as policymakers legislator, regulator, judiciary at both national and European levels."--Publisher

Recent public debate on common ownership by institutional investors has brought awareness to one of the many intersections between the corporate and antitrust worlds. But the interplay between these two fields dates back to the dawn of US antitrust. This volume shines a light on the often underplayed and misunderstood connections between antitrust and corporate law and finance. It offers a multi-disciplinary perspective on highly trending issues, such as parallel equity holdings, interlocking directorships, the anticompetitive effects of certain corporate governance arrangements, and the relationships between ESG and not-for profit activities with antitrust law. This edited collection brings together leading experts from across the US, Europe, and Asia and provides a cross-border perspective on alternative policy approaches for the field.

Corporate governance law addresses the misaligned incentives between officers and directors of publicly-owned companies and their shareholders and how this can lead to the destruction of shareholder value. Antitrust law governs the interaction between corporations and other economic actors in the marketplace and prohibits and penalizes anticompetitive agreements, unilateral conduct which unreasonably injures competition, and mergers and acquisitions which may substantially lessen competition. This article explores the puzzling lack of meaningful interaction between these two fields of law which govern the internal and external operations of key economic players in our economy. While a handful of commentators have lamented the lack of a closer organic connection between these two bodies of law, most do not even notice. This article goes beyond the conventional disconnect and discusses how to create a more unified approach to two key area of business law in order to promote the interests of both shareholders and consumers in a more systematic and meaningful way.

Florence Thépot provides the first systematic account of the interaction between competition law and corporate governance. She challenges the 'black box' conception of the firm- or 'undertaking' - in competition law, as applied to increasingly complex corporate relations. The book opens the 'black box' of the firm to understand the internal drivers of collusive behaviour, and proposes a unified approach to cartel enforcement, based on the agency theory. It explores key issues including corporate compliance programmes, the attribution of liability in corporate groups, and structural links between competitors, and should be read by anyone interested in how the evolution of the corporate landscape impacts competition law.