Macroprudential policy focuses on the financial system as a whole, as distinct from individual institutions, and its objective is to limit the costs to the real economy from system-wide distress of the financial sector. This book helps readers discover and decipher the multi-faceted and fascinating area of macroprudential policy through taking a theoretical, interdisciplinary and legal-focused approach.

MCM conducted a survey in December 2010 to take stock of international experiences with financial stability and the evolving macroprudential policy framework. The survey was designed to seek information in three broad areas: the institutional setup for macroprudential policy, the analytical approach to systemic risk monitoring, and the macroprudential policy toolkit. The survey was sent to 63 countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), including all countries in the G-20 and those subject to mandatory Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). The target list is designed to cover a broad range of jurisdictions in all regions, but more weight is given to economies that are systemically important (see Annex for details). The response rate is 80 percent. This note provides a summary of the survey’s main findings.

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.

This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries

Macroprudential policy (MPP) has been one of the major initiatives in the post-2008 crisis restructuring of financial regulation. Under the macroprudential mandate, the regulator monitors and judiciously controls systemic risk in the financial system, in an attempt to minimise the probability and severity of a future financial crisis. The book reveals why MPP authorities are rightfully at the centre of a highly sensitive policy debate, as MPP necessitates the allocation of significant regulatory power to technocrats, while the highly technical nature of MPP makes policy evaluation challenging. Specific issues examined include: the importance of financial stability as a public policy goal; the political economy issues stemming from the delegation of MPP to an independent authority; and the definition of accountability in the context of MPP. Focusing on a case study on the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England, the macroprudential authority in the UK, the book develops the normative grounds to justify the need for accountability in the conduct of MPP, while also formulating the necessary institutional framework to ensure the accountability of MPP authorities.

Macro-prudential policies aimed at mitigating systemic financial risks have become part of the policy toolkit in many emerging markets and some advanced countries. Their effectiveness and efficacy are not well-known, however. Using panel data regressions, we analyze how changes in balance sheets of some 2,800 banks in 48 countries over 2000–2010 respond to specific macro-prudential policies. Controlling for endogeneity, we find that measures aimed at borrowers––caps on debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios––and at financial institutions––limits on credit growth and foreign currency lending––are effective in reducing asset growth. Countercyclical buffers are little effective through the cycle, and some measures are even counterproductive during downswings, serving to aggravate declines, consistent with the ex-ante nature of macro-prudential tools.

This document outlines the Government's programme of reform to renew the UK's system of financial regulation. It believes that weaknesses were inherent in the tripartite approach whereby three authorities - the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority and the Treasury - were collectively responsible for financial stability. The Government will create a new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the Bank of England with primary statutory duty to maintain financial stability. The FPC will be given control of macro-prudential tools to ensure that systemic risks to financial stability are dealt with. This macro-prudential regulation must be co-ordinated with the prudential regulation of individual firms. Operational responsibility for prudential regulation will transfer from the FSA to a new subsidiary of the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority. The third development is the creation of a dedicated Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA) with a primary statutory responsibility to promote confidence in financial services and markets. Protection of consumers will be delivered though a strong consumer division within CPMA. The document also covers: the issue of market regulation; co-ordination of the regulatory bodies in a potential crisis; the next steps, including public consultation, legislative passage and operational implementation. The Government will, after considering responses, produce more detailed proposals - including draft legislation - for further consultation in early 2011, with a view to having legislation on the statute book within two years.