This book contends that various forms of regulation have costs as well as benefits and it examines the impact of government regulation on the innovativeness of ’monopolies’ - in this book meaning firms with the power to affect market price. The government regulation analyzed in this case is limited to rate-of-return regulation. Using theoretical models such as the Averch-Johnson model and a two-stage Nash equilibrium model, this volume examines whether regulated monopolies engage in more or less technological innovation than unregulated monopolies. Furthermore, if the unregulated (or less regulated) monopolies do engage in more research and development than regulated ones, it questions whether social welfare would be greater with the former. Using a case study of ten privately-owned electric utilities in the State of Texas, USA, it then tests out the general propositions brought forward by the theoretical modelling and finally makes its conclusions taking into consideration both theoretical and empirical findings.

Survey of the literature on transportation, communications and electric utilities in the U.S., Canada, Britain, France, West Germany and Japan.

Conference report on the influence of price and profit regulation on technological change and Innovation in industry in the USA - comprises a record of discussion on the nature and effects of regulatory decisions and industrial policy implications, examines the impact on enterprises operating under monopoly conditions and covers the electric power industry, telecommunications, civil air transport and surface goods transport. References and statistical tables. Conference held in Washington 1969 feb.

To evaluate the impact of regulation on the innovativeness of firms, this study considers the unusual case of electric utilities in the state of Texas. In the current era of deregulation, the electric utility industry in Texas is unique because its regulation was relatively limited until 1975, after which time Texas legislators imposed rate-of-return regulation. Utilizing a trans log cost framework on annual data covering the years 1965 to 1985, this study is thus able to compare the rate of technological change both before and after the imposition of rate-of-return regulation. The findings indicate that before the implementation of rate-of-return regulation, costs decreased significantly because of technological progress. After the implementation, however, the findings indicate that costs increased significantly due to technological regress brought on by regulation.

Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments effectively transfers an environmental property right, the difference in unrestricted emissions and the yearly endowment, 3 from certain fIrms to the public domain. Phase I is to reduce annual SOz emissions of 261 large (100 MW or more) utility generating units with emissions greater than 2. 5 IbslmmBtu. The yearly endowment during Phase I is equal to 2. 51bslmmBtu times the 1985-1987 baseline energy usage. Phase I standards are required to be met by 1995, an exception being units that install certain control technologies. In this case, units may postpone compliance until 1997 and may receive bonus 4 allowances. Phase II begins in the year 2000 and applies to any utility units (25 MW or more) with emissions above 1. 2 Ibs/mmBtu. The endowment is 1. 2 Ibs/mmBtu times baseline fuel use (U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 1990). 5 Hahn and Noll (1982), Bohi and Burtraw (1992), Lock and Harkawik (1991), and Walther (1991) discuss interactions between traditional rate-of-return regula- tion and overlaying environmental regulations, particularly tradable emission allowances, in the electric utility industry. Lock and Harkawik (1991) and Niemeyer (1991) discuss utility planning in this regard. Bohi and Burtraw (1992) fmd that a utility's environmental investment incentives will vary depending on cost recovery rules and argue that symmetry in treatment of investments in allowances and control technology is necessary if the utility is to be provided with the incentive to minimize costs of compliance.

Americans praise medical technology for saving lives and improving health. Yet, new technology is often cited as a key factor in skyrocketing medical costs. This volume, second in the Medical Innovation at the Crossroads series, examines how economic incentives for innovation are changing and what that means for the future of health care. Up-to-date with a wide variety of examples and case studies, this book explores how payment, patent, and regulatory policiesâ€"as well as the involvement of numerous government agenciesâ€"affect the introduction and use of new pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and surgical procedures. The volume also includes detailed comparisons of policies and patterns of technological innovation in Western Europe and Japan. This fact-filled and practical book will be of interest to economists, policymakers, health administrators, health care practitioners, and the concerned public.