For dealing with an increasingly chaotic and violence-prone world, Higher Realism offers a grand strategy that rejects the imperial thrust of recent U.S. foreign policy as well as the conventional "realist" approach of focusing only on U.S. interests. The emerging world order is one in which many powers of various sorts-states and nonstate actors, large and small, allies and adversaries-have an essential role. Seyom Brown calls this the emergent international "polyarchy," and argues that neither the assertive interventionism of the neoconservatives nor the cool, nonideological geopolitics of the conventional realists is the appropriate response. Instead, responsive to how U.S. interests have become inextricably bound up with world interests, Brown proposes a foreign policy of higher realism centered on cooperation to ensure the security and well-being of all. Brown defines and analyzes those common interests in the environment, peace and security, health and economic vitality, human rights and democracy, and transnational accountability. He faults the arrogant assumption that what is good for the United States is ipso facto good for the world, insisting rather that U.S. policies for global development must respect religious and cultural diversity. Brown's approach transcends the traditional dichotomies of realism versus idealism and self-interest versus altruistic morality. The recommended programs and policies are designed to help a new U.S. presidential administration reformulate a foreign policy that will ensure national security and promote international well-being: higher realism in philosophy and practice.

For dealing with an increasingly chaotic and violence-prone world, Higher Realism offers a grand strategy that rejects the imperial thrust of recent U.S. foreign policy as well as the conventional "realist" approach of focusing only on U.S. interests. The emerging world order is one in which many powers of various sorts-states and nonstate actors, large and small, allies and adversaries-have an essential role. Seyom Brown calls this the emergent international "polyarchy," and argues that neither the assertive interventionism of the neoconservatives nor the cool, nonideological geopolitics of the conventional realists is the appropriate response. Instead, responsive to how U.S. interests have become inextricably bound up with world interests, Brown proposes a foreign policy of higher realism centered on cooperation to ensure the security and well-being of all. Brown defines and analyzes those common interests in the environment, peace and security, health and economic vitality, human rights and democracy, and transnational accountability. He faults the arrogant assumption that what is good for the United States is ipso facto good for the world, insisting rather that U.S. policies for global development must respect religious and cultural diversity. Brown's approach transcends the traditional dichotomies of realism versus idealism and self-interest versus altruistic morality. The recommended programs and policies are designed to help a new U.S. presidential administration reformulate a foreign policy that will ensure national security and promote international well-being: higher realism in philosophy and practice.

Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism is the first study of its kind to address a range of realist and idealist views inspired by psychological nominalism. Bringing together premier analytic realists and distinguished defenders of German idealism, it reveals why psychological nominalism is one of the most important theories of the mind to come out the 20th century. The theory, first put forward by Wilfrid Sellars, argues that language is the only means by which humans can learn the types of socially shared practices that permit rationality. Although wedded to important aspects of German idealism, Sellars' theory is couched in bold realist terms of the analytic tradition. Those who are sympathetic to German idealism find this realist's appropriation of German idealism problematic. Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism and Realism thus creates a rare venue for realists and idealists to debate the epistemic outcome of the mental processes they both claim are essential to experience. Their resulting discussion bridges the gap between analytic and continental philosophy. In providing original and accessible chapters on psychological nominalism, this volume raises themes that intersect with numerous disciplines: the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics. It also provides clarity on arguably the best available account of why humans can reason, be self-aware, know, and act as agents.

At the heart of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy is an epistemological and metaphysical position he calls transcendental idealism; the aim of this book is to understand this position. Despite the centrality of transcendental idealism in Kant's thinking, in over two hundred years since the publication of the first Critique there is still no agreement on how to interpret the position, or even on whether, and in what sense, it is a metaphysical position. Lucy Allais argue that Kant's distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear to us has both epistemological and metaphysical components. He is committed to a genuine idealism about things as they appear to us, but this is not a phenomenalist idealism. He is committed to the claim that there is an aspect of reality that grounds mind-dependent spatio-temporal objects, and which we cannot cognize, but he does not assert the existence of distinct non-spatio-temporal objects. A central part of Allais's reading involves paying detailed attention to Kant's notion of intuition, and its role in cognition. She understands Kantian intuitions as representations that give us acquaintance with the objects of thought. Kant's idealism can be understood as limiting empirical reality to that with which we can have acquaintance. He thinks that this empirical reality is mind-dependent in the sense that it is not experience-transcendent, rather than holding that it exists literally in our minds. Reading intuition in this way enables us to make sense of Kant's central argument for his idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and to see why he takes the complete idealist position to be established there. This shows that reading a central part of his argument in the Transcendental Deduction as epistemological is compatible with a metaphysical, idealist reading of transcendental idealism.