The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the United States of September 2002 stated that defending the Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government and that the primary threat is from terrorists. The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is a test of our national will and one that requires the employment of all the nation's instruments of power. However before we can employ instruments of power against an enemy it must be determined clearly against what sources of their strength and weakness are we directing our power. We must be certain that we are targeting that one critical source of strength their strategic center of gravity. The NSS states that the GWOT is against a politically motivated network of terrorists with global reach and not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. This means that unlike prior enemies there is no clear state for the U.S. to direct its national powers against but instead a loose organization of groups. Without a dear idea of what is the unifying factor(s) for these terrorist groups their center(s) of gravity or the source(s) of their power there exists a possibility that our national power employment efforts may be misdirected marginalized or even counterproductive. If the grand strategy is silent on this unifying power issue it leaves the components of the federal government to decide for themselves the enemy's centers of gravity on the strategic operational and tactical level. This lends itself to misdirection if diverse and conflicting centers of gravity are determined but not coordinated by U.S elements. The purpose of this paper is fourfold: first to analyze the issue of centers of gravity to determine if it is possible that ideology can be a center of gravity (COG); second to determine if ideology is the COG for global terrorists; third to identify which ideology is that unifying ideology; fourth to present response strategies against the determined center(s) of gravity.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the United States of September 2002 stated that defending the Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government and that the primary threat is from terrorists. The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is a test of our national will and one that requires the employment of all the nation's instruments of power. However before we can employ instruments of power against an enemy it must be determined clearly against what sources of their strength and weakness are we directing our power. We must be certain that we are targeting that one critical source of strength their strategic center of gravity. The NSS states that the GWOT is against a politically motivated network of terrorists with global reach and not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. This means that unlike prior enemies there is no clear state for the U.S. to direct its national powers against but instead a loose organization of groups. Without a dear idea of what is the unifying factor(s) for these terrorist groups their center(s) of gravity or the source(s) of their power there exists a possibility that our national power employment efforts may be misdirected marginalized or even counterproductive. If the grand strategy is silent on this unifying power issue it leaves the components of the federal government to decide for themselves the enemy's centers of gravity on the strategic operational and tactical level. This lends itself to misdirection if diverse and conflicting centers of gravity are determined but not coordinated by U.S elements. The purpose of this paper is fourfold: first to analyze the issue of centers of gravity to determine if it is possible that ideology can be a center of gravity (COG); second to determine if ideology is the COG for global terrorists; third to identify which ideology is that unifying ideology; fourth to present response strategies against the determined center(s) of gra7.

Essay from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1,7, , language: English, abstract: The center of gravity paradigm created and published by Carl von Clausewitz in his famous study about the appearance of war is nowadays still widely used to describe the core incitements and driving factors of warring factions, political parties, militias and even terrorist groups. In a short summary this military term of a center of gravity is defined as the one or few main forces where a party in a conflict drives its willpower and its strength from. It is a common element amongst the members and supporters of this group and with reference to Clausewitz’s study, it is this key element the opponent needs to identify and to overcome in order to break the willpower of the party and to finally conquer them. For that reason various studies have been undertaken und research has been performed with regards to the center of gravity in warfare as well as the center of gravity for terrorist groups and esp. for Al Qaeda. In the case of Al Qaeda most completed studies and published documents agreed to the point that the ideology preached by the core leaders of the network is the key element, where their followers draw their support and willpower from. At the same time Al Qaeda these days transformed itself to a loose network with just a common brand name and ideology, but without much central guidance or command. Numerous groups throughout all parts of world emerge and entitle themselves with the name Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliated. Often there are no or just minor links to the former core leadership of Al Qaeda. For that reason it seems, that the network called Al Qaeda with most of its global affiliates is not more a strict hierarchical structured group, nor is it a self-contained network anymore with its origin in the mountain region of the Afghan-Pakistan (AfPak) border area. Al Qaeda seems to have many different appearances. Therefore the underlying hypothesis of this essay is that beside the remaining core of Al Qaeda in the AfPak region, the name Al Qaeda is nowadays used as a corporate name of different local or regional acting terrorist groups in order to provide a powerful proof of their willingness and capability. In that line the outcome of the hypothesis argues that the CoG for Al Qaeda affiliates is derived from their own and individual domestic or regional issues and interests as well as their regional supremacy.

According to President Bush, "the American people are safer" as a result of invading Iraq. True, Saddam Hussein has been removed from power. But al Qaeda, the group that planned and carried out the attacks on September 11, remains at large. Meanwhile, the White House has conceded that Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with the attacks. Charles Peña argues that the war in Iraq is but one misstep in the Bush administration's "global war on terror." Terrorism is simply a tactic, however, not an enemy. Trying to eradicate it is a quixotic quest that does not focus on those responsible for 9/11. Instead, the national security strategy should consist of three central elements: establishing homeland security against further attacks; dismantling the al Qaeda terrorist network; and enacting a foreign policy that does not attract new al Qaeda terrorists. This approach requires restructuring U.S. forces and ending Cold War-era commitments that distract from the current, pressing threat. It also requires ameliorating the negative consequences of an interventionist U.S. foreign policy, which creates incentives and opportunities for terrorists to target the United States. If we misdiagnose al Qaeda's motivations or focus military efforts on the wrong targets, then we run the risk that the war against the al Qaeda terrorist threat (and the radical Islamic ideology it represents) will become a broader war against the Islamic world that could last generations and cost countless lives. With a foreword by Michael Scheuer, the bestselling author of Imperial Hubris.

Subject: America entered the Global War on Terrorism with little understanding of the enemy it faced. AI-Qaeda plays a leading role in the larger movement of global jihad, a splinter faction of militant Islamism intent on establishing its vision of strict Islamic rule in the Muslim world through armed action. Global jihadis have spent more than 40 years refining their philosophy, gaining experience, building their organization, and developing plans to reestablish what they see as the only true Islamic state on earth. The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks set this plan in motion. In the years leading up to and following the 9/11 attacks, global jihadis have written copiously on their military strategy for creating an Islamic state. This paper draws on those writings to examine and explain the mechanisms by which they plan to neutralize the superpower guardian of world order, claim land and peoples for Islamic emirates out of the resulting chaos, and bring these emirates together to become a true Islamic state. Their writings also expose weaknesses in their strategy, and this paper explores some of those potential vulnerabilities as well.