In this White Paper, the Government reaffirms its commitment to maintain Britain's independent nuclear capability by investing in a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines and extending the life of the Trident D5 missile. However, in order to ensure the deterrent system is the minimum necessary to provide effective deterrence, there will be a further 20 per cent reduction in operationally available warheads. The Government believes this decision balances the interests of national security against its undertaking to work towards multilateral disarmament and to counter nuclear proliferation, and it is fully compatible with Britain's international legal obligations. The White Paper discusses the policy context and sets out the reasons why decisions on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent system are needed now, as well as considering the various options and their costs, and the industrial aspects involved in building the new submarines in the UK.

This book investigates the UK’s nuclear weapon policy, focusing in particular on how consecutive governments have managed to maintain the Trident weapon system. The question of why states maintain nuclear weapons typically receives short shrift: its security, of course. The international is a perilous place, and nuclear weapons represent the ultimate self-help device. This book seeks to unsettle this complacency by re-conceptualizing nuclear weapon-armed states as nuclear regimes of truth and refocusing on the processes through which governments produce and maintain country-specific discourses that enable their continued possession of nuclear weapons. Illustrating the value of studying nuclear regimes of truth, the book conducts a discourse analysis of the UK’s nuclear weapons policy between 1980 and 2010. In so doing, it documents the sheer imagination and discursive labour required to sustain the positive value of nuclear weapons within British politics, as well as providing grounds for optimism regarding the value of the recent treaty banning nuclear weapons.

In its White Paper (published in December 2006 as Cm 6994, ISBN 0101699425) on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to maintain the submarine-based Trident weapons system. This will require the procurement of a new generation of nuclear-powered Trident submarines to replace the current fleet of Vanguard-class submarines. Following on from the Committee's earlier report on the strategic context and timetable for decision-making on the renewal of the UK's nuclear deterrent (HCP 986, session 2005-06; ISBN 0215029445), this report focuses on issues related to the UK manufacturing and skills base. These include: the level of investment needed to sustain essential infrastructure and core skills in the UK submarine construction industry; the potential consequences of a gap in the submarine building programme for the long-term viability of the domestic manufacturing and skills base; the implications of the rationalisation of the UK shipbuilding industry for the construction, maintenance and affordability of a Vanguard-class successor; and the linkage between the Government's Defence Industrial Strategy and the decision on retention, replacement or abolition of the UK's Trident system. It also examines the Government's investment programme at the Atomic Weapons Establishment and the possible impact of a new civil nuclear build programme for the retention of nuclear skills and expertise in the military sector.

The programme aims to maintain the UK's nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the current system, with the introduction into service of the first of a new class of submarines in 2024. The timetable is challenging and the MoD needs to manage key risks if continuous nuclear deterrence is to be maintained. The current two year initial concept phase for the new class of submarines requires a series of important and difficult decisions to be taken by September 2009 to keep the programme on track. The MoD has appointed a Senior Responsible Owner to co-ordinate these decisions. The current predicted cost of procuring the new nuclear deterrent is between �15 billion and �20 billion (2006-7 prices), as outlined in the 2006 White Paper, The future of the UK's nuclear deterrent (Cm. 6994, ISBN 9780101699426). The estimated operating costs once the new class of submarines comes into operation are similar to those of the current deterrent, and the MoD recognises the need by September 2009 to produce robust estimates of whole-life costs. There are major areas of uncertainty in the budget, including the provision for contingency and VAT. The submarine industry is a highly specialised industrial sector with a number of monopoly suppliers and there are real difficulties in providing the right incentives for these suppliers to deliver to time and budget. The tight timetable set for ensuring the seamless transition from the present Vanguard class of submarines to the future class is challenging. A further risk to the programme is a shortage of nuclear-related skills in industry and within MoD - potentially aggravated by competition from civil nuclear projects.

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.

The Committee in this report which, on the basis of evidence from the Ministry of Defence (the Department), examined making important decisions, managing dependence on the United States and managing the programme effectively. The United Kingdom first deployed a submarine-launched nuclear deterrent in 1968. Since then, successive governments have been committed to a policy of continuous at sea deterrence, meaning that at least one nuclear-armed submarine is on patrol at any one time. In its 2006 White Paper, the Government announced its intention to maintain the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent capability and its plans to build a new class of submarines to replace the current Vanguard fleet and to participate in the United States' Trident D5 ballistic missile life extension programme. The Ministry of Defence's ability to sustain its nuclear deterrent capability in the future is dependent on collaboration with the United States. The new class of submarine is likely to remain in service beyond the extended life of the existing Trident D5 missile, which will be renewed in 2042, and must therefore be compatible with any successor missile developed by the United States. The Department has received a series of assurances from the United States that any new missile will be compatible with the United Kingdom's new submarine class. Nevertheless, the concern remains that the Department has no direct control over the development of the new missile. The future deterrent programme is still at the concept phase. The Department has yet to make many decisions about the principal parameters of the submarine design, the type of nuclear reactor, and the design and size of the missile compartment. The Department expects to make these decisions by September 2009.

Since 1969, the United Kingdom always has always had one submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles underwater, undetected, in constant communication, ready at a set notice to fire at targets anywhere in the world. This is part of its Trident Programme, which includes the development, procurement, and operation of the current generation of British nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. Operated by the Royal Navy and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland’s west coast, it is the most expensive and most powerful capability of the British military forces. In 2016, the United Kingdom had to decide on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines that will allow the UK to remain in the nuclear business well into the second half of this century. The book presents the political, cultural, technical, and strategic aspects of Trident to provide a thoughtful overview of the UK’s complex relationship with nuclear weapons. The authors, both scholars and practitioners, bring together diverse perspectives on the issue, discussing the importance of UK nuclear history as well as the political, legal, and diplomatic aspects of UK nuclear weapons—internationally and domestically. Also addressed are the new technical, military, and strategic challenges to the UK nuclear thinking and strategy.