A comprehensive account of how government deficits and debt drive inflation Where do inflation and deflation ultimately come from? The fiscal theory of the price level offers a simple answer: Prices adjust so that the real value of government debt equals the present value of taxes less spending. Inflation breaks out when people don’t expect the government to fully repay its debts. The fiscal theory is well suited to today’s economy: Financial innovation undermines money demand, and central banks don’t control the money supply or aggressively change interest rates, invalidating classic theories, while large debts and deficits threaten inflation and constrain monetary policy. This book presents a comprehensive account of this important theory from one of its leading developers and advocates. John Cochrane aims to make fiscal theory useful as a conceptual framework and modeling tool, and for analyzing history and policy. He merges fiscal theory with standard models in which central banks set interest rates, giving a novel account of monetary policy. He generalizes the theory to explain data and make realistic predictions. For example, inflation decreases in recessions despite deficits because discount rates fall, raising the value of debt; specifying that governments promise to partially repay debt avoids classic puzzles and allows the theory to apply at all times, not just during periods of high inflation. Cochrane offers an extensive rethinking of monetary doctrines and institutions through the eyes of fiscal theory, and analyzes the era of zero interest rates and post-pandemic inflation. Filled with research by Cochrane and others, The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level offers important new insights about fiscal and monetary policy.

"Inflation, in which all prices and wages in an economy rise, is mysterious. If a war breaks out in the Middle East, and the price of oil goes up, the mechanism is no great mystery-supply and demand often work pretty visibly. But if you ask the grocer why the price of bread is higher, he or she will blame the wholesaler, who will blame the baker, who will blame the wheat supplier, and so on. Perhaps the ultimate cause is a government printing more money, but there is really no way to know this for certain but to sit down in an office with statistics, armed with some decent economic theory. But current economic theory doesn't really explain why we haven't seen inflation for so long, and more and more economists think that current theory doesn't hold together, or provide much guidance for how central banks should behave if inflation does break out. Many also worry that central banks have much less power over the economy than they think they do, and much less understanding of the mechanism behind what power they do have. The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level is a comprehensive new approach to monetary policy. Economist John Cochrane argues that money has value because the government accepts it for tax payments. This insight, he argues, leads to a deep re-reading of monetary policy and institutions. Inflation comes when a government is unable to repay its debts, rather than from mismanagement of the split of debt between money and bonds. In the book, he will analyze institutional design, historical episodes, and compare fiscal theory to the Keynesian and new-Keynesian theory based on interest rate targets, and to monetarism. The book offers an overview and introduction to the range of contemporary monetary economics and history of thought as well as the fiscal theory"--

It is not common for an entire scholarly literature to be based on a fallacy, that is, 'on faulty reasoning; misleading or unsound argument'. The 'fiscal theory of the price level', recently re-developed by Woodford, Cochrane, Sims and others, is an example of a fatally flawed research programme. The source of the fallacy is an economic misspecification. The proponents of the fiscal theory of the price level do not accept the fundamental proposition that the government's intertemporal budget constraint is a constraint on the government's instruments that must be satisfied for all admissible values of the economy-wide endogenous variables. Instead they require it to be satisfied only in equilibrium. This economic misspecification has implications for the mathematical or logical properties of the equilibria supported by models purporting to demonstrate the properties of the fiscal approach. These include: overdetermined (internally inconsistent) equilibria; anomalies like the apparent ability to price things that do not exist; the need for arbitrary restrictions on the exogenous and predetermined variables in the government's budget constraint; and anomalous behaviour of the equilibrium' price sequences, including behaviour that will ultimately violate physical resource constraints. The issue is of more than academic interest. Policy conclusions could be drawn from the fiscal theory of the price level that would be harmful if they influenced the actual behaviour of the fiscal and monetary authorities. The fiscal theory of the price level implies that a government could exogenously fix its real spending, revenue and seigniorage plans, and that the general price level would adjust the real value of its contractual nominal debt obligations so as to ensure government solvency. When reality dawns, the result could be painful fiscal tightening, government default, or unplanned recourse to the inflation tax.

The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) is the claim that, in a popular class of theoretical models, the price level is sometimes determined by fiscal policy rather than monetary policy. The models where this claim has been established assume that all decisions are made by an infinitely-lived representative agent. We present an alternative, arguably more realistic model, populated by sixty-two generations of people. We calibrate our model to an income profile from U.S. data and we show that the FTPL breaks down. In our model, the price level and the real interest rate are indeterminate, even when monetary and fiscal policy are both active. Our findings challenge established views about what constitutes a good combination of fiscal and monetary policies.

It is well known that the balance sheets of most major central banks significantly expanded in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-2011, but the consequences of this expansion are not well understood. This book develops a unified framework to explain how and why central bank balance sheets have expanded and what this shift means for fiscal and monetary policy. Buiter addresses a number of key issues in monetary economics and public finance, including how helicopter money works, when modern monetary theory makes sense, why the Eurosystem has a potentially fatal design flaw, why the fiscal theory of the price level is a fallacy and how to escape from the zero lower bound.

Why we need to heed the lessons of high inflation Today's global economy, with most developed nations experiencing very low inflation, seems a world apart from the "Great Inflation" that spanned the late 1960s to early 1980s. Yet, in this book, Brigitte Granville makes the case that monetary economists and policymakers need to keep the lessons learned during that period very much in mind, lest we return to them by making the same mistakes we made in the past. Granville details the advances in macroeconomic thinking that gave rise to the "Great Moderation"—a period of stable inflation and economic growth, which lasted from the mid-1980s through the most recent financial crisis. She makes the case that the central banks' management of monetary policy—hinging on expectations and credibility—brought about this period of stability, and traces the roots of this success back to the eighteenth-century foundations of modern monetary thought. Tackling fundamental questions such as the causes of inflation and its relation to unemployment and growth, the natural rate of inflation hypothesis, the fiscal theory of the price level, and the proper goals of central banks, the book aims above all to demonstrate the dangers of forgetting the role of credibility in establishing sound monetary policy. With the lessons of the past firmly in mind, Granville presents stimulating ideas and proposals about inflation-targeting principles, which provide tools for present-day monetary authorities dealing with the forces of globalization, mercantilism, and reserve accumulation.

IN TRADITIONAL economics the theory of money and the theory of output have been treated separately with little or no tendency toward integration. First Wicksell and then Keynes gave impetus to the movement to combine the theory of money with that of output as a whole. Drawing on classical economics and the modern aggregate analysis of Keynes, Professor Hansen in this volume succeeds in writing a book which, unlike the classical studies, shows the importance of money in the theory of output as a whole; and which, unlike numerous modern writings (e.g., of Hawtrey, Douglas, Hayek), avoids overemphasizing the importance of money. Here is a book that shows what monetary policy can and cannot achieve and why it has often failed in the past; the necessary supplementary role of monetary policy as an aid to fiscal policy; and the manner of integrating monetary and fiscal policy, in periods of both depression and inflation, as prerequisites for assuring a stable economy. Professor Hansen has drawn on his rich experience over thirty-five years in the study of cycles, fiscal policy, and international economics, and on his many years as an economic practitioner to write a book that makes use of the riches of classical economics, as well as neoclassical and Keynesian economics. The book should, for many years to come, be the standard work on monetary theory and fiscal policy as determinants of output. The reader will find here not only the modern theory of money and fiscal policy, but also rich surveys covering the last 150 years, reinterpreted with the tools of modern economics. He will find also suggestions, based on theory and history, for a policy in the years to come that will yield the high levels of income and stability without which the survival of democratic institutions is most unlikely.