This study examines the banking crises in Finland, Norway and Sweden, which took place in the early 1990s, and draws some policy conclusions from their experiences. One key conclusion is that factors in addition to business cycle effects explain the Nordic countries financial problems. Although the timing of the deregulation in all three countries coincided with a strongly expansionary macroeconomic momentum, the main reasons for the banking crises were the delayed policy responses, the structural characteristics of the financial systems, and the banks inadequate internal risk-management controls.

The Nordic financial crisis had it all: a botched liberalization, a huge boom followed by an even bigger bust, massive taxpayer-financed bailouts and, finally, deep long-run gains. The first-class team of scholars mobilized in this book convincingly tell a story that should be carefully studied by economists, bankers and policymakers. After this book, no one should be able to say: If we only knew ! Charles Wyplosz, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland The financial crisis in Scandinavia in the early 1990s was a forerunner of the later world-wide crisis in 2007/8. Although the initial causation was different, the impact on their banks, though more localised, was just as severe. So we can benefit, and already policymakers have done so, from learning the lessons in this book on how to restore shattered banking systems to health. For this we owe a debt of gratitude to the editors, who have put together a series of key papers that emerged from a much larger exercise on the crisis that was earlier reported in four volumes in Swedish and Finnish. Amongst the many studies on current and past financial crises, this is a classic must-read . Charles A.E. Goodhart, London School of Economics, UK The Nordic experience with financial crisis resolution could not be more timely. Everyone cites it as an example of how it should be done , but rarely does one find careful and detailed analysis. Now policymakers and others searching for guidance will know where to look. Barry Eichengreen, University of California, Berkeley, US Following World War II, Nordic countries were commonly regarded as successful and stable economies. This perception was, however, shattered in the early 1990s when Finland and Sweden encountered severe financial crises. Here, the authors explore the symptoms of financial crisis decreasing real income, soaring unemployment and exploding public deficits and their devastating effects. The book compares and contrasts the experiences of Finland and Sweden, then adopts an international perspective, encompassing the experiences of Asia, Latin America, Denmark and Norway. Lessons from the 1990s crisis are drawn, and possible solutions prescribed. The conclusion is that long-term effects of financial crises financial liberalization and integration are not as dramatic as the short-term effects, but may prove to be of greater importance over time. Only the future will show whether these long-term benefits will balance or even outweigh the enormous short-term costs of the crises. Highly relevant to the current international financial crisis currently afflicting the world economy, this timely book will prove invaluable to economists and other social scientists with a general interest in financial crises, and to those with a more specific interest in the evolution and models of Scandinavian economies.

This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.

This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

We update the widely used banking crises database by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010) with new information on recent and ongoing crises, including updated information on policy responses and outcomes (i.e. fiscal costs, output losses, and increases in public debt). We also update our dating of sovereign debt and currency crises. The database includes all systemic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises during the period 1970-2011. The data show some striking differences in policy responses between advanced and emerging economies as well as many similarities between past and ongoing crises.

Beginning with the 2008 global crisis in the United States, and particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic shook economies around the world, academics, practitioners, and other experts have become increasingly sensitised to the potential for financial and economic fragility to result in a systemic breakdown. Presenting a synopsis of lessons learnt from financial crises arising out of the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries, each entry examines a unique past issue to help to develop future outcomes, operating as a touchstone for further research.