Financial statecraft' goes beyond sanctions against rogue states. The aims of financial statecraft may be defensive or offensive, its targets bilateral or systemic, and its instruments financial or monetary. Regions and countries profiled include Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, India, Southeast Asia, China, and Japan.

'Financial statecraft' goes beyond sanctions against rogue states. National governments manipulate money, credit, and exchange rate resources to achieve a range of foreign policy goals. The aims of financial statecraft may be defensive or offensive, its targets bilateral or systemic, and its instruments financial or monetary. Since the global financial crisis of 2008-9, rising multipolarity in international relations has given 'new kids on the block' such as China, India, and Brazil the opportunity - and desire - to move beyond the old forms of defensive financial statecraft, such as debt default, to new and assertive types of international financial statecraft, including collective pressure on the industrial democracies to expand the IMF quotas of emerging powers. An open question for the future is whether the leaders of major emerging powers will continue to cooperate with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in global financial governance - or whether some of them will move toward more direct challenges to the existing system's governing principles or its power hierarchy.

Introduction: the BRICS as a club -- Global power shift: the BRICS, building capabilities for influence -- BRICS collective financial statecraft: four cases -- Motives for BRICS collaboration: views from the five capitals -- Conclusion: whither the BRICS?

Financial statecraft' goes beyond sanctions against rogue states. The aims of financial statecraft may be defensive or offensive, its targets bilateral or systemic, and its instruments financial or monetary. Regions and countries profiled include Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, India, Southeast Asia, China, and Japan.

Starting from the key concept of geo-economics, this book investigates the new power politics and argues that the changing structural features of the contemporary international system are recasting the strategic imperatives of foreign policy practice. States increasingly practice power politics by economic means. Whether it is about Iran’s nuclear programme or Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Western states prefer economic sanctions to military force. Most rising powers have also become cunning agents of economic statecraft. China, for instance, is using finance, investment and trade as means to gain strategic influence and embed its global rise. Yet the way states use economic power to pursue strategic aims remains an understudied topic in International Political Economy and International Relations. The contributions to this volume assess geo-economics as a form of power politics. They show how power and security are no longer simply coupled to the physical control of territory by military means, but also to commanding and manipulating the economic binds that are decisive in today’s globalised and highly interconnected world. Indeed, as the volume shows, the ability to wield economic power forms an essential means in the foreign policies of major powers. In so doing, the book challenges simplistic accounts of a return to traditional, military-driven geopolitics, while not succumbing to any unfounded idealism based on the supposedly stabilising effects of interdependence on international relations. As such, it advances our understanding of geo-economics as a strategic practice and as an innovative and timely analytical approach. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, international political economy, foreign policy and International Relations in general.

divAs trade flows expanded and trade agreements proliferated after World War II, governments—most notably the United States—came increasingly to use their power over imports and exports to influence the behavior of other countries. But trade is not the only way in which nations interact economically. Over the past two decades, another form of economic exchange has risen to a level of vastly greater significance and political concern: the purchase and sale of financial assets across borders. Nearly $2 trillion worth of currency now moves cross-border every day, roughly 90 percent of which is accounted for by financial flows unrelated to trade in goods and services—a stunning inversion of the figures in 1970. The time is ripe to ask fundamental questions about what Benn Steil and Robert Litan have coined as “financial statecraft,” or those aspects of economic statecraft directed at influencing international capital flows. How precisely has the American government practiced financial statecraft? How effective have these efforts been? And how can they be made more effective? The authors provide penetrating and incisive answers in this timely and stimulating book. /DIV

Financialising City Statecraft and Infrastructure addresses the struggles of national and local states to fund, finance and govern urban infrastructure. It develops fresh thinking on financialisation and city statecraft to explain the socially and spatially uneven mixing of managerial, entrepreneurial and financialised city governance in austerity and limited decentralisation across England. As urban infrastructure fixes for the London global city-region risk undermining national ‘rebalancing’ efforts in the UK, city statecraft in the rest of the country is having uneasily to combine speculation, risk-taking and prospective venturing with co-ordination, planning and regulation.