By Aug. 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early Aug., Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west toward Avranches to cut off the US forces to the south. With the ‘Ultra’ intelligence, Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton’s Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar’s First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. The encirclement of the German forces would be known as the Falaise pocket. To the north, Montgomery’s forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton’s Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. Late on the 12th of Aug., Bradley stopped Patton’s forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army’s movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket. I will analyze the leadership decisions, command relationships, and what I think to be a lack of communication between the Allied leaders. Why did Montgomery, who was commander of the Allied ground forces in France, not close the pincer from the south? Why did Bradley stop forces at Argentan? Why didn’t Eisenhower get involved? The Allied leadership failed to capitalize or exploit the mistake made by Hitler driving the German Army westward. By not closing the pocket’s gap at Falaise, the Allied forces lost an opportunity to destroy a large percentage of the enemy in France. The major factor for this failure was conflicting commander personalities.

By August 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early August, Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west to cut off the US forces to the south. Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton's Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar's First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. To the north, Montgomery's forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton's Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. bate on the 12th of August, Bradley stopped Patton's forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army's movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket. The failure of the Allied forces to close the Falaise Gap was the result of lack of communication directly linked to the type of personalities of the commanders.

By August 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early August, Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west to cut off the US forces to the south. Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton's Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar's First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. To the north, Montgomery's forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton's Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. Late on the 12th of August, Bradley stopped Patton's forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army's movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket. The failure of the Allied forces to close the Falaise Gap was the result of lack of communication directly linked to the type of personalities of the commanders.

This WWII military history explores the dramatic turning point of the Battle of Normandy—illustrated throughout with archival photos and maps. On June 6th, 1944, the Allied forces embarked on Operation Overlord with the first wave of Normandy landings. But it wasn’t until August of that year that the tide of the battle—and the entire war—began to turn. The decisive moment came at the Battle of the Falaise Pocket. The German Army had managed to hold back the Allies for months, but its resources were running out, and the Allies ruled the skies. As the Allies began to push South and East, Hitler refused to permit Field Marshal von Kluge, the commander of Army Group B, to withdraw. General Montgomery ordered the Allied armies to converge on the Falaise area on August 8th, and by August 21st they had some 50,000 Germans surrounded. While many German soldiers did escape the encirclement, the losses were catastrophic. By the end of the month, Army Group B had retreated across the Seine, ending the battle of Normandy. This illustrated account examines the battle from the failed offensive at Mortain, looking at both German and Allied perspectives, using maps, diagrams and profiles to complete the story.

This fascinating volume charts the progress of the Allied breakout of Normandy through German eyes. Beginning with Operation COBRA and ending with the offensive which led to the liberation of Paris, this critical phase of the war in the west is examined and described by senior German officers. These, from staff officers at OKW to divisional generals on the ground, critique their performance, examine Allied superiority, and evaluate their own efforts to contain Allied forces in Normandy. They look at such key events as the counter-attack at Mortain, the American offensive, British and Canadian efforts and the sequence of events that led to the fighting around the Falaise gap. The German officers originally submitted the reports presented here to Allied intelligence efforts as part of post-war debriefing sessions. The current volume, which follows on from Fighting the Invasion and Fighting in Normandy, consists of carefully selected and edited material. Fighting the Breakout gives a broad picture of German hopes balanced with the realisation that they could not hope to contain the Allied efforts for long. With supplementary material by David C. Isby, Fighting the Breakout is a fascinating glimpse into how a defeated army sought hard to turn the tide of defeat.

This WWII history critically reexamines one of the most dramatic and significant battles to follow the D-Day landings in Normandy. The destruction of the trapped German forces in the Falaise pocket in August 1944 is one of the most famous episodes of the Normandy campaign. But myths have grown up around the battle, and its impact on the course of the war is often misunderstood. In this meticulously researched study, Anthony Tucker-Jones dispels misconceptions about the battle, describes the combat in graphic detail, and reassesses the outcome in the context of the campaign to liberate Europe. Tucker-Jones takes a broad view of the sequence of operations that culminated in the battle at Falaise, tracing the course of the campaign mainly from the panzers’ viewpoint. For two bloody months following the Normandy landings, the panzers held the Allies at bay. But when they found themselves blocked in at Falaise, the area became a killing ground. Some liken the event to Hitler’s defeat at Stalingrad, while others argue the victory was flawed because so many German troops escaped.