The collection of essays discusses the background to President Truman's decision and its impact and legacy, recreating the atmosphere of post World War II containment issues and debates. The publication also looks forward by examining the current balance of power in the Mediterranean and its implications for United States policy toward this area. HIS051000

America's experience in Greece has often been cited as a model by those later policymakers in Washington who regard the involvement as a "victory" for American foreign policy. Indeed, President Johnson and others referred to Greece as the model for America's deepening involvement in Vietnam during the mid-1960's. Greece became the battlefield for a new kind of war--one that included the use of guerrilla warfare, propaganda, war in the shadows, terror tactics and victory based on outlasting the enemy. It was also a test before the world of America's resolve to protect the principle of self-determination. Jones argues that American policy towards Greece was the focal point in the development of a global strategy designed to combat totalitarianism. He also argues that had the White House and others drawn the real "lessons" from the intervention in Greece, the decisions regarding Vietnam might have been more carefully thought out.

In this work, Denise M. Bostdorff considers President Truman’s address to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. She focuses on the public and private language that influenced administration perceptions about the precipitating events in Greece and Turkey and explores the news management campaign that set the stage for Truman’s speech. Bostdorff even examines how the president’s health may have influenced his policy decision and how it affected his delivery of the address and campaign for congressional approval. After a rhetorical analysis of the Truman Doctrine speech, the book ends with Bostdorff’s conclusions on its short- and long-term impact. She identifies themes announced by Truman that resound in U.S. foreign policy down to the present day, when George W. Bush has compared his policies in the war on terror to those of Truman and members of his administration have compared Bush to Truman. This important work is a major contribution to scholarship on the presidency, political science, and public rhetoric.

Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies offers a reassessment of the Truman Doctrine. In this insightful, thorough, and carefully documented study, Judith Jeffery tests the truth of the claim that America's peacetime intervention in Greece was a model on which to base other such ventures. In March 1947, President Truman launched a program of U.S. aid to Greece. Truman saw in Greece, which had been shattered by World War II, not only a dire situation needing humanitarian aid, but also an opportunity to assert American authority in this early period of the Cold War: civil war waged by the Communist-backed guerrilla movement against the government was threatening to further destroy the country. The president and his administration thus dispatched American troops with the directive to destroy the Communist forces. The defeat of the Communists in 1949 was hailed as a great U.S. military achievement. Did this achievement come at the expense of the Truman Doctrine--which made explicit that the first priority of President Truman and his administration in defeating communism was to improve the standard of living in Greece? How do claims about the success of the aid program measure up against the original intentions of the Administration in mid-1947 and against the program's real outcome at the beginning of the 1950s? What was the real story behind the Greek Communist defeat? Jeffery's cogent analysis of events from 1947 to 1952 provides fodder for today's heavily contested debates about U.S. foreign policy and intervention.