INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EU AND THE EURO CHAPTER 2. DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU AND THE EMU CHAPTER 3. BUDGETARY INSTRUMENTS OF THE EU CHAPTER 4. THE EU SINGLE MARKET CHAPTER 5. THE EU COMPETITION POLICY CHAPTER 6. IS THE EUROZONE AN OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA? CHAPTER 7. THE EURO CRISIS CHAPTER 8. THE SINGLE MONETARY POLICY CHAPTER 9. THE NEW ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE CHAPTER 10. TOWARDS A BANKING UNION CHAPTER 11. GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS CHAPTER 12. THE WAY FORWARD: SAVING THE EURO AND COMPLETING THE EMU.

Analyzes the roots of Europe's economic decline, examining institutions of the European Union and exploring possibilities for reform.

It is rare for countries to give up their currencies and thus their ability to influence such critical aspects of their economies as interest and exchange rates. Yet ten years ago a number of European countries did exactly that when they adopted the euro. Despite some dissent, there were a number of arguments in favor of this policy change: it would facilitate exchange of goods, money, and people by decreasing costs; it would increase trade; and it would enhance efficiency and competitiveness at the international level. A decade is an ideal time frame over which to evaluate the success of the euro and whether it has lived up to expectations. To that aim, Europe and the Euro looks at a number of important issues, including the effects of the euro on reform of goods and labor markets; its influence on business cycles and trade among members; and whether the single currency has induced convergence or divergence in the economic performance of member countries. While adoption of the euro may not have met the expectations of its most optimistic proponents, the benefits have been many, and there is reason to believe that the euro is robust enough to survive recent economic shocks. This volume is an essential reference on the first ten years of the euro and the workings of a monetary union.

Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

The euro was supposed to create an unbreakable bond between the nations and people of Europe. But when the debt crisis struck, the flaws of the half-built currency brought the European Union close to breaking point after decades of post-war integration. Deep fault-lines have opened up between European institutions and the nation-states -- and often between the rulers and the ruled -- raising profound questions about Europe's democratic deficit. Belief in European institutions and national governments alike is waning, while radicals on both the left and the right are gaining power and influence. Europe's leaders have so far proved the doomsayers wrong and prevented the currency from breaking up. "If the euro fails, Europe fails," says Angela Merkel. Yet the euro, and the European project as a whole, is far from safe. If it is to survive and thrive, leaders will finally have to confront difficult decisions. How much national sovereignty are they willing to give up to create a more lasting and credible currency? How much of the debt burden and banking risk will they share? Is Britain prepared to walk away from the EU? And will other countries follow? In Unhappy Union, The Economist's Europe editor and Brussels correspondent provide an astute analysis of the crisis. They describe America's behind-the-scenes lobbying to salvage the euro, economists' bitter debates over austerity, the unseen maneuvers of the European Central Bank and the tortuous negotiations over banking union. In the final chapter, they set out the stark choices confronting Europe's leaders and citizens.

With Economic and Monetary Union, the European Union has embarked on one of the biggest projects in its history. Previous literature has focused on how EMU came into being and on the policy issues that it raises. European States and the Euro seeks to move the discussion forwards by offering the first systematic evaluation of how it is affecting EU states, both members and non-members of the Euro-Zone. It is the first book to explicitly situate EMU in the growing literature on Europeanization. It examines the effects on public policies, political structures, discourses, and identities. The book seeks to identify the scope of EMU's effects, the direction that it imparts to political and policy changes, the mechanisms by which it produces its effects, and the role of domestic institutions, political leadership and specific forms of discourse in shaping responses. In addition, the book assesses how, and with what effects, EMU is affecting key policy sectors labour markets and wages, welfare states, and financial market governance. What conditions the degree of convergence discernible in these sectors? Finally, the book seeks to 'contextualize' EMU by assessing its effects both in comparison with other variables like globalization and in a historical perspective of the European Monetary System as a 'training ground'. The book combines sectoral and country case studies with a thematic treatment by recognized experts in their fields. It moves from globalization, through EU-level changes, to member states and finally to specific sectors. The main conclusions are that EMU is most important in affecting the timing, tempo and rhythm of domestic change that these changes are experienced pre-eminently at the level of policy; that it strengthens pressures for convergence; but that different domestic institutional arrangements and discourses lead to variations in policy processes and effects and in the way change is 'framed'. In particular, whilst EMU contains a neo-liberalizing tendency exhibited most clearly in financial market effects, it is not to be characterized as a neo-liberal project by means of which the EU is becoming an economic and social space simply converging around Anglo-American market capitalism.