Known for his seminal work in efficiency-wage theory, Andrew Weiss surveys recent research in the field and presents new results. He shows how wage schedules affect the kinds of workers a firm employs and how well those workers perform on the job. Using straightforward examples, he demonstrates how efficiency-wage theory can explain labor market outcomes and guide government policy. There is a separate section of applications to less developed countries. "Efficiency-wage models represent one of the most important developments in economic theory of recent years. They have, at last, provided integrated explanations both of macroeconomic phenomena, such as unemployment and wage rigidity, and microeconomic phenomena, such as wage dispersion. Weiss--one of the pioneers of efficiency-wage theory--provides here a masterful survey, a lucid and systematic and yet critical account of this rapidly developing branch of economics. This book should be required reading in all courses in macroeconomics."--Joseph Stiglitz, Stanford University "Efficiency Wages should be on the bookshelf of all labor and macroeconomists."--Lawrence H. Summers, Harvard University "A splendid monograph ... most readable... I will put it on my reading list."--Partha Dasgupta, Stanford University Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Using on data from the 1987/88 UK Survey of Incomes In and Out of Work, proposes a simple test of one prominent version of the efficiency wage model, the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) which focuses directly on the issue of whether involuntary unemployment exists or not.

A reduction in the legal workweek may induce a degree of downward wage flexibility, while an employment subsidy to firms accommodates downward wage rigidity. It may be possible, therefore, to increase employment with a policy that combines a reduction in the workweek with an employment subsidy. In general, however, the long-run employment outcome is ambiguous, and a decline in output cannot be ruled out. More direct policy measures whose impact can be assessed with greater certainty—in particular, removing structural rigidities in the labor market—should be given priority to decrease long term unemployment.

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade-off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the Public Use Microdata sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The empirical results suggest that efficiency wages operate primarily for blue collar workers, i.e. workers who tend to be in occupations that face higher levels of supervision. For this subset of workers, longer commutes imply higher levels of unemployment and higher wages, which are both consistent with shirking and leisure being substitutable.