The purpose research is to examine other variables that also affect the relationship between conservatism and earnings quality. Good Corporate Governance is a set of mechanisms that can protect minority shareholders from expropriation by managers and insider shareholders with an emphasis on legal mechanisms.Data Population are companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2010-20015. The sample selection is based on purposive sampling method with the purpose of obtaining a representative sample. An Alternative measure of accounting conservatism used is the instrumental variables of Accounting conservatism (VIKV) developed by Lo (2005). The quality of earnings can be measured through discretionary accruals calculated by way of setting aside total accruals (TACC) and nondiscretionary accruals (NDACC). In calculating DACC, Modified Jones Model is used because it is considered better among other models to measure earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995).The results of this study indicate that the Instrumental Variables Conservatism (VIK) has a significant positive effect on the Earning Quality. This means that management positively signals the application of accounting conservatism within the company and has an impact on improving the quality of earnings. The next investor is expected to provide more valuations by providing a high premium for the company's stock price.

Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews and illustrates earnings management, conservatism, and their effects on earnings quality in an economic modeling framework. Both earnings management and conservative accounting introduce biases to financial reports. The fundamental issue addressed is what economic effects these biases have on earnings quality or financial reporting quality. Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews analytical models of earnings management and conservatism and shows that both can have beneficial or detrimental economic effects, so a differentiated view is appropriate. Earnings management can provide additional information via the financial reporting communication channel, but it can also be used to misrepresent the firm's position. What the authors find is that similar to earnings management, conservatism can reduce the information content of financial reports if it suppresses relevant information, but it can be a desirable feature that improves economic efficiency. The approach to study earnings management, conservatism, and earnings quality is based on the information economics literature. A variety of analytical models are reviewed that capture the effects and subtle interactions of managers' incentives and rational expectations of users. The benefit of analytical models is to make precise these, often highly complex, strategic effects. They offer a rigorous explanation for the phenomena and show that sometimes conventional wisdom does not apply. The monograph is organized around a few basic model settings, which are presented in simple versions first and then in extensions to elicit the main insights most clearly. Chapter 2 presents the basic rational expectations equilibrium model with earnings management and rational inferences by the capital market. Chapter 3 is devoted to earnings quality and earnings quality metrics used in many studies. Chapter 4 studies conservatism in accounting. Finally, the authors examine the interaction between conservatism and earnings management. Each chapter ends with a section containing a summary of the main findings and conclusions.

Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews and illustrates earnings management, conservatism, and their effects on earnings quality in an economic modeling framework. Both earnings management and conservative accounting introduce biases to financial reports. The fundamental issue addressed is what economic effects these biases have on earnings quality or financial reporting quality. Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality reviews analytical models of earnings management and conservatism and shows that both can have beneficial or detrimental economic effects, so a differentiated view is appropriate. Earnings management can provide additional information via the financial reporting communication channel, but it can also be used to misrepresent the firm's position. What the authors find is that similar to earnings management, conservatism can reduce the information content of financial reports if it suppresses relevant information, but it can be a desirable feature that improves economic efficiency. The approach to study earnings management, conservatism, and earnings quality is based on the information economics literature. A variety of analytical models are reviewed that capture the effects and subtle interactions of managers' incentives and rational expectations of users. The benefit of analytical models is to make precise these, often highly complex, strategic effects. They offer a rigorous explanation for the phenomena and show that sometimes conventional wisdom does not apply. The monograph is organized around a few basic model settings, which are presented in simple versions first and then in extensions to elicit the main insights most clearly. Chapter 2 presents the basic rational expectations equilibrium model with earnings management and rational inferences by the capital market. Chapter 3 is devoted to earnings quality and earnings quality metrics used in many studies. Chapter 4 studies conservatism in accounting. Finally, the authors examine the interaction between conservatism and earnings management. Each chapter ends with a section containing a summary of the main findings and conclusions.

Decision making in the economic affairs needs information. The shortage of information causes the ambiguity of the decision making process. The financials provide some of the needed information of this process. The perception of the earnings as the most important information source of the company was being supported by empirical studies. The mentioned researches have shown that the decision makers anchor on the accounting earnings more than any other benchmarks. The purpose of the following research is to help investors and other users to be able to assess the degree of the effects of the conservatism on the earning quality and ROI. The results show that the earning quality index presented based on the conservatism index has the ability to describe some of the differences between return on the operational assets and the current stock returns from the current year to the next year. In other word, economic entities that use the conservative procedures are able to change the earning quality with making some changes in the investments of the operational assets.

This review lays out a research perspective on earnings quality. We provide an overview of alternative definitions and measures of earnings quality and a discussion of research design choices encountered in earnings quality research. Throughout, we focus on a capital markets setting, as opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. Our reason for this choice stems from the view that the capital market uses of accounting information are fundamental, in the sense of providing a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. Because resource allocations are ex ante decisions while contracting/stewardship assessments are ex post evaluations of outcomes, evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. We focus on how the precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation-relevant constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by capital market participants. We emphasize that the choice of constructs to be measured is typically contextual. Our main focus is on the precision of earnings, which we view as a summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. Our intent in discussing research that evaluates the capital market effects of earnings quality is both to stimulate further research in this area and to encourage research on related topics, including, for example, the role of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship.

Purpose -- The study on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality is not new. However, the results are inconsistent and mixed, and to some degree, even contradictory, which represents a gap in the literature. The purpose of this study is to provide some explanations for these mixed results in the literature by investigating the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, as a moderator variable (which has not been considered in the literature before), on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality based on the Dechow and Dichev model and the modified Jones model. Design/methodology/approach --The statistical model used in this study is a multivariate regression model; furthermore, the statistical technique used to test the hypotheses is panel data. Findings --The findings reveal that the adopted models Dechow and Dichev) and the corporate governance mechanisms (such as board independence, large shareholders, and institutional ownership) can have a moderating effect on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality. These findings are exciting, contribute to the current literature, and explain some of the reasons for mixed results. Practical implications -- The findings of the current study provide an important guideline for firms to consider the impact of adopted models (Dechow and Dichev), as well as the corporate governance mechanisms (such as board independence, large shareholders, and institutional ownership) on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality. Originality/value -- Examining the impact of Dechow and Dichev models as well as the corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between accounting conservatism and earnings quality is new in this paper. It can explain part of the reasons for the mixed and inconsistent results in the literature.

The purpose research is to examine other variables that also affect the relationship between conservatism and earnings quality. Good Corporate Governance is a set of mechanisms that can protect minority shareholders from expropriation by managers and insider shareholders with an emphasis on legal mechanisms.Data Population are companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2010-20015. The sample selection is based on purposive sampling method with the purpose of obtaining a representative sample. The results of this study indicate that the Instrumental Variables Conservatism has a significant positive effect on the Earning Quality. This means that management positively signals the application of accounting conservatism within the company and has an impact on improving the quality of earnings. The next investor is expected to provide more valuations by providing a high premium for the company's stock price.