This book explores the social dynamics of the interaction between inspectors and their inspectees in the public sector. Government inspectors have a crucial role in enforcing rules and standards. The role of inspectors has changed. Their task is no longer to merely inspect and enforce, but also to educate, to negotiate, and to make compromises. Their decisions come about as a result of an interaction with inspectees: Do I punish or do I let go? Do I negotiate or do I issue a fine? Do I believe what this inspectee is telling me? Using insights from public administration, regulation and sociology, this book looks at the daily work of a diverse group of inspectors such as tax inspectors, veterinary inspectors, school inspectors, environmental inspectors or health inspectors.

Environmental Enforcement Authorities (EEAs), sometimes called Environmental Protection Agencies (EPAs), are the regulatory, monitoring and enforcement agencies of national, state/provincial and local governments worldwide responsible for implementing, monitoring and enforcing environmental legislation. This one-of-a-kind, authoritative handbook offers a comprehensive assessment of the principles and best practice of EEAs throughout the world with a focus on Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia, east and south-east Asia and various other OECD, transition and developing countries.The book assesses structures, expertise and capacity, financing, permitting, monitoring, inspection, enforcement and EEA performance and future directions. It also identifies best practice for creating or improving EEAs. It offers substantial information for industry on the nature of compliance with environmental regulations as well as vital information for professionals, consultants, NGOs and researchers working at the interface between government EEAs and industry.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency uses a dynamic approach to environmental enforcement for air pollution, with repeat offenders subject to high fines and designation as high priority violators (HPV). We estimate the benefits of dynamic monitoring and enforcement by developing and estimating a dynamic model of a plant and regulator, where plants decide when to invest in pollution abatement technologies. We use a fixed grid approach to estimate random coefficient specifications. Investment, fines, and HPV designation are very costly to most plants. Eliminating dynamic enforcement would have large adverse impacts on the number of high priority violators and pollutants emitted.

This Advanced Introduction provides a clear and accessible guide to the essential elements of environmental compliance and enforcement programs. It examines compliance programs designed to assist regulated entities in meeting their obligations, as well as enforcement tools designed to address non-compliance - such as administrative, civil judicial, and criminal enforcement. Offering an insightful overview of this important area, LeRoy C. Paddock highlights recent developments that are changing the way compliance and enforcement work is practiced.

One of the most controversial issues in environmental law and policy-and one that of considerable importance to the EPA-is the allocation of power and authority between the federal and state governments. The recent evolution in approaches of environmental enforcement highlights many of the tensions inherent in this debate. During the past several years, the federal and state governments have spent a good deal of energy attempting to "reinvent" their relationship. The shifts in federal/state enforcement relations are highly significant, with the potential to fundamentally reorder the division of authority that has existing over the past 25 years. This book thoroughly documents the changing nature of federal/state relations in enforcing environmental law. It breaks new ground in analyzing the federal/state enforcement relationship, particularly in light of the many recent developments that have occurred in this area. The author's findings provide important lessons about the interplay between federal and state efforts in other regulatory areas, and for the structure of federal/state relations generally. Professors Rechtschaffen's and Markell's clear, in-depth analysis will be essential reading for legal and regulatory experts, attorneys who are involved in environmental enforcement matters, the judiciary, legislators, political scientists, public policy experts, and anyone with an interest in environmental law and policy.

Environmental inspections help governments to ensure manufacturers' compliance with environmental regulations and reduce pollution. The effectiveness of these inspections has been exhaustively examined in Western countries, which have effective law systems. However, it has not been examined in the emerging market affected by severe environmental problems. The mechanism underlying the effects of inspections on the supply-side environmental violation and abatement also remains poorly understood. Our study enters this discourse by examining the relationship between the government's environmental inspection frequency (effort) and the manufacturer's environmental performance (in terms of environmental incidents). First, by sampling Chinese listed manufacturers, our empirical analysis reveals that a higher inspection frequency improves a manufacturer's environmental performance in the short- but not in the long-term. We further develop a dynamic game model to explore the reasons behind this lack of effectiveness in the long-term. The results show that effectiveness can be achieved through integration between inspection frequency and penalties for non-compliance. Inspection leads to cosmetic improvements in a manufacturer, and frequent inspections accompanied by increases in penalties substantially enhance a manufacturer's abatement efforts, which is the most effective enforcement policy. Our study suggests that penalty can be the boundary condition between rational choice and behavioral shock on environmental enforcement. It urges manufacturers to make a reasonable abatement effort to reduce the environmental penalty and improve environmental performance on the supply-side. Our study has important implications for policy makers in that it provides them a basis to review the current environmental law and enforcement process.