Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

The European Community is negotiating a new treaty to establish the constitutional foundations of an economic and monetary union in the course of the 1990s. This study provides the only comprehensive guide to the economic implications of economic and monetary union. The work of an economist inside the Commission of the European Community, it reflects the considerations influencing the design of the union. The study creates a unique bridge between the insights of modern economic analysis and the work of the policy makers preparing for economic and monetary union.

Sir Alan Walters ex-chief economic advisor to PM Margaret Thatcher Whether it succeeds or fails, Europe is everyone's concern. The idea of a united Europe has been entertained, even partially at least, achieved, inter alia, CharlemagI!e, Napoleon, Hitler, and in our da)' by Spaak, Monet and Chancellor Kohl: the first three by military conquest, the last three by "negotiation" and the creation of integrating institutional arrangements. The motives varied from the twisted paranoia of the Nazis to the idealism of SpaaklMonet/Kohl in avoiding conflicts and wars. Under the protection of NATO the European Coal and Steel Community soon was transformed into the EEC by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The massive reduction of trade barriers, particularly between France and Germany, was rewarded by vigorous growth over the next 15 years. Even as late as 1972, when Britain acceeded to the Treaty of Rome, the EEC was thought to be lar~ely a customs union: in de Gaulle eyes the EEC was simply a collection of sovereISJ:l states who cooperated primarily on trade. Each state however enjoyed a veto; deCIsions had to be unanimous.

The global economic and financial crisis that started in 2007 exposed serious flaws in the euro's original design. This report examines why Europe's economic and monetary union was so badly affected by the crisis, and assesses whether further changes need to be made to the structure of economic governance that underpins it. A Chatham House, Elcano and AREL Report