A biography of a British pilot set against the backdrop of the Royal Navy’s fight to regain control of its aviation after the First World War. The establishment of the RAF came at a cost—and it was the Royal Navy that paid the price. In 1918 it had been pre-eminent in the technology and tactics of employing aircraft at sea, but once it lost control of its own air power, it struggled to make the RAF prioritize naval interests, in the process losing ground to the rival naval air forces of Japan and the United States. This book documents that struggle through the cash-strapped 1920s and ’30s, culminating in the Navy regaining control of its aviation in 1937, but too late to properly prepare for the impending war. However, despite the lack of resources, British naval flying had made progress, especially in the advancement of carrier strike doctrine. These developments are neatly illustrated by the experiences of Lieutenant William Lucy, who was to become Britain’s first accredited air ‘ace’ of the war and to lead the world’s first successful dive-bombing of a major warship. Making extensive use of the family archive, this book also reproduces many previously unseen photographs from Lucy’s album, showing many aspects of life in the Fleet Air Arm up to the end of the Norway campaign. The inter-war concentration on carrier strike would be spectacularly vindicated during World War II—and it was the Royal Navy that had led the way.

As a follow-up to the highly regarded British Pacific Fleet, David Hobbs looks at the post-World War II fortunes of the most powerful fleet in the Royal Navy—its decline in the face of diminishing resources, its final fall at the hands of ignorant politicians, and its recent resurrection in the form of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers, the largest ships ever built for the Royal Navy. Despite prophecies that nuclear weapons would make conventional forces obsolete, British carrier-borne aircraft were almost continuously employed. The Royal Navy faced new challenges in places like Korea, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf. During these trials the Royal Navy invented techniques and devices crucial to modern carrier operations, pioneering novel forms of warfare tactics for countering insurgency and terrorism. This book combines narratives of poorly understood operations with clear analysis of their strategic and political background. With beautiful illustrations and original research, British Carrier Strike Fleet tells an important but largely untold story of renewed significance as Britain once again embraces carrier operation.

This report presents the highlights of the U.S. Navy's carrier air performance during the first two major wars of the 21st century: Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 and the subsequent 3-week period of major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 that finally ended the rule of Saddam Hussein. The report also addresses ongoing modernization trends in U.S. carrier air capability. In the first war noted above, U.S. carrier air power substituted almost entirely for land-based theater air forces because of an absence of suitable shore-based forward operating locations for the latter. In the second, 6 of 12 carriers and their embarked air wings were surged to contribute to the campaign, with a seventh carrier battle group held in reserve in the Western Pacific and an eighth also deployed and available for tasking. The air wings that were embarked in the 6 committed carriers in the latter campaign flew approximately half the total number of fighter sorties generated altogether by U.S. Central Command. As attested by the performance of naval aviation in both operations, the warfighting potential of today's U.S. carrier strike groups has grown substantially over that of the carrier battle groups that represented the cutting edge of U.S. naval power at the end of the Cold War. The research findings reported herein are the interim results of a larger ongoing study by the author on U.S. carrier air operations and capability improvements since the end of the Cold War. They should interest U.S. naval officers and other members of the defense and national security community concerned with the evolving role of U.S. carrier air power in joint and combined operations. An extensive bibliography is included.

“If you only read one book on the development of the Fleet Air Arm and Naval air warfare in the Mediterranean during World War 2 then this should be it.” —Military Historical Society After the Italian declaration of war in June 1940, the Royal Navy found itself facing a larger and better-equipped Italian surface fleet, large Italian and German air forces equipped with modern aircraft and both Italian and German submarines. Its own aircraft were a critical element of an unprecedented fight on, over and under the sea surface. The best-known action was the crippling of the Italian fleet at Taranto, which demonstrated how aircraft carriers and their aircraft had replaced the dominance of battleships, but every subsequent operation is covered from the perspective of naval aviation. Some of these, like Matapan or the defense of the “Pedestal” convoy to Malta, are famous but others in support of land campaigns and in the Aegean after the Italian surrender are less well recorded. In all these, the ingenuity and innovation of the Fleet Air Arm shines through—Taranto pointed the way to what the Japanese would achieve at Pearl Harbor, while air cover for the Salerno landings demonstrated the effectiveness of carrier-borne fighters in amphibious operations, a tactic adopted by the US Navy. The author’s years of archival research together with his experience as a carrier pilot allow him to describe and analyze the operations of naval aircraft in the Mediterranean with unprecedented authority. This provides the book with novel insights into many familiar facets of the Mediterranean war while for the first time doing full justice to the Fleet Air Arm’s lesser known achievements. “A full and fascinating story.” —Clash of Steel

In the Afghanistan war, U.S. carrier-based fighters substituted almost entirely for land-based theater air forces. The Navy's carriers again played a key role in conducting around-the-clock operations against Saddam Hussein's forces in Iraq. American carrier air power is now able to conduct coordinated deep-strike missions well beyond coastal reaches. The Navy's performance over Afghanistan and Iraq showed how the nation's carrier force can provide around-the-clock target coverage, consistently accurate target attack, and multiple successful target attacks per sortie.

CARRIER STRIKE The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, October 1942 By Eric Hammel The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, a strategic naval action in the bitter Guadalcanal Campaign, was history’s fourth carrier-versus-carrier naval battle. Though technically a Japanese victory, the battle proved to be the Empire of Japan’s last serious attempt to win the Pacific War by means of an all-out carrier confrontation. Only one other carrier battle occurred in the Pacific War, in June 1944, in the Philippine Sea. By then, however, the U.S. Navy’s Fast Carrier Task Force was operational, and Japan’s dwindling fleet of carriers was outnumbered and completely outclassed. Though hundreds of Japanese naval aviators perished in the great Marianas Turkey Shoot of June 19–20, 1944, it was during the first four carrier battles—in the six-month period from early May through late October 1942—that the fate of Japan’s small, elite naval air arm was sealed. It was at Coral Sea, in May, that Japan’s juggernaut across the Pacific was blunted. It was at Midway, in June, that Japan’s great carrier fleet was cut down to manageable size. And it was at Eastern Solomons, in August, and Santa Cruz, in October, that Japan’s last best carrier air groups were ground to dust. After their technical victory at Santa Cruz, the Japanese withdrew their carriers from the South Pacific—and were never able to use them again as a strategically decisive weapon. Of the four Japanese aircraft carriers that participated in the Santa Cruz battle, only one survived the war. Following Santa Cruz and the subsequent series of air and surface engagements known as the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the Imperial Navy’s Combined Fleet never again attempted a meaningful strategic showdown with the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Though several subsequent surface actions in the Solomons were clearly Japanese victories, their results were short-lived. After November 1942, Japan could not again muster the staying power—or the willpower—to wage a strategic war with her navy. Once the veteran carrier air groups had been shredded at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, Japanese carriers ceased to be a strategic weapon. The Santa Cruz clash was deemed a Japanese victory because U.S. naval forces withdrew from the battlefield. That is how victory and defeat are strictly determined. But on the broader, strategic, level, the U.S. Navy won at Santa Cruz—because it was able to achieve its strategic goal of holding the line and buying time. Japan was unable to achieve her strategic goal of defeating the U.S. Pacific Fleet in a final, decisive, all-or-nothing battle. The technical victory cost Japan any serious hope she had of winning the Pacific naval war. The “victory” at Santa Cruz cost Japan her last best hope to win the war in the Pacific. Once again, author-historian Eric Hammel brings to the reading public an exciting narrative filled with the latest information and written in the edge-of-the-seat style that his readers have enjoyed for nearly two decades, in nearly thirty acclaimed military history books. As was the case with its companion volume, Carrier Clash, this new book is based upon American and Japanese battle reports and the recollections of many airmen and seamen who took part.

Among many other developments, World War II saw naval warfare shift from the battleship to the aircraft carrier, which remains one of the iconic weapons of the war and the core of modern battle fleets. Developed in the 1920s and 1930s, the aircraft carrier came into its own in World War II and featured prominently in numerous battles, including the Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, and Leyte Gulf. Later in the war, with many of its own carriers destroyed and its carrier-borne air force crippled, the Japanese relied on kamikazes to replace its aerial strike force and to attack the United States’ carrier force, and the United States used its carriers to attack the Japanese homeland. In this photo history, Donald Nijboer traces the history of aircraft carriers, from their early development just after World War I, to the Japanese carrier-borne attack on Pearl Harbor, through the great battles of the Pacific War, which featured some of military history’s great ships: the Yorktown, the Enterprise, the Hornet, the Lexington, and other vessels. Special sections cover British carrier operations in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as the limited carrier operations of the German Navy, including the Graf Zeppelin.