Dirk is a graduate Civil Engineer from the Mackenzie University (Sao Paulo, Brazil) and Automobile Engineer from the General Motors Institute - GMI (Flint, Michigan - USA) and has specialized courses on Psychology, Human Relations, Human Development, Marketing, Business Strategy and Business Administration from Brazil and abroad. In his executive career in the Automotive and Railway industries in Brazil, he was Director of Product Engineering and Quality Control of Chrysler Brazil. He was also head of the Product and Marketing Committees for Chrysler Brazil and Argentina. Dirk was President of Fresinbra Industrial S.A., the Brazilian subsidiary of Westinghouse Airbrakes / American Standard Co. and was simultaneously Director of all the other American Standard Corp. companies in Brazil. At this time he was, by invitation, a member of the Young Presidents Club (Paris, France), which is exclusive for large company Presidents under 40 years of age. In 1982 he was the founder and only President of DM-PRODUTIVISMO S/C LTDA. a consulting firm specializing in Value Analysis and Value Engineering, business development, competitiveness, quality and management techniques. During this period, Dirk had as clients many of the largest companies in Brazil (the 100 largest of Exame Magazine), and was Member of the Council for industries, hospitals and commerce companies. Among his international clients, Dirk consulted for Leighton Contractors (Asia) in Hong Kong and for John Holland Group, in Camberra and Sidney, Australia. Dirk was responsible for the introduction of new techniques in Brazil like Value Analysis and Engineering and the Theory of Constraints, and developed successful new productivity, quality and competitiveness techniques, implemented with impressive results in companies in Brazil, China and Australia. Dirk published articles on Management in the U.S.A., Europe, Japan, China and several Latin American countries. He was awarded in 1988 by SAVE International the Value Engineering Merit Award and in 1997 with a Special Recognition Award by SJVE - The Society of Japanese Value. He was also merit awarded by several Universities in Brazil, Argentina and Chile.

This book provides a thorough explanation of the evolution of international competitiveness theories and their economic and strategic implications. The theories range from classical theories such as Adam Smith's theory of absolute advantage, to new theories such as Michael Porter's diamond model.

Hunt convincingly demonstrates that competition is not about dividing up limited resources but about creating more resources and thus competition is pro-society. This truly interdisciplinary book successfully develops a general theory of competition which is rich in explanatory breadth and depth. Consequently, executives and entrepreneuers, management consultants, public makers, and scholars and students in economics, law, political science, and business should read and study this book. —Robert F. Lusch, University of Oklahoma This book develops a new theory of competition. This theory – labeled "resource-advantage theory" – stems from no single research tradition, but draws on several different traditions in economics, management, marketing, and sociology. In this ground-breaking volume, Shelby Hunt articulates R-A theory, uses the theory to explain and predict economic phenomena, and shows how (and why) it explains and predicts such phenomena.

Competitiveness and Death examines the increase and reduction of regulatory barriers to trade across three industries: environmental, labor, and safety rules on automobiles, consumer protection regulations on meat, and intellectual property regulations on medicines. The fundamental negotiation in trade and regulatory policymaking occurs between businesses, activists, and government officials. Gary Winslett builds on new trade theories to explain when and why businesses are most likely to lobby governments to reduce these regulatory trade barriers. He argues that businesses prevail when they can connect with broader concerns about national economic competitiveness. He examines how activist organizations overcome collective action problems and defend regulatory differences, arguing that they succeed when they can link their desire for barriers with preventing needless death. Competitiveness and Death provides a political companion to new trade theories in economics, questioning cleavage-based explanations of trade politics, demonstrating the underappreciated importance of activists, suggesting the limits of globalization, providing in-depth examination of previously ignored trade negotiations, qualifying the California Effect (the shift toward stricter regulatory standards), and showing the relative rarity of regulations used as disguised protectionism.

This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided.

A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.

Competition, competitiveness, innovation and growth are inherently linked. This book covers the main ideas underlying competitiveness and its applications, drawing lessons for developing economies and relevant policy recommendations.