Offers a distinctive account of the rule of law and legislative sovereignty within the work of Albert Venn Dicey.

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the differences between common law and civil law systems from various theoretical perspectives. Written by a global network of experts, it explores the topic against the background of a variety of legal traditions.Common law and civil law are typically presented as antagonistic players on a field claimed by diverse legal systems: the former being based on precedent set by judges in deciding cases before them; the latter being founded on a set of rules intended to govern the decisions of those applying them. Perceived in this manner, common law and civil law differ in terms of the (main) source(s) of law; who is to create them; who is (merely) to draw from them; and whether the law itself is pure each step of the way, or whether the law’s purity may be tarnished when confronted with a set of contingent facts. These differences have deep roots in (legal) history – roots that allow us to trace them back to distinct traditions. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the divide thus depicted is as great as it may seem: international and supranational legal systems unconcerned by national peculiarities appear to level the playing field. A normative understanding of constitutions seems to grant ever-greater authority to High Court decisions based on thinly worded maxims in countries that adhere to the civil law tradition. The challenges contemporary regulation faces call for ever-more detailed statutes governing the decisions of judges in the common law tradition. These and similar observations demand a structural reassessment of the role of judges, the power of precedent, the limits of legislation and other features often thought to be so different in common and civil law systems. The book addresses this reassessment.

This book examines the development of legal professionalism in the early English common law, with specific reference to the 13th-century treatise known as Bracton and to its likely authors.

Great Legal Traditions: Civil Law, Common Law, and Chinese Law in Historical and Operational Perspective draws on the nearly thirty years of experience that the author has accumulated from working in and writing about a variety of legal systems around the world. After an introduction to the underlying concepts and values of comparative legal studies, Head embarks on a brisk six-chapter survey of European civil law, English and American common law, and Chinese law (both dynastic and contemporary). Each legal tradition is divided into two perspectives — first historical and then operational. Numerous illustrations and biographical sketches bring the historical surveys to life, thereby setting the stage for a close examination of several key attributes of representative legal systems in each of the three traditions. Head's "operational" topics include sources of law, the role and training of lawyers, the division of court jurisdiction, constitutional review, the role of codification, and more — and he gives special attention to comparative criminal procedure. Great Legal Traditions is designed primarily for use in law schools and other graduate programs in comparative history, international relations, and both European and Chinese area studies, but the book is also written to be accessible to a more general readership. The main text is supplemented with numerous appendices that serve in place of a documents supplement. A teacher's manual is also available with guidance on each of the study questions that Head places at the beginning of each chapter (roughly 200 study questions in all). The teacher's manual also provides guidance (and confidence) to instructors not already familiar with Chinese law and history.

This book commemorates a place and a time in American law teaching, but more importantly, an outlook: the common law tradition. That outlook was empirical and tolerant. These values were carried into expression by a group of people who were not part of a cult or faction nor ruled by the herd instinct. Now in paperback, The Common Law Tradition is a collective portrait of five scholars who epitomize the tradition.The focus is Chicago in the 1960s. The five figures considered--Edward H. Levi, Harry Kalven, Jr., Karl Llewellyn, Philip Kurland, and Kenneth Culp Davis--did much to broaden the perspectives of the legal academy. Levi made use of sociology, economics, and comparative law. Kalven collaborated with sociologists on the Jury Project and with economists on tax law and auto compensation plans. Llewellyn's commitment to empirical research underpinned his work on the Uniform Commercial Code. Kurland's approach to constitutional law was highlighted by his insistence on the relevance of legal history. Davis was an energetic comparativist in his work on administrative law. What distinguished these Chicagoans is that their work was practical and rooted in the law, and hence yielded concrete applications. The group's diversity, the tolerant atmosphere in which they taught and wrote, and the attachment of its individual members to empirical approaches differentiate them from today's legal scholars and make their ideas of continuing importance.

Common law rules predominate in some areas of law, such as torts and contracts, and are extremely important in other areas, such as corporations. Nevertheless, it has been unclear what principles courts use—or should use—in establishing common law rules. In this lucid book, Melvin Eisenberg develops the principles that govern this process.