Abstract: "There has been an explosion in the number of preferential trade agreements in the past decade. Preferential trade agreements are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus they can potentially clash with and retard multilateral trade liberalization. Despite this important concern with preferential trade agreements, there is almost no systematic evidence on whether they actually affect multilateral trade liberalization. Karacaovali and Limô model the effect of preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalization and show that preferential trade agreements slow down multilateral trade liberalization unless they have a common external tariff and allow for internal transfers. Next, they use detailed data on product-level tariffs negotiated by the European Union in the past two multilateral trade rounds to structurally estimate their model. The authors confirm the main prediction--the European Union's preferential trade agreements have clashed with its multilateral trade liberalization--and find that the effect is quantitatively significant. Moreover, they also confirm several auxiliary predictions of the model and provide new evidence on the political economy determinants of multilateral liberalization in the European Union. This paper--a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the interaction between preferential and multilateral liberalization"--World Bank web site.

There has been an explosion in the number of preferential trade agreements in the past decade. Preferential trade agreements are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus they can potentially clash with and retard multilateral trade liberalization. Despite this important concern with preferential trade agreements, there is almost no systematic evidence on whether they actually affect multilateral trade liberalization. The authors model the effect of preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalization and show that preferential trade agreements slow down multilateral trade liberalization unless they have a common external tariff and allow for internal transfers. Next, they use detailed data on product-level tariffs negotiated by the European Union in the past two multilateral trade rounds to structurally estimate their model. The authors confirm the main prediction-the European Union's preferential trade agreements have clashed with its multilateral trade liberalization--and find that the effect is quantitatively significant. Moreover, they also confirm several auxiliary predictions of the model and provide new evidence on the political economy determinants of multilateral liberalization in the European Union.

Because of concern that OECD tariff reductions will translate into worsening export performance for the least developed countries, trade preferences have proven a stumbling block to developing country support for multilateral liberalization. The authors examine the actual scope for preference erosion, including an econometric assessment of the actual utilization and the scope for erosion estimated by modeling full elimination of OECD tariffs, and hence full most-favored-nation liberalization-based preference erosion. Preferences are underutilized due to administrative burden-estimated to be at least 4 percent on average-reducing the magnitude of erosion costs significantly. For those products where preferences are used (are of value), the primary negative impact follows from erosion of EU preferences. This suggests the erosion problem is primarily bilateral rather than a WTO-based concern.

The book Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements is a selection of published articles examining how policy externalities motivate and can be addressed by international trading institutions. The studies provide groundbreaking evidence of the role of international market power and policy uncertainty as motives for trade agreements and on the potential clash between preferential trade liberalization (e.g. European Union, NAFTA) and multilateral agreements (WTO). The studies presented in this book not only identify and estimate how different policies interact with each other and across agreements, but also examine how international trading institutions can be used to limit redistribution towards special interest groups and enforce better cooperation across issues, such as labor and the environment, and between developing and developed countries.

Along with its painful economic costs, the financial crisis of 2008 raised concerns over the future of international policy making. As in recessions past, new policy initiatives emerged, approaches that placed greater importance on protecting national interests than promoting international economic cooperation. Whether in fiscal or monetary policies, the control of currencies and capital flows, the regulation of finance, or the implementation of protectionist policies and barriers to trade, there has been an almost worldwide trend toward the prioritizing of national economic security. But what are the underlying economic causes of this trend, and what can economic research reveal about the possible consequences? Prompted by these questions, Robert C. Feenstra and Alan M. Taylor have brought together top researchers with policy makers and practitioners whose contributions consider the ways in which the global economic order might address the challenges of globalization that have arisen over the last two decades and that have been intensified by the recent crisis. Chapters in this volume consider the critical linkages between issues, including exchange rates, global imbalances, and financial regulation, and plumb the political and economic outcomes of past policies for what they might tell us about the future of the global economic cooperation.

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have proliferated around the world in the past two decades, and now nearly all members of the WTO are party to at least one. Besides tariffs and rules of origin regulating trade in goods, many RTAs now include provisions on services, investments, technical barriers to trade and competition rules, as well as a host of issues not directly related to trade. The geographic reach of RTAs is expanding, with transcontinental agreements spreading forcefully alongside intra-regional agreements. 'Multilateralizing Regionalism' was the title of a major conference held from 10–12 September 2007 at the WTO in Geneva. Brought together in this publication, the conference papers achieve two things. First, they marshall detailed, new empirical work on the nature of the 'Spaghetti Bowl' and the problems it poses for the multilateral trade system. Second, they contribute fresh and creative thinking on how to 'tame the tangle' of regional trade agreements.