Assessing three of the most enduring civilian regimes in Africa--Botswana, Kenya, and, until the December 1999 coup, the Ivory Coast--Boubacar N'Diaye focuses on the role of civilian regimes in the institutionalization of civilian control. The author warns that only government legitimacy and a culture of genuine military professionalism are likely to assure civilian control of the military. N'Diaye calls for a bold conceptual shift in the study of African civil-military relations away from expedient short-term coup avoidance. Refreshingly, his study emphasizes the policies regimes enact instead of the structures of African societies or the personal idiosyncrasies of leaders. This book has important implications not only for understanding the causes and outcomes of coups in Africa, but also for the study of emerging democracies everywhere.

In recent decades, several East Asian nations have undergone democratic transitions accompanied by changes in the balance of power between civilian elites and military leaders. These developments have not followed a single pattern: In Thailand, failure to institutionalize civilian control has contributed to the breakdown of democracy; civil-military relations and democracy in the Philippines are in prolonged crisis; and civilian control in Indonesia is yet to be institutionalized. At the same time, South Korea and Taiwan have established civilian supremacy and made great advances in consolidating democracy. These differences can be explained by the interplay of structural environment and civilian political entrepreneurship. In Taiwan, Korea, and Indonesia, strategic action, prioritization, and careful timing helped civilians make the best of their structural opportunities to overcome legacies of military involvement in politics. In Thailand, civilians overestimated their ability to control the military and provoked military intervention. In the Philippines, civilian governments forged a symbiotic relationship with military elites that allowed civilians to survive in office but also protected the military's institutional interests. These differences in the development of civil-military relations had serious repercussions on national security, political stability, and democratic consolidation, helping to explain why South Korea, Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, Indonesia have experienced successful democratic transformation, while Thailand and the Philippines have failed to establish stable democratic systems.

Effective governance is a crucial aspect of all modern nations. Through various collaborative efforts and processes, nations can enhance their current governance systems. The Handbook of Research on Sub-National Governance and Development is a pivotal reference source for the latest scholarly material on the intersection between local and national politics, analyzing how this relationship affects nations’ economy and administration. Highlighting theoretical foundations and real-world applications, this book is ideally designed for professionals, academics, students, and practitioners actively involved in the fields of public policy and governance.

This comparative work examines the political role played by armed forces in South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The work brings together theory and empirical study, analyzing how security threats have shaped the military's organization, doctrine, and domestic political role at various stages of political development, from the state-building period to today's post-democratization era. Using four representative case studies, Woo sets to answer: What determines the armed forces' political influence? How does it affect political development? How do democratically elected leaders establish civilian control over them? The book first looks at how security threats led to military expansion and authoritarianism at the onset of the Cold War. Next, it examines military dictatorial rule, followed by a study of the military's withdrawal process during democratization. Lastly, it focuses on contemporary civil-military dynamics in the four countries, discussing the obstacles faced by civilian authority and what maybe the most desirable model for civil-military relations in post-democratization Asian societies. "Security Challenges and Military Politics in East Asia" will be an essential resource for anyone studying Asian political development, civil-military relations, and comparative democratization.

How can civilians in newly democratized countries ensure their control over the military? While establishing civilian control of the military is a necessary condition for a functioning democracy, it requires prudent strategic action on the part of the decision-makers to remove the military from positions of power and make it follow their orders.

The armed forces may no longer rule nations throughout Latin America, but they continue to influence democratic governments across the region. In nine original, thought-provoking essays, this book offers fresh theoretical insights into the dilemmas facing Latin American politicians as they struggle to gain full control over their military institutions. Latin America has changed in profound ways since the end of the Cold War, the re-emergence of democracy, and the ascendancy of free-market economies and trade blocs. The contributors to this volume recognize the necessity of finding intellectual approaches that speak to these transformations. They utilize a wide range of contemporary models to analyze recent political and economic reform in nations throughout Latin America, presenting case studies on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela. Bridging the gap between Latin American studies and political science, these essays not only explore the forces that shape civil-military relations in Latin America but also address larger questions of political development and democratization in the region. The contributors are Felipe Aguero, J. Samuel Fitch, Wendy Hunter, Ernesto Lopez, Brian Loveman, David R. Mares, Deborah L. Norden, David Pion-Berlin, and Harold A. Trinkunas. Latin American Studies/Political Science

With its creation of the U.S. Bureau of Efficiency in 1916, Congress sought to bring the principles of "scientific management" to the federal government. Although this first staff agency in the executive branch lasted only a relatively short time, it was the first central agency in the federal government dedicated to improving the management of the executive branch. Mordecai Lee offers both a chronological history of the agency and a thematic treatment of the structure, staffing, and work processes of the bureau; its substantive activities; and its effects on the development of both the executive and the legislative branches. Charged with conducting management and policy analyses at the direction of the president, this bureau presaged the emergence of the activist and modern executive branch. The Bureau of Efficiency was also the first legislative branch agency, ushering in the large administrative infrastructure that now supports the policy-making and program oversight roles of Congress. The Bureau of Efficiency's assistance to presidents foreshadowed the eventual change in the role of the president vis-a-vis Congress; it helped upend the separation of powers doctrine by giving the modern executive the management tools for preeminence over the legislative branch.