Essay from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1,7, , language: English, abstract: The center of gravity paradigm created and published by Carl von Clausewitz in his famous study about the appearance of war is nowadays still widely used to describe the core incitements and driving factors of warring factions, political parties, militias and even terrorist groups. In a short summary this military term of a center of gravity is defined as the one or few main forces where a party in a conflict drives its willpower and its strength from. It is a common element amongst the members and supporters of this group and with reference to Clausewitz’s study, it is this key element the opponent needs to identify and to overcome in order to break the willpower of the party and to finally conquer them. For that reason various studies have been undertaken und research has been performed with regards to the center of gravity in warfare as well as the center of gravity for terrorist groups and esp. for Al Qaeda. In the case of Al Qaeda most completed studies and published documents agreed to the point that the ideology preached by the core leaders of the network is the key element, where their followers draw their support and willpower from. At the same time Al Qaeda these days transformed itself to a loose network with just a common brand name and ideology, but without much central guidance or command. Numerous groups throughout all parts of world emerge and entitle themselves with the name Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliated. Often there are no or just minor links to the former core leadership of Al Qaeda. For that reason it seems, that the network called Al Qaeda with most of its global affiliates is not more a strict hierarchical structured group, nor is it a self-contained network anymore with its origin in the mountain region of the Afghan-Pakistan (AfPak) border area. Al Qaeda seems to have many different appearances. Therefore the underlying hypothesis of this essay is that beside the remaining core of Al Qaeda in the AfPak region, the name Al Qaeda is nowadays used as a corporate name of different local or regional acting terrorist groups in order to provide a powerful proof of their willingness and capability. In that line the outcome of the hypothesis argues that the CoG for Al Qaeda affiliates is derived from their own and individual domestic or regional issues and interests as well as their regional supremacy.

Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist org. than the one that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. The pre-9/11 AQ was akin to a corp., with Osama Bin Laden acting as a CEO issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. It has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. Contents of this report: (1) Background; (2) AQ Origins; (3) Afghanistan; (4) Pakistan; (5) Arabian Peninsula; (6) Iraq; (7) North Africa/Sahel: Islamic Maghreb; Algeria; The Sahel; (8) Somalia; The Islamic Courts Union, Al Shabaab; (9) Radical Islamist Groups in SE Asia: Jemaah Islamiya; Abu Sayyaf Group; (10) AQ¿s Global Strategy and Long Term Policy Implications.

Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare's principles and processes. The author uses the terrorist network, Al Qaeda, as an illustration of the process in correctly identifying a center of gravity for a terrorist force, a force not fitting the common definition of a conventional or unconventional operational force. In applying the principles and processes of operational warfare in this analysis, the author first needed to determine the war on terrorism's strategic enemy and that strategic enemy's objective, because it is from the national strategic, or political objective objectives, that operational objectives are derived. In analysis of the strategic enemy, the author postulates that radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups, when viewed in holistically, comprise a "will of the people, more precisely defined as, radical Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism." In conclusion, the author states that it turns out that defining Al Qaeda's center of gravity is "easy" relatively speaking, but it is the courses of action deriving from that center of gravity which are hard to define, develop, and execute in defeating not only Al Qaeda, but "Adversary."

Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare's principles and processes. The author uses the terrorist network, Al Qaeda, as an illustration of the process in correctly identifying a center of gravity for a terrorist force, a force not fitting the common definition of a conventional or unconventional operational force. In applying the principles and processes of operational warfare in this analysis, the author first needed to determine the war on terrorism's strategic enemy and that strategic enemy's objective, because it is from the national strategic, or political objective objectives, that operational objectives are derived. In analysis of the strategic enemy, the author postulates that radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups, when viewed in holistically, comprise a "will of the people, more precisely defined as, radical Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism." In conclusion, the author states that it turns out that defining Al Qaeda's center of gravity is "easy" relatively speaking, but it is the courses of action deriving from that center of gravity which are hard to define, develop, and execute in defeating not only Al Qaeda, but "Adversary."

Today, Islamicist organizations are becoming more widespread and diffuse. They often lack a direct connection to al Qaeda's strategic leadership but are inspired by its ideology. Al Qaeda's operational role is subdued, but its ideological, propaganda, and support roles are critical to its affiliates. Many groups now adhere to the original goals and ideology of al Qaeda, which extends the scope of its influence well beyond that of the original organization, although al Qaeda itself is still considered the most dangerous of all transnational extremist groups and is America's principal enemy.