This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

"I don't blame my executioners. I will pray God bless them. " So said General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Japan's most accomplished military commander, as he stood on the scaffold in Manila in 1946. His stoic dignity typified the man his U.S. Army defense lawyers had come to deeply respect in the first war crimes trial of World War II. Moments later, he was dead. But had justice been served? Allan A. Ryan reopens the case against Yamashita to illuminate crucial questions and controversies that have surrounded his trial and conviction, but also to deepen our understanding of broader contemporary issues-especially the limits of command accountability. The atrocities of 1944 and 1945 in the Philippines-rape, murder, torture, beheadings, and starvation, the victims often women and children-were horrific. They were committed by Japanese troops as General Douglas MacArthur's army tried to recapture the islands. Yamashita commanded Japan's dispersed and besieged Philippine forces in that final year of the war. But the prosecution conceded that he had neither ordered nor committed these crimes. MacArthur charged him, instead, with the crime-if it was one-of having "failed to control" his troops, and convened a military commission of five American generals, none of them trained in the law. It was the first prosecution in history of a military commander on such a charge. In a turbulent and disturbing trial marked by disregard of the Army's own rules, the generals delivered the verdict they knew MacArthur wanted. Yamashita's lawyers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, whose controversial decision upheld the conviction over the passionate dissents of two justices who invoked, for the first time in U.S. legal history, the concept of international human rights. Drawing from the tribunal's transcripts, Ryan vividly chronicles this tragic tale and its personalities. His trenchant analysis of the case's lingering question-should a commander be held accountable for the crimes of his troops, even if he has no knowledge of them-has profound implications for all military commanders.

In 1945, US intelligence officers in Manila discovered that the Japanese had hidden large quantities of gold bullion and other looted treasure in the Philippines. President Truman decided to recover the gold but to keep its riches secret. These, combined with Japanese treasure recovered during the US occupation, and with recovered Nazi loot, would create a worldwide American political action fund to fight communism. This 'Black Gold' gave Washington virtually limitless, unaccountable funds, providing an asset base to reinforce the treasuries of America's allies, to bribe political and military leaders, and to manipulate elections in foreign countries for more than fifty years.

“Illuminating.… An eloquent testament to a doomed city and its people.” —The Wall Street Journal In early 1945, General Douglas MacArthur prepared to reclaim Manila, America’s Pearl of the Orient, which had been seized by the Japanese in 1942. Convinced the Japanese would abandon the city, he planned a victory parade down Dewey Boulevard—but the enemy had other plans. The Japanese were determined to fight to the death. The battle to liberate Manila resulted in the catastrophic destruction of the city and a rampage by Japanese forces that brutalized the civilian population, resulting in a massacre as horrific as the Rape of Nanking. Drawing from war-crimes testimony, after-action reports, and survivor interviews, Rampage recounts one of the most heartbreaking chapters of Pacific War history.

A title in The Lawbook Exchange series, Foundations of the Laws of War. With a New Introductory Essay entitled "Will We Finally Apply Nuremberg's Lessons?" by Benjamin Ferencz, Chief Prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, author of Defining International Aggression: The Search for World Peace (1975), Adjunct Professor of International Law, Pace University and founder of the Pace Peace Center.Originally published three years before the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1973, this important book is not a polemic, but a sober account of the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of international law. Framed in reference to the Nuremberg Trials that followed the Second World War, it describes problems the United States may have to face due to its involvement in the Vietnam conflict. After presenting a general history of war crimes and an account of the Nuremberg Trials, Taylor turns his attention to Vietnam. He also examines parallels between actions committed by American troops during the then-recent My Lai Massacre of 1968 and Hitler's SS in Nazi-occupied Europe. Telford Taylor [1908-1998] was chief counsel for the prosecution at the Nuremberg Trials. Later Professor of Law at Columbia University, he was a vigorous opponent of Senator Joseph McCarthy and an outspoken critic of U.S. actions during the Vietnam War. His books include Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich (1952), Grand Inquest: The Story of Congressional Investigations (1955) and The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (1992).

Includes over 30 illustrations As in Nazi occupied countries that were liberated by the Allies, horrible crimes had been uncovered, perpetrated in the name of superior culture on defenceless civilians and prisoners of war. As the emaciated American, British, Australian soldiers emerged from the prisoner of war camps with barbaric tales of torture, mistreatment and neglect, it was clear that justice must be sought. The U.S. Military fixed on two Japanese generals who were foremost in causing and ordering these outrages, the conqueror of Malaya Tomoyuki Yamahsita and the notorious “Death March” Masaharu Homma. Lt. Col. Kenworthy was a member of the U.S. military police assigned to the Philippines and saw at first hand the military tribunal ordered at the express command of General MacArthur. He was detailed to guard both Yamashita and Homma during the trial and was able to view their reactions to the detailed evidence that was used against them. He was determined to write this account of this momentous event, he recorded not only the evidence of the crimes but also the stoic calm with which the two generals faced the weight of Allied Justice. A fascinating sidelight on the ending of the World War Two.