Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

Only of late has defense "burden sharing" emerged as a key issue in U.S.-Japanese relations. This monograph examines the legal, political, economic, and attitudinal constraints inhibiting the Japanese from contributing more to their defense. Includes discussion on the legal obligation of burden sharing; indicators of contribution to defense; legal, policy, and political constraints; Japan's defense contribution and some initiatives for increased burden sharing; and U.S. strategy to influence Japan's contribution. Charts and tables.

Japan's new politics challenge some basic assumptions about U.S.-Japan alliance management. CFR Senior Fellow Sheila A. Smith explores this new era of alternating parties in power and reveals the growing importance of Japan's domestic politics in shaping alliance cooperation.

As Japan's newfound economic power leads to increased political power, there is concern that Japan may be turning East Asia into a regional economic bloc to rival the U.S. and Europe. In Regionalism and Rivalry, leading economists and political scientists address this concern by looking at three central questions: Is Japan forming a trading bloc in Pacific Asia? Does Japan use foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia to achieve national goals? Does Japan possess the leadership qualities necessary for a nation assuming greater political responsibility in international affairs? The authors contend that although intraregional trade in East Asia is growing rapidly, a trade bloc is not necessarily forming. They show that the trade increase can be explained entirely by factors independent of discriminatory trading arrangements, such as the rapid growth of East Asian economies. Other chapters look in detail at cases of Japanese direct investment in Southeast Asia and find little evidence of attempts by Japan to use the power of its multinational corporations for political purposes. A third group of papers attempt to gauge Japan's leadership characteristics. They focus on Japan's "technology ideology," its contributions to international public goods, international monetary cooperation, and economic liberalization in East Asia.

Relations between Japan and the US remain strong, and government-to-government relations continue to be productive. However, complaints can be heard. This volume reflects these sentiments and emphasizes the need to promote closer ties and greater understanding between the US and Japan.

Japan's National Security offers a detailed examination of Japan's distinctive security policy. It traces in considerable detail the evolution of Japan's approach to the economic, political and military dimensions of national structures of government as well as a particular set of relations between state and society. One of the noteworthy aspects of this book is its detailed attention to the transnational links between the Japanese and the American militaries. The book accords a special place of the interaction between the legal and social norms that have affected Japanese conceptions of national security since 1945. Japan's National Security offers an important, meticulously researched, and up-to-date perspective on the role that Japan is likely to play after the Cold War. Together with Defending the Japanese State, these two monographs analyze the structures and norms that are shaping Japan's policy on internal and national security. The specific focus is on governmental, state-society and transnational structures as well as the social and legal norms that affect the policies of Japan's police and self-defense forces.