"On 1 October 1949, the People's Republic of China came into being and changed forever the course of Asian history. Power moved from the hands of the nationalist Kuomintang government to the Communist Party of China headed by Mao Tse Tung. All of a sudden, it was not only an assertive China that India had to deal with but also an increasingly complex situation in Tibet which was reeling under pressure from China. Clearly, newly independent India, with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at its helm, was navigating very choppy waters. Its relations with China progressively deteriorated, eventually leading to the Indo-China war in 1962. Today, more than six decades after the war, we are still plagued by border disputes with China that seem to routinely grab the headlines. It leads one to question what exactly went on during those initial years of the emergence of a new China"--Publisher's summary.

The status of Tibet has been at the core of the Tibet-China conflict for all parties drawn into it over the past century. This study is a guide to the historical arguments made by the primary parties to the Tibet-China conflict, and examines the extent to which positions on Tibet issues that are thought to reflect centuries of popular consensus are actually very recent constructions, often at variance with the history on which they claim to be based.

At the outset, this book must be viewed as a policy relevant document rather than an abstract historical research paper. The authors have revisited the seemingly intractable India-China border dispute from a contemporary conflict resolution perspective and thus are relatively detached from the historical baggage that has so often influenced other commentaries on this controversial subject. The great natural defensive line of northern India, the mighty Himalayas, separating Tibet from north-east India, is a barrier which, by tradition, was impenetrable. This defensive line is embodied by the 1914 Line, India s non-negotiable interest. Thus, from an Indian perspective, it can never be conceived that its frontiers with China are ever formalized on the Brahmaputra plains. Further, the 1914 alignment, aside from its strategic sanctity, also upholds the ethnic and linguistic affinities to peoples south of it, who are distinct from the homogenous Tibetan or Han people. Similarly, from China s perspective it too is in possession of its non-negotiable interest the Aksai Chin plateau. And therein lies the essence of an east-west swap. By retracing the historical record, the authors argue that such a swap is eminently feasible and historically justifiable. Moreover, realpolitik demands it. From the Indian perspective, however, it should be equally clear that a bipartisan national consensus is imperative for any breakthrough resolution to emerge. It remains to be seen, however, if political managers on both sides are able to muster the necessary will to resolve a dispute that has lasted for more than half-a-century. Contents: Introduction · Acknowledgments · The Legacy of the Great Game · India, Tibet and China · India Inherits the Frontiers :1947-1954 · The Debacle of 1962 · Road to Rapprochement: Diplomacy since the 1970s · The Way Forward: Mutual accommodation and accommodation of reality · Appendices · Bibliography · Index

A deep dive into understanding India-China relations Why did India and China go to war in 1962? What propelled Jawaharlal Nehru's 'vision' of China? Why is it necessary to understand the trans-Himalayan power play of India and China in the formative period of their nationhoods? The past shadows the present in this relationship and shapes current policy options, strongly influencing public debate in India to this day. Nirupama Rao, a former Foreign Secretary of India, unknots this intensely complex saga of the early years of the India-China relationship. As a diplomat-practitioner, Rao's telling is based not only on archival material from India, China, Britain and the United States, but also on a deep personal knowledge of China, where she served as India's Ambassador. In addition, she brings a practitioner's keen eye to the labyrinth of negotiations and official interactions that took place between the two countries from 1949 to 1962. The Fractured Himalaya looks at the inflection points when the trajectory of diplomacy between these two nations could have course-corrected but did not. Importantly, it dwells on the strategic dilemma posed by Tibet in relations between India and China-a dilemma that is far from being resolved. The question of Tibet is closely interwoven into the fabric of this history. It also turns the searchlight on the key personalities involved-Jawaharlal Nehru, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the 14th Dalai Lama-and their interactions as the tournament of those years was played out, moving step by closer step to the conflict of 1962.

This study of Chinese foreign policy is intended for academics and graduates of Chinese studies and of international relations, international economics and those interested in decision-making theory.