"What is the difference between seeing and thinking? Is the border between seeing and thinking a joint in nature in the sense of a fundamental explanatory difference? Is it a difference of degree? Does thinking affect seeing, i.e. is seeing "cognitively penetrable"? Are we aware of faces, causation, numerosity and other "high-level" properties or only of the colors, shapes and textures that-according to the advocate of high level perception--are the basis on which we see them? Is perception conceptual and propositional? Is perception iconic or more akin to language in being discursive? Is seeing singular? Which is more fundamental, visual attribution or visual discrimination? Is all seeing seeing-as? What is the difference between the format and content of perception and do perception and cognition have different formats? Is perception probabilistic and if so, why are we not normally aware of this probabilistic nature of perception? Are the basic features of mind known as "core cognition" a third category in between perception and cognition? Are there perceptual categories that are not concepts? Where does consciousness fit in with regard to the difference between seeing and thinking? Do the lessons from seeing apply to other senses? These are the questions I will be exploring in this book. I will be exploring them not mainly by appeals to "intuitions" as is common in philosophy of perception but by appeal to empirical evidence, including experiments in neuroscience and psychology"--

"What is the difference between seeing and thinking? Is the border between seeing and thinking a joint in nature in the sense of a fundamental explanatory difference? Is it a difference of degree? Does thinking affect seeing, i.e. is seeing "cognitively penetrable"? Are we aware of faces, causation, numerosity and other "high-level" properties or only of the colors, shapes and textures that-according to the advocate of high level perception--are the basis on which we see them? Is perception conceptual and propositional? Is perception iconic or more akin to language in being discursive? Is seeing singular? Which is more fundamental, visual attribution or visual discrimination? Is all seeing seeing-as? What is the difference between the format and content of perception and do perception and cognition have different formats? Is perception probabilistic and if so, why are we not normally aware of this probabilistic nature of perception? Are the basic features of mind known as "core cognition" a third category in between perception and cognition? Are there perceptual categories that are not concepts? Where does consciousness fit in with regard to the difference between seeing and thinking? Do the lessons from seeing apply to other senses? These are the questions I will be exploring in this book. I will be exploring them not mainly by appeals to "intuitions" as is common in philosophy of perception but by appeal to empirical evidence, including experiments in neuroscience and psychology"--

"In Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of representational mind: perception. Focusing on its form, function, and underlying capacities, as indicated in the sciences of perception, Burge provides an account of the representational content and formal representational structure of perceptual states, and develops a formal semantics for them. The account is elaborated by an explanation of how the representational form is embedded in an iconic format. These structures are then situated in current theoretical accounts of the processing of perceptual representations, with an emphasis on the formation of perceptual categorizations. An exploration of the relationship between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-clarifies the distinction between perceiving, with its associated capacities, and thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing on a broad range of historical and contemporary research, rather than relying on introspection or ordinary talk about perception, Perception: First Form of Mind is a scientifically rigorous and agenda-setting work in the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of science"--

The first of a planned two-volume collection of Ned Block's writings on philosophy of mind; this volume treats consciousness, functionalism, and representation and can be regarded as Block's most complete statement of his positions on consciousness.

"Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noë. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noë argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought—that perception is a kind of thoughtful activity. Touch, not vision, should be our model for perception. Perception is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skillful activity of the body as a whole. We enact our perceptual experience. To perceive, according to this enactive approach to perception, is not merely to have sensations; it is to have sensations that we understand. In Action in Perception, Noë investigates the forms this understanding can take. He begins by arguing, on both phenomenological and empirical grounds, that the content of perception is not like the content of a picture; the world is not given to consciousness all at once but is gained gradually by active inquiry and exploration. Noë then argues that perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession and exercise of practical bodily knowledge, and examines, among other topics, the problems posed by spatial content and the experience of color. He considers the perspectival aspect of the representational content of experience and assesses the place of thought and understanding in experience. Finally, he explores the implications of the enactive approach for our understanding of the neuroscience of perception.

Using the borderscapes concept, this book offers an approach to border studies that expresses the multilevel complexity of borders, from the geopolitical to social practice and cultural production at and across the border. Accordingly, it encourages a productive understanding of the processual, de-territorialized and dispersed nature of borders and their ensuring regimes in the era of globalization and transnational flows as well as showcasing border research as an interdisciplinary field with its own academic standing. Contemporary bordering processes and practices are examined through the borderscapes lens to uncover important connections between borders as a ’challenge' to national (and EU) policies and borders as potential elements of political innovation through conceptual (re-)framings of social, political, economic and cultural spaces. The authors offer a nuanced and critical re-reading and understanding of the border not as an entity to be taken for granted, but as a place of investigation and as a resource in terms of the construction of novel (geo)political imaginations, social and spatial imaginaries and cultural images. In so doing, they suggest that rethinking borders means deconstructing the interweaving between political practices of inclusion-exclusion and the images created to support and communicate them on the cultural level by Western territorialist modernity. The result is a book that proposes a wandering through a constellation of bordering policies, discourses, practices and images to open new possibilities for thinking, mapping, acting and living borders under contemporary globalization.

A timely collection of debates concerning the major themes and topics in philosophy of mind, fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments in the field Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind provides a lively and engaging introduction to the conceptual background, ongoing debates, and contentious issues in the field today. Original essays by more than 30 of the discipline’s most influential thinkers offer opposing perspectives on a series of contested questions regarding mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities. Written to appeal to non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, the second edition of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid. Presents 15 sets of specially commissioned essays with opposing viewpoints on central topics in philosophy of mind Offers head-to-head debates on central topics such as consciousness, intentionality, normativity, mental causation, materialism, and perception Provides a dynamic view of contemporary thinking about fundamental and controversial issues Includes a thorough introduction providing a comprehensive background to the issues explored in each debate Part of Wiley-Blackwell’s acclaimed Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, academics, professional philosophers, and sophisticated general readers with an interest in the subject.