A concise and balanced view of what is known as the Blitz on London. The title emphasizes bombing over blitz and recognises that the meaning of ‘the Blitz’ has now acquired other general connotations and is often equated to ‘Britain in wartime’ or the spirit of carrying on.

The Blitz Companion offers a unique overview of a century of aerial warfare, its impact on cities and the people who lived in them. It tells the story of aerial warfare from the earliest bombing raids and in World War 1 through to the London Blitz and Allied bombings of Europe and Japan. These are compared with more recent American air campaigns over Cambodia and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, the NATO bombings during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, and subsequent bombings in the aftermath of 9/11. Beginning with the premonitions and predictions of air warfare and its terrible consequences, the book focuses on air raids precautions, evacuation and preparations for total war, and resilience, both of citizens and of cities. The legacies of air raids, from reconstruction to commemoration, are also discussed. While a key theme of the book is the futility of many air campaigns, care is taken to situate them in their historical context. The Blitz Companion also includes a guide to documentary and visual resources for students and general readers. Uniquely accessible, comparative and broad in scope this book draws key conclusions about civilian experience in the twentieth century and what these might mean for military engagement and civil reconstruction processes once conflicts have been resolved.

The Little Blitz on London in the early part of 1944 is briefly mentioned in most accounts of the aerial war against the UK during the Second World War but is seldom deemed worthy of more than a few lines. The Little Blitz is the name applied to the air raids on Britain which were the manifestation of the Luftwaffe's Operation Steinbock, planned in the last few months of 1943 and put into effect from the middle of January 1944. The raids, planned as revenge for the destructive RAF raids on Berlin, were mainly targeted London, and after nearly three years of respite from air raids, the Little Blitz was an unwelcome surprise for residents of the Capital. The offensive was largely ineffective but some of the raids caused significant casualties and damage, and some alarm amongst the population and the authorities. This is the first account of the Little Blitz to explore these bombings in detail and assess their impact on London. This book describes the raids, making use of some vivid personal accounts, to give a gripping picture of the effect that these little-known events had on a complacent city.

An analytical investigation into Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s decision-making process during every stage of World War II. When Winston Churchill accepted the position of Prime Minister in May 1940, he insisted in also becoming Minister of Defence. This, though, meant that he alone would be responsible for the success or failure of Britain’s war effort. It also meant that he would be faced with many monumental challenges and utterly crucial decisions upon which the fate of Britain and the free world rested. With the limited resources available to the UK, Churchill had to pinpoint where his country’s priorities lay. He had to respond to the collapse of France, decide if Britain should adopt a defensive or offensive strategy, choose if Egypt and the war in North Africa should take precedence over Singapore and the UK’s empire in the East, determine how much support to give the Soviet Union, and how much power to give the United States in controlling the direction of the war. In this insightful investigation into Churchill’s conduct during the Second World War, Allen Packwood, BA, MPhil (Cantab), FRHistS, the Director of the Churchill Archives Centre, enables the reader to share the agonies and uncertainties faced by Churchill at each crucial stage of the war. How Churchill responded to each challenge is analyzed in great detail and the conclusions Packwood draws are as uncompromising as those made by Britain’s wartime leader as he negotiated his country through its darkest days.

"Overy has written a masterpiece of analytical history, posing and answering one of the great questions of the century."—Sunday Times (London) Richard Overy's bold book begins by throwing out the stock answers to this great question: Germany doomed itself to defeat by fighting a two-front war; the Allies won by "sheer weight of material strength." In fact, by 1942 Germany controlled almost the entire resources of continental Europe and was poised to move into the Middle East. The Soviet Union had lost the heart of its industry, and the United States was not yet armed. The Allied victory in 1945 was not inevitable. Overy shows us exactly how the Allies regained military superiority and why they were able to do it. He recounts the decisive campaigns: the war at sea, the crucial battles on the eastern front, the air war, and the vast amphibious assault on Europe. He then explores the deeper factors affecting military success and failure: industrial strength, fighting ability, the quality of leadership, and the moral dimensions of the war.

War was coming. Everyone knew that confrontation with Nazi Germany was inevitable and that London was likely to be a prime target of Hitler’s bombers. So, in January 1939, Aylmer Firebrace, the Chief Officer of London Fire Brigade, was seconded to the Home Office to plan for the capital’s fire defence. Before joining the Fire Brigade, Aylmer Firebrace had been a Royal Navy officer who had fought in the Battle of Jutland during the First World War. It was following the Armistice that, in 1919, he became principal officer in the London Fire Brigade. He was promoted to deputy chief and finally chief officer in June 1938.. That war struck London soon enough, but it was on 7 September 1940, that Firebrace’s preparations were truly tested with the start of the Blitz. For the next fifty-seven days and nights London was subjected to the longest continuous bombing campaign in history. Then, as the Luftwaffe ranged wider and further across Britain’s towns and cities, Firebrace was tasked with toured the nation to see the effects of the bombing, at which point he saw the need for a national response. The result was the creation of the National Fire Service. Formed in August 1941, by the amalgamation of some 1,600 separate brigades, this remarkable organisation had, at its peak, a strength of 370,000 men and women. It was led for its entire existence by Aylmer Firebrace. As the war continued, Firebrace became Chief of the Fire Staff and Inspector-in-Chief of the Fires Services, being the first and, to date, only person to head all the fire-fighting services in Britain. This body had to deal with the expansion of the Blitz as well as the so-called ‘Baedeker’ raids, the ‘tip-and-run’ attacks, Baby Blitz and V1 and V2 offensives of the later years of the war. In his fascinating account, written immediately the war, Firebrace reflects on the functioning of the fire service at its most testing time. This book is an essential addition to the understanding of the Blitz and how London and the rest of the country survived its darkest hour.

This historical reassessment of the World War II British bombing campaign notes that though in 1940 Churchill declared that he was waging “a military and not a civilian war” to destroy “military objectives” and not “women and children,” within eighteen months both types of targets would be struck by Bomber Command. The author searches for the reasons in “three contiguous realms” of strategic influence: moral (and legal), political, and military. The study concludes that although for much of the war “area bombing” of cities was a “tragic necessity” meeting the ‘reasonable man’s’ standard of what was decently allowable given the blunt weapons the Allies had” and the evils they faced, nonetheless Allied leaders could have and should have abandoned indiscriminate bombing in the last phases of the conflict, when more precise means were at hand and “Nazi power had been overmatched.”