This guide has been prepared by the IUCN Environmental Law Programme and the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), in cooperation with the World Resources Institute (WRI). The main goal of the guide is to facilitate the understanding of the obligations of Parties to the Protocol, by providing an information base on the content and origin of the Protocol provisions, accessible to the non-specialist and useful for those who will be involved in the development and implementation of national safety frameworks.

With over 40 contributions from negotiators, stakeholders and analysts of the biosafety talks, this book provides a unique insight into the international process that led to the adoption of the Biosafety Protocol in January 2000. The contributors trace the evolution of major negotiating positions; examine key elements of the treaty; and highlight the Protocol's implications for trade, development and environmental policy and law.

This book, the first in a series that focuses on treaty implementation for sustainable development, examines key legal aspects of implementing the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) at national and international levels. The volume provides a serious contribution to the current legal and political academic debates on biosafety by discussing key issues under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety that affect the further design of national and international law on biosafety, and analyzing progress in the development of domestic regulatory regimes for biosafety. In the year of the fifth UN Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, at the signature of a new Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Protocol on Liability and Redress, this timely book examines developments in biosafety law and policy.

Biosafety in the Laboratory is a concise set of practical guidelines for handling and disposing of biohazardous material. The consensus of top experts in laboratory safety, this volume provides the information needed for immediate improvement of safety practices. It discusses high- and low-risk biological agents (including the highest-risk materials handled in labs today), presents the "seven basic rules of biosafety," addresses special issues such as the shipping of dangerous materials, covers waste disposal in detail, offers a checklist for administering laboratory safetyâ€"and more.

The effort to understand and combat infectious diseases has, during the centuries, produced many key advances in science and medicine-including the development of vaccines, drugs, and other treatments. A subset of this research is conducted with agents that, like anthrax, not only pose a severe threat to the health of humans, plants, and animals but can also be used for ill-intended purposes. Such agents have been listed by the government as biological select agents and toxins. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks prompted the creation of new regulations aimed at increasing security for research with dangerous pathogens. The outcome of the anthrax letter investigation has raised concern about whether these measures are adequate. Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins evaluates both the physical security of select agent laboratories and personnel reliability measures designed to ensure the trustworthiness of those with access to biological select agents and toxins. The book offers a set of guiding principles and recommended changes to minimize security risk and facilitate the productivity of research. The book recommends fostering a culture of trust and responsibility in the laboratory, engaging the community in oversight of the Select Agent Program, and enhancing the operation of the Select Agent Program.

During July 10-13, 2011, 68 participants from 32 countries gathered in Istanbul, Turkey for a workshop organized by the United States National Research Council on Anticipating Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-containment Biological Laboratories. The United States Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement Program sponsored the workshop, which was held in partnership with the Turkish Academy of Sciences. The international workshop examined biosafety and biosecurity issues related to the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of high-containment biological laboratories- equivalent to United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention biological safety level 3 or 4 labs. Although these laboratories are needed to characterize highly dangerous human and animal pathogens, assist in disease surveillance, and produce vaccines, they are complex systems with inherent risks. Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories summarizes the workshop discussion, which included the following topics: Technological options to meet diagnostic, research, and other goals; Laboratory construction and commissioning; Operational maintenance to provide sustainable capabilities, safety, and security; and Measures for encouraging a culture of responsible conduct. Workshop attendees described the history and current challenges they face in their individual laboratories. Speakers recounted steps they were taking to improve safety and security, from running training programs to implementing a variety of personnel reliability measures. Many also spoke about physical security, access controls, and monitoring pathogen inventories. Workshop participants also identified tensions in the field and suggested possible areas for action.